State v. Weaver, 74233
| Decision Date | 19 April 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 74233,74233 |
| Citation | 915 P.2d 746,259 Kan. 844 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Raymond L. WEAVER, Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Upon the hearing of a motion to suppress evidence, the State bears the burden of proving to the trial court the lawfulness of the search and seizure.
2. When reviewing a trial court's decision as to the suppression of evidence, an appellate court normally gives great deference to the factual findings of the trial court. The ultimate determination of the suppression of evidence is a legal question requiring independent appellate determination.
3. A "stop" does not occur until physical force is applied to the accused or the accused submits to the officer's show of authority.
4. The critical time that a law enforcement officer must have knowledge of facts giving rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion thata person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime is at the time of the actual stop, not when the officer makes a determination to stop a person.
Appeal from Reno District Court; Steven R. Becker, Judge. Opinion filed April 19, 1996.
Alan D. Hughes, Assistant County Attorney, and Carla J. Stovall, Attorney General, were on the brief, for appellant.
Reindert J. Kleinherenbrink, Hutchinson, was on the brief, for appellee.
This is an appeal by the State, pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3602(b)(1), from the trial court's order suppressing the evidence and dismissing the State's case without prejudice. The defendant was charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer, and consumption of an alcoholic beverage by a minor. The issue is whether a stop occurred when the law enforcement officer activated his flashing lights or when the defendant actually stopped his vehicle and submitted to the officer's authority.
On April 16, 1995, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Deputy Randy Headings of the Reno County Sheriff's Office was standing outside his patrol car in rural Reno County, talking to a resident and observing traffic near the intersection of Longview and Mayfield roads. He had been dispatched to this location due to two complaints about reckless driving in the area. One complainant described the recklessly driven vehicle as a light-colored Bronco or Blazer.
While talking to the resident, the officer observed a northbound vehicle approximately one-half mile south heading towards him. The vehicle's headlights suddenly went out, and the officer heard several individuals whooping and hollering in fun from the vicinity of the vehicle. The vehicle's headlights came back on and it proceeded a few feet, then the headlights went off again. This pattern of the flashing headlights occurred several times. When the headlights were on, the vehicle appeared to be moving toward the officer. However, the officer did not know and could not tell if the vehicle was moving during the time that the headlights were turned off. The officer testified he thought the vehicle was stopped when the headlights were turned off, but that it could have been moving very slowly. The officer also stated that, from what he could tell, the vehicle was on the roadway when the headlights were turned off.
Finally, the vehicle passed Deputy Headings with its headlights on. At this time, Headings observed that the vehicle was a brown-colored pickup with several people in the back and cab of the truck. Headings could not tell how many people were in the truck, their ages, their sex, or what they were doing. The officer followed the truck. The pickup was traveling close to the speed limit (55 m.p.h.). The officer testified that the pickup did not weave, nor did he see anything thrown out of the truck at this time. While following the truck, the officer did not observe any other oncoming vehicles or vehicles parked in the roadway. The officer stated that he "wanted to stop the vehicle to see why it had stopped" and to see what it was doing with its headlights. Further, the officer stated that he was suspicious because of the earlier reports of reckless driving and prior mailbox damage near where the vehicle had stopped. After briefly following the truck, the officer activated his red and blue emergency lights in order to pull the car over.
When the officer activated his emergency lights, the pickup sped up and a chase ensued. The pickup turned into a private drive, drove through the yard, went through the garden, and drove into a wheat field where it finally stopped. The officer followed the truck into the field. Once the truck stopped, everyone in the truck got out of the vehicle and started running away, including the driver. The officer drew his handgun and ordered the driver to stop. The driver immediately stopped and was arrested. He was then identified as the defendant.
The defendant was charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, and consumption of alcoholic beverages by a minor. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, alleging that the officer was without sufficient probable cause to stop the defendant's vehicle. The defendant asked the trial court to suppress all the evidence seized as a result of unconstitutional stop, including the defendant's identity and the alcohol test results.
The trial court ruled that the officer must have had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity at the point in time when the officer decided to stop the vehicle by activating his emergency lights. Thus, in determining whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to make a stop, the trial court did not consider any of the events which occurred after the officer activated his emergency lights. The trial court found that the pickup was parked on the road and its lights were turned off, then the lights were turned back on, and the truck proceeded. The court found that this observation did not create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Thus, the court found that at the time the officer activated his emergency lights and decided to stop the vehicle, the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Relying on State v. McKeown, 249 Kan. 506, 819 P.2d 644 (1991), the court granted the defendant's motion to suppress all the evidence discovered after the officer activated his emergency lights, and the court dismissed the charges against the defendant.
Both parties agree that the stop of a moving vehicle always constitutes a seizure; thus, to make such a stop, an officer must have articulable facts sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion under K.S.A. 22-2402. State v. Field, 252 Kan. 657, 659, 847 P.2d 1280 (1993). K.S.A. 22-2402(1) states:
"(1) Without making an arrest, a law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place whom such officer reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime and may demand ... the name [and] address of such suspect and an explanation of such suspect's actions."
The question of whether reasonable suspicion existed under K.S.A. 22-2402 is a question of law, or in some cases a mixed question of law and fact for this court to determine under the totality of the facts and circumstances. State v. Field, 252 Kan. at 664-65, 847 P.2d 1280. This court recently clarified the standard it should use when reviewing a trial court's suppression of evidence in State v. Vandiver, 257 Kan. 53, 891 P.2d 350 (1995). The court stated:
257 Kan. at 57-58, 891 P.2d 350.
First, this court must determine when the "stop" occurred and at what point in the process of the stop was the officer required to have reasonable suspicion. The State contends that the stop did not occur when the officer activated his emergency lights. Rather, the lights simply indicated that the officer intended to stop the vehicle, and the lights were used to effectuate the stop. As the State points out, the vehicle did not come to a stop when the officer turned on his lights. Instead, the vehicle sped away, leading the officer on a chase through a yard, a garden, and into a wheat field. Even when the vehicle quit moving, the State contends that a stop did not occur because the defendant and the other passengers jumped out of the truck and starting running. According to the State, a stop did not occur until the officer pulled his gun and ordered the defendant to stop, which caused the defendant to actually stop running. The State argues that the activation of an officer's emergency lights should be viewed only as an order to stop and not as an actual stop in and of itself.
The State cites to State v. Hodges, 252 Kan. 989, 991, 851 P.2d 352 (1993), as authority for its position that a stop did not occur until the defendant stopped running in the wheat field. In Hodges, a Riley County police officer had been assigned to the surveillance of a Manhattan business district which had been burglarized. The officer observed a vehicle make several suspicious maneuvers in the surveillance area. The vehicle eventually left the surveillance area and drove to a restaurant....
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