State v. Webb
| Decision Date | 13 November 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 61893,61893 |
| Citation | 364 So.2d 984 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Randall WEBB. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Alton T. Moran, Director, Allen J. Bergeron, Jr., Michael W. McKay, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara B. Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie B. Brown, Dist. Atty., Anthony J. Marabella, Jr., Marilyn C. Castle, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
A December 1976 indictment of the East Baton Rouge Parish Grand Jury charged that Randall Webb committed attempted aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, and armed robbery. Webb was tried before a jury and found guilty on all three counts. His motion for a new trial was heard, and granted on the aggravated kidnapping charge. New trials were denied in the armed robbery and aggravated rape convictions. On each of these last two convictions Webb was sentenced to be confined in the custody of the Director of the Department of Corrections for a period of fifty years, the sentences to run concurrently. This appeal is from the denial of a new trial on the attempted aggravated rape and armed robbery convictions.
According to the State's witnesses, on February 2, 1976, Webb went to the house of the victim and demanded money. When she denied that she had money, he forced her at knife point to go with him to a bank to cash a check. On the way to the bank, defendant drove the victim to a wooded area and told her that he was a member of a motorcycle gang whose members were at her house waiting for her children. He threatened also that if she did not have sexual relations with him he would return to her house where all members of the gang would assault her.
After he forced her to disrobe and have sexual relations they drove to a grocery store where defendant took $2.00 from the victim to purchase gasoline. He compelled her to go with him to a bank where he forced her to cash a check for $250, then took the money and released her.
Assignment 1: Two prospective women jurors, Ragan and Weidner, were being questioned concerning their attitude toward an attempted aggravated rape prosecution and the effect of such an offense upon their judgment. In answer to a leading question that it was the rape charge that "bothered" them, both replied in the affirmative. Because of other answers, a challenge for cause was allowed as to Ragan. Weidner also conceded the "possibility" that she would be more willing to believe the woman than the man in a rape situation. When Weidner was asked if there was any problem with her being able to strictly apply the presumption of innocence, she replied that she had three daughters, and the problem would be on her mind. In summary, however, she stated that she thought that she could honestly weigh the facts from the testimony.
In ruling on the defense motion to challenge Weidner for cause, the trial judge answered the defense argument that Weidner was disqualified because of her feminist leanings, her daughters and her statement that there was a "possibility" that she would favor the victim. As to the latter challenge, the judge said,
Insofar as pertinent here, the grounds upon which a juror may be challenged for cause are:
La.Code Crim.Pro. art. 797(2).
As in many other facets of a criminal trial, judging the sincerity, fairness and credibility of jurors on voir dire is a matter which lies heavily upon the shoulders of the trial judge. His evaluation of the attributes required to qualify a prospective juror is entitled to great weight. Accordingly, his exercise of the wide discretion that determination requires will not be set aside unless it is arbitrary and unreasonable. Furthermore, rehabilitation of Weidner by the trial judge effectively removed the charge of bias. State v. Demouchet, 353 So.2d 1025 (La.1977); State v. George, 346 So.2d 694 (La.1977); State v. Passman, 345 So.2d 874 (La.1977); State v. Jones, 315 So.2d 650 (La.1975).
This assignment is without merit.
Assignment 3: The defendant urges on appeal that the trial judge committed error when he denied a defense motion for access to a taped interview with the alleged victim.
Sergeant Smith of the East Baton Rouge Sheriff's Department testified that he participated in the investigation leading to the arrest of Webb. He recounted the steps in the investigation and arrest ending with an interrogation of Webb in the parish courthouse. At this point in Smith's testimony defense counsel stated, while the jury was retired, that he had learned that certain objects recovered during the investigation were obtained on the basis of information furnished by the victim in a taped interview. That being the case, defense counsel asserted that he had a right to listen to the taped recording prior to examining the victim. The State's attorney answered that the victim had taken the stand previously and defense counsel was given full opportunity to cross-examine her at that time; for this and other reasons the defense was not entitled to this information.
In denying the defense the right to listen to the taped recording of the interview with the victim, the trial judge ascertained that no Brady motion had been filed on behalf of defendant. He declared further that he was aware of no rule of law which would permit a defendant to compel production of the statement of a witness obtained in an investigation, unless it could be alleged that the testimony of the witness was inconsistent with the pretrial statement. When the ruling had been made defense counsel acquiesced, saying, "We can proceed, Your Honor, I'll get it out of him another way."
There was, therefore, no objection to the ruling and the matter cannot be considered on appeal. La.Code Crim.Pro. art. 841.
Assignments 4 and 5: Defendant was arrested and booked at the courthouse in Baton Rouge. The arrest followed an interview with Webb's wife in nearby Ascension Parish. Webb's wife was being detained by the authorities in Ascension Parish while Webb was being interrogated by the Baton Rouge authorities. As a result of his interrogation, Webb gave a confession which was tape recorded.
As the contention on appeal is understood, Webb's sole claim of involuntariness of the confession is that he requested permission to speak to his wife on the telephone prior to giving the statement to the Baton Rouge authorities. Permission was not granted, however, until he had given the statement, at which time he was allowed to telephone his wife. In effect, the contention is that the confession was induced by promises of the interrogating officers to release Webb's wife if he would confess.
The record does not support the defendant's contention. Officers present at the time testified that no promises or threats were made to the defendant before his statement was recorded; nor did any of the interrogating officers promise that Webb's wife would be released from detention if he gave a statement.
From Webb's testimony it can be concluded that he believed that she had been arrested because she had helped him to elude capture. His concern was that she would be charged as an accessory to his crimes, and would be retained in custody until he gave a statement. These inferences he drew from the situation surrounding him, conceding that no one responsible for his arrest or incarceration told him that these were the facts, or that they made promises or threats.
In his ruling the trial judge was of the opinion that Webb's inferences were drawn from facts within his knowledge that his wife had helped him to elude capture not from representations, inducements or promises by the authorities who arrested or interrogated him. Accordingly the trial judge held that the confession was admissible.
Admissibility of a confession is in the first instance a question for the trial judge. His conclusions on the credibility and weight of testimony relating to the voluntariness of a confession will not be overturned on appeal...
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