State v. Webb

• Decision Date: 25 January 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03-561.,03-561.
• Citation: 325 Mont. 317,106 P.3d 521,2005 MT 5
• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Petitioner and Respondent, v. Charles WEBB, Defendant and Appellant.

106 P.3d 521

2005 MT 5

325 Mont. 317

STATE of Montana, Petitioner and Respondent, v. Charles WEBB, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 03-561.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs January 6, 2004.

Decided January 25, 2005.

For Appellant: Vincent van der Hagen, Cascade County Public Defender Office, Great Falls, Montana.

For Respondent: Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General, Robert Stutz, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana; Brant S. Light, Cascade County Attorney, Joel Thompson, Deputy County Attorney.

Justice PATRICIA O. COTTER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Charles Webb (Webb) was convicted in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, of Sexual Intercourse Without Consent, Second Offense, in violation of § 45-5-503, MCA, a felony. Webb was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole pursuant to § 46-18-219, MCA. He appeals his sentence. We affirm the District Court.

¶ 2 There are four issues raised in this appeal:

¶ 3 1. Whether the exception to the mandatory minimum sentence provided in § 46-18-222(3), MCA, was applicable to Webb's case.

¶ 4 2. Whether the mandatory minimum sentence set forth in § 46-18-219, MCA, violates Webb's procedural and substantive due process rights under the United States and Montana Constitutions.

¶ 5 3. Whether the mandatory minimum sentence set forth in § 46-18-219, MCA, violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under Article II, Section 22, of the Montana Constitution both on its face and as applied.

¶ 6 4. Whether the mandatory minimum sentence set forth in § 46-18-219, MCA, violates Article II, Section 28(1), of the Montana Constitution.

BACKGROUND

¶ 7 On September 12, 2002, the State filed an Information charging Webb with Sexual Intercourse Without Consent pursuant to § 45-5-503, MCA, a felony, for raping a handicapped neighbor in Great Falls after attempting to kill her by breaking her neck. Webb later turned himself over to police custody, admitted to the crime, entered into a plea agreement and subsequently pled guilty. Webb had a prior conviction of sexual intercourse without consent, so his sentence was given pursuant to § 46-18-219, MCA, which provides that a person convicted of a second violation of § 45-5-503, MCA, must be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Webb appeals from this sentence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8 Trial judges are granted broad discretion to determine the appropriate punishment for offenses. State v. Hembd (1992), 254 Mont. 407, 411, 838 P.2d 412, 415. On appeal we will not review a sentence for mere inequity or disparity. Hembd, 254 Mont. at 411,838 P.2d at 415. Rather, this Court will only review a criminal sentence for its legality; that is, whether the sentence is within statutory parameters. State v. Heath, 2004 MT 58, ¶ 8, 320 Mont. 211, ¶ 8, 89 P.3d 947, ¶ 8. A trial court's statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review to determine whether it is correct. Heath, ¶ 8.

¶ 9 Questions of constitutional law are subject to plenary review by this Court and the district court's interpretation of the law is reviewed for correctness. State v. Bedwell, 1999 MT 206, ¶ 4, 295 Mont. 476, ¶ 4, 985 P.2d 150, ¶ 4.

DISCUSSION

ISSUE ONE

¶ 10 Whether the exception to the mandatory minimum sentence provided in § 46-18-222(3), MCA, was applicable to Webb's case.

¶ 11 Webb argues the District Court erred when it failed to adequately consider the exception found at § 46-18-222(3), MCA, to the mandatory minimum sentence of § 46-18-219, MCA. The State argues the District Court properly considered the exception and found it did not apply because Webb did not commit the crime under unusual or substantial duress. We agree with the State.

¶ 12 Criminal sentencing alternatives are strictly matters of statute in Montana. State v. Stevens (1993), 259 Mont. 114, 115, 854 P.2d 336, 337. In 1995, the Montana Legislature amended § 46-18-219, MCA, to set a minimum sentence of life in prison without parole for a second conviction of any one of five enumerated offenses, including sexual intercourse without consent. The pertinent part of the statute provides:

Life sentence without possibility of release. (1)(a) . . . [I]f an offender convicted of one of the following offenses was previously convicted of one of the following offenses. . . the offender must be sentenced to life in prison, unless the death penalty is applicable and imposed:

. . . .

(iii) 45-5-503, sexual intercourse without consent[.]

¶ 13 The Legislature further provided that the mandatory minimum sentence required under § 46-18-219, MCA, does not apply if the sentencing court concludes an exception, pursuant to § 46-18-222, MCA, is warranted. Subsection (3) of that statute allows for relief from the mandatory life sentence if the defendant was "acting under unusual and substantial duress," at the time he committed the offense. The pertinent part of the statute states:

Exceptions to mandatory minimum sentences and restrictions on deferred imposition and suspended execution of sentence. Mandatory minimum sentences prescribed by the laws of this state, mandatory life sentences prescribed by 46-18-219 . . . do not apply if:

. . .

(3) the offender, at the time of the commission of the offense for which the offender is to be sentenced, was acting under unusual and substantial duress, although not such duress as would constitute a defense to the prosecution[.]

¶ 14 Webb contends his long history of psycho-sexual problems, his sexual fantasies, his other life struggles of losing two jobs and being evicted from his residence when the local newspaper published his status as a sex offender, his concern and anxiety about re-offending and the negligent supervision by his probation officers combined to provide sufficient duress that the District Court should have granted him an exception pursuant to § 46-18-222(3), MCA. Webb asserts the District Court simply ignored this trauma when it found he was not suffering from any psychological disorder. He argues that because the statute clearly requires "significant distress" and not a "psychological disorder," the District Court committed error by failing to consider § 46-18-222(3), MCA, in the context of his circumstances at the time he committed the crime.

¶ 15 Webb's argument hinges on whether the District Court failed to consider the statutory exception and whether the court erred in finding no "unusual and substantial duress." The transcript shows Webb's counsel asked the court for a finding on the applicability of the exception, the District Court specifically considered the exception, applied it to the facts and found the exception did not apply.

COURT: So you want a finding on this issue, then, based on the record?

MR. VAN DER HAGEN: That's correct, Your Honor.

COURT: So far that we have this hearing. Alright. Regarding the applicability of section 346-18-222(3)[sic], which is the section you're relying on; is that correct?

MR. VAN DER HAGEN: That's correct, Your Honor.

COURT: Which provides for an exception to the mandatory minimum if the offender at the time of the commission of the offense for which the offender is to be sentenced was acting under unusual and substantial duress, although not such duress as would constitute a defense to the prosecution, the court finds that anything might be called duress in the defendant's life as he's testified to was his own urge to commit crimes of this sort.

The defendant, according to the reports, the presentence report and records that we have at this point, was under no psychological disorder that would cause him to have been acting under unusual or substantial duress at the time of the commission of the offense.

Issues related to his supervision and counseling are not established by the record presented here, and I doubt could be considered evidence in any event of acting under unusual or substantial duress at the time of committing the offense.

Nor does the Court find any other factors which would satisfy the requirements of that statute. And accordingly, the Court finds that the exceptions of XX-XX-XXX do not apply.

The record here does not support Webb's contention that the District Court failed to consider the exception. The court's task under § 46-18-222(3), MCA, was to specifically consider and analyze whether the exception was applicable. It did so and found that the exception was not applicable to this case. Webb demonstrates no error in the District Court's determination that the sentencing exception was inapplicable. We conclude the sentence imposed by the District Court fits within the statutory parameters of § 46-18-219, MCA, and the District Court correctly analyzed whether the exception found at § 46-18-222(3), MCA, applied in this matter.

ISSUE TWO

¶ 16 Whether the mandatory minimum sentence set forth in § 46-18-219, MCA, violates Webb's procedural and substantive due process rights under the United States and Montana Constitutions.

¶ 17 Webb argues that § 46-18-219, MCA, which requires a court to sentence an offender twice convicted of sexual intercourse without consent to a minimum mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole, is unconstitutional because it is arbitrary on several fronts, and as such, violates the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 17, of the Montana Constitution.

¶ 18 A person who has been convicted of an offense is eligible for, and the court may impose, whatever punishment is authorized by statute for his offense, so long as the penalty is not cruel and unusual and so long as the penalty is not based on an arbitrary distinction that would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Chapman v. United States (1991), 500 U.S. 453, 465, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 1927, 114 L.Ed.2d 524, 538 superceded by statute on other grounds 21...