State v. Webb, 93-441
| Decision Date | 25 May 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-441,93-441 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Yohan WEBB, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Roxy M. Schumann, Davenport, for appellant.
Bonnie J. Campbell, Atty. Gen., Chris Odell, Asst. Atty. Gen., William E. Davis, County Atty., and Gerda C. Lane, Asst. County Atty., for appellee.
Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and LAVORATO, NEUMAN, ANDREASEN, and TERNUS, JJ.
This appeal arises from a judgment and sentence entered upon defendant's conviction of delivery of a controlled substance following a jury trial. Defendant raises several issues relating to the execution of the arrest warrant, effective assistance of counsel, and the jury instructions. For reasons that follow, we affirm.
On May 14, 1992, several undercover police officers working with the Quad City Metropolitan Enforcement Group set up surveillance in a well-known high narcotics trafficking area in Davenport, Iowa, while other officers were poised to purchase illegal drugs from street dealers. That afternoon officers Dan Roach and Gregory Trudell provided surveillance of the area from their vehicle. Before officers Jeffrey Patterson and Fred Jones entered the area on foot, Roach contacted them by radio and told them to target a certain black male with braided hair who was wearing a dark coat with a red stripe. Within a short period both Patterson and Jones had purchased crack cocaine from two individuals on the street. Upon returning to their vehicle Patterson radioed Roach to confirm the deals and to give descriptions of the individuals.
Approximately twenty minutes later Roach and Trudell stopped the man they had targeted a few blocks away. They told him they were investigating a robbery and asked him for identification. The suspect complied and was identified as Yohan Webb, the defendant in this case. Webb told the officers that he was from Chicago and was visiting a girlfriend in the area. Roach then told Webb he did not match the description after all and he was free to go.
Following the filing of a criminal complaint on June 26, a warrant was issued for Webb's arrest. On July 3, Roach saw Webb riding a bicycle in a Davenport park and alerted the police. Webb was arrested and later charged by trial information with delivery of a controlled substance, crack cocaine, in violation of Iowa Code section 204.401(1)(c) (1991) ().
Webb entered a plea of not guilty and waived his right to speedy trial. Iowa R.Crim.P. 27(2)(b). His first appointed attorney withdrew in mid-July. The court then appointed attorney Robert Phelps to represent Webb. In September Webb filed a motion to quash the arrest based on noncompliance with statutory arrest procedures. See Iowa Code §§ 804.14, 804.21. After a hearing on the matter, the district court denied Webb's motion. Webb also filed a notice of the defense of alibi.
Trial commenced on October 26. Following an afternoon recess, Webb stood up and began to make a statement to the jury about certain things he felt his attorney had omitted. When Judge James Kelley entered the courtroom he immediately sent the jury from the room. Webb refused to sit down, spit on Phelps, told the court he would have to be found in contempt, and began striking Phelps. At this time Phelps requested a mistrial. The court directed the deputy to mace Webb and he was then removed from the courtroom. When the jury returned the court declared a mistrial based on the defendant's conduct and ordered a hearing the next morning on the issue of contempt.
At the contempt hearing Webb became verbally abusive and vulgar. He was found in contempt of court and sentenced to six months in the county jail. Phelps was allowed to withdraw and the court appointed attorney Kent Simmons to represent Webb. The court set trial for January 25, 1993.
Webb wrote a letter to the court on January 14 which expressed his dissatisfaction with Simmons and requested a hearing on the matter. Simmons filed a motion to withdraw the same day. In a memorandum supporting his motion Simmons urged that Webb be granted the right to represent himself at trial provided he fully understood the procedures and rules involved.
On January 21 the court held a hearing on the motion to withdraw. Webb explained that he was dissatisfied with Simmons because Simmons had written just one letter to him and had visited him only once. Webb also wanted to file an interlocutory appeal, to depose a State witness regarding lab test results, and to receive a copy of a deposition of a special agent. Webb believed his counsel "was prejudiced in stereotype ideas of [him]." Webb clearly stated that he did not wish to represent himself because he had insufficient knowledge and training. He asked the court to appoint attorney Roxy Schumann.
After listening to the statements made by Simmons and Webb, the court began to question Webb about his attempt to speak to the jury during the October trial. In response to the court's inquiry as to whether he would make that speech again if he didn't agree with his attorney, Webb stated that he could not predict the future. The court then denied Simmons' motion to withdraw and ordered trial to begin as scheduled, that "the Defendant shall not be present at this trial, but shall be held in the holding cell next to the courtroom ...," and that Simmons would confer with Webb at regular intervals.
Webb's second trial began on January 25. Webb refused to see Simmons the first morning. Webb was taken to the holding room in the courthouse but was soon returned to the jail because he became very disruptive and noisy. Prior to voir dire the court proposed a jury instruction to explain defendant's absence from the courtroom. The court overruled Simmons' objection to the wording of the instruction. The court read the instruction to prospective jurors and repeated it after the jury was sworn in and again at the end of the trial.
The critical issue at trial was whether the officers had correctly identified Webb as the person who sold crack cocaine to Patterson. Webb relied on two alibi witnesses. The attorneys agreed that Webb would not be present in the courtroom for witness identification. The witnesses were permitted to identify Webb based on prior court proceedings.
Simmons met with Webb before trial the next morning and updated him on the proceedings. After the State completed its case the defense unsuccessfully moved for a directed judgment of acquittal. During the noon recess Simmons met with Webb again. He later stated on the record that Webb had decided not to testify but had requested a jury instruction explaining his right to not testify. This request was granted.
At the afternoon hearing on jury instructions Simmons again objected to the instruction on the defendant's absence and he also proposed modifications on two of the court's instructions. The court overruled his objections to the instructions and denied a renewed motion for a directed verdict. The jury began deliberations that afternoon and found Webb guilty as charged.
Subsequently, Webb filed a motion for arrest of judgment and a new trial. The court denied the motion at a sentencing hearing on February 11. At this hearing Webb told the court that he felt his constitutional rights had been violated because he was denied the attorney of his choice, mistreated by the court, and excluded from his trial. Simmons was permitted to withdraw from Webb's case. The court proceeded with sentencing and appointed Roxy Schumann to represent Webb on appeal.
On appeal Webb claims that (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to quash his illegal arrest; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to unduly suggestive identification procedures and in failing to protect his right to be present at trial; and (3) the jury instructions denied him a fair trial. We will provide further details regarding the facts and proceedings in the course of our analysis of the legal issues presented.
Webb first challenges the legality of his arrest on statutory and constitutional grounds. His motion to quash arrest claimed that the police failed to comply with the statutory procedures relating to the manner of making an arrest. See Iowa Code §§ 804.14, 804.21(1). Our review of the statutory challenge is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 4.
Webb contends that the officers making the arrest did not show him an arrest warrant and that he was not read the warrant in violation of Iowa Code section 804.14. At the hearing on pending motions it was stipulated that officers Wehrheim and Kindred arrested Webb on the street, took him to the station where officer Bauer read the warrant, and that someone else processed and delivered him to the jail. Webb denied the warrant was read to him.
Iowa Code section 804.14 provides in part that
[t]he person making the arrest must inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest the person, the reason for arrest, and that the person making the arrest is a peace officer ...; if acting under the authority of a warrant, the law enforcement officer need not have the warrant in the officer's possession at the time of arrest, but upon request the officer shall show the warrant to the person being arrested as soon as possible. If the officer does not have the warrant in the officer's possession at the time of the arrest, the officer shall inform the person being arrested of the fact that a warrant has been issued.
Under the statute it is clearly permissible to show the warrant to the person being arrested at a later time. There is no evidence in the record that Webb asked to see the warrant at the time he was taken into custody. We find there was substantial compliance with the statutory requirements. See State v. Yates, 243 N.W.2d 645, 648-49 (Iowa 1976).
Webb also contends that under the statute the same...
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