State v. Weddle

• Decision Date: 28 January 2020
• Docket Number: Docket: Kno-18-138
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Randall J. WEDDLE
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

224 A.3d 1035

STATE of Maine

v.Randall J. WEDDLE

Docket: Kno-18-138

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: February 7, 2019

Reargued: June 26, 2019

Decided: January 28, 2020

Jeremy Pratt, Esq. (orally), and Ellen Simmons, Esq., Camden, for appellant Randall J. Weddle

Jonathan Liberman, District Attorney, and Jeffrey E. Baroody, Dep. Dist. Atty. (orally), Prosecutorial District VI, Rockland, for appellee State of Maine

Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Jeffrey E. Baroody, Asst. Atty. Gen. (transfer during pendency of appeal), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

Lawrence C. Winger, Esq., Portland, for amicus curiae Lawrence C. Winger

Emma E. Bond, Esq., and Zachary L. Heiden, Esq., American Civil Liberties Union of Maine Foundation, Portland, for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Maine Foundation

Jamesa J. Drake, Esq., Drake Law, LLC, Auburn, for amicus curiae Maine Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, and CLIFFORD, JJ.

Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, and CLIFFORD, JJ.

Concurrence: CLIFFORD and ALEXANDER, JJ.

JABAR, J.

[¶1] Randall J. Weddle appeals from a judgment of conviction entered by the trial court (Knox County, Stokes, J. ) as a result of a jury verdict finding him guilty of two counts of manslaughter (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A) (2018), two counts of causing a death while operating under the influence (Class B), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(D)(1-A) (2018), and other related charges.¹ Weddle contends that the court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the results of a warrantless blood draw taken at the scene of a fatal motor vehicle accident.²

[¶2] Specifically, Weddle argues that 29-A M.R.S. § 2522(2) (2018), which directs law enforcement officers to test the blood of all drivers involved in a fatal, or likely fatal, motor vehicle accident is unconstitutional on its face because it purports to authorize unreasonable searches and seizures in the absence of probable cause, which is inherently unreasonable and therefore in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Although we now agree that section 2522(2) violates the Fourth Amendment and is unconstitutional on its face, we affirm the trial court's denial of Weddle's motion to suppress because we conclude, in the unique circumstances presented by this case, that the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule applies to the otherwise unconstitutional search. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

[¶3] The following facts were found by the suppression court and are supported by competent evidence in the record. See State v. Turner , 2017 ME 185, ¶ 2, 169 A.3d 931. On March 18, 2016, law enforcement officers, firefighters, and medical rescue personnel responded to a major motor vehicle accident on Route 17 in Washington, Maine. When they arrived, first responders were faced with an accident scene that involved five vehicles, one of which was engulfed in flames. There were "numerous occupants [of those vehicles] potentially in need of medical care," and two drivers who appeared to be dead. A large tractor trailer was upside down in a ditch alongside Route 17, with its load of lumber strewn across the road and into the ditch. The operator of the tractor trailer, Weddle, was "pinned inside the cab and needed to be extricated."

[¶4] In addition to the accident and its aftermath, the first responders were also faced with the closure of Route 17—the major road between Augusta and Rockland—which "required the management and redirection of a significant flow of traffic travelling east and west at rush hour." In short, the accident scene was "chaotic, confusing, intense and large."

[¶5] A sergeant with the Knox County Sheriff's Department, believing that Weddle may have been responsible for the accident, "decided that it was necessary to preserve any evidence by taking a blood sample from [Weddle]." Prior to the blood draw, the officer did not have information that caused him to believe that there was probable cause to believe that Weddle had been under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the accident. Instead, the officer relied solely upon his knowledge and understanding of Maine's mandatory blood draw statute. See 29-A M.R.S. § 2522(2). A second officer of the Knox County Sheriff's Department also testified that he did not believe that he had probable cause to believe that Weddle was operating while impaired.

[¶6] It took approximately an hour to extricate Weddle from his overturned truck. Once extricated, Weddle was immediately placed on a backboard for transport to a hospital via helicopter. While medical personnel were preparing Weddle for transport, the Knox County officer directed an EMT to take a sample of Weddle's blood. At no time before the sample was taken did the officer request a warrant, attempt to gather information regarding Weddle's state of sobriety, or attempt to obtain Weddle's consent.

[¶7] Several hours later, while Weddle was being treated at the hospital, he consented to law enforcement officers obtaining a second sample of blood from some that had been drawn by hospital personnel. The results of the hospital sample showed a blood-alcohol content of .07 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood. Several days after the accident, during a vehicle autopsy on Weddle's truck, law enforcement officers discovered a three-quarters-full bottle of Crown Royal whiskey and a shot glass in the cab of the truck.

B. Procedure

[¶8] In April 2016, Weddle was charged by complaint with two counts of manslaughter and two counts of causing a death while operating under the influence, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Weddle was subsequently charged by indictment with two counts of manslaughter (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A), two counts of causing a death while operating under the influence (Class B), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(D)(1-A), one count of causing injury while operating under the influence (Class C), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(D)(1) (2018), one count of aggravated driving to endanger (Class C), 29-A M.R.S. § 2413(1-A) (2018), one count of driving to endanger (Class E), 29-A M.R.S. § 2413(1) (2018), and eight counts of violations of commercial motor carrier operator rules (Class E), 29-A M.R.S. § 558-A(1)(A) (2018): operating with impaired ability or alertness, operating with a detectable presence of alcohol, possession or use of alcohol while on duty, and five counts of making a false report in connection with a duty status.

[¶9] Weddle pleaded not guilty and moved to suppress the results of the blood draw taken at the accident scene.³ The trial court denied the motion. A five-day jury trial was held in January 2018, following which the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Weddle to thirty years' incarceration, with all but twenty-five years suspended, and four years' probation after release, and imposed a fine. Weddle timely appealed. See 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2018) ; M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Title 29-A M.R.S. § 2522

[¶10] On appeal, Weddle's main argument is that 29-A M.R.S. § 2522 is unconstitutional and that the motion court erred by denying his motion to suppress the results of the warrantless blood draw taken in accordance with that statute.

[¶11] Section 2522(1) requires every driver involved in a fatal, or likely fatal, motor vehicle accident to "submit" to testing that will allow the State to determine if there was alcohol or drugs in his or her system at the time of the accident:

1. Mandatory submission to test. If there is probable cause to believe that death has occurred or will occur as a result of an accident, an operator of a motor vehicle involved in the motor vehicle accident shall submit to a chemical test, as defined in section 2401, subsection 3, to determine an alcohol level or the presence of a drug or drug metabolite in the same manner as for OUI.

Although a "chemical test" is defined as "a test or tests used to determine alcohol level or the presence of a drug or drug metabolite by analysis of blood, breath, or urine," 29-A M.R.S. § 2401(3) (2018), section 2522(2) explicitly directs that law enforcement officers "shall cause a blood test to be administered":

2. Administration of test. The investigating law enforcement officer shall cause a blood test to be administered to the operator of the motor vehicle as soon as practicable following the accident and may also cause a breath test or another chemical test to be administered if the officer determines appropriate. The operator shall submit to and complete all tests administered ....

Finally, the statute provides that the result of a test taken pursuant to section 2522(1) —blood, breath, or urine—may be admissible in a subsequent prosecution:

3. Admissibility of test results. The result of a test is admissible at trial if the court, after reviewing all the evidence, whether gathered prior to, during or after the test, is satisfied that probable cause exists, independent of the test result, to believe that the operator was under the influence of intoxicants at the time of the accident.

29-A M.R.S. § 2522(3) (2018).

[¶12] We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo as a matter of law. See State v. Nisbet , 2018 ME 113, ¶ 16, 191 A.3d 359. To establish that the statute is unconstitutional on its face, it is Weddle's burden to show that there are "no circumstances in which it would be valid." Conlogue v. Conlogue , 2006 ME 12, ¶ 5, 890 A.2d 691 ; see Bouchard v. Dep't of Pub. Safety , 2015 ME 50, ¶ 8, 115 A.3d 92. It is a "heavy burden ... since all acts of the Legislature are presumed constitutional." Bouchard , 2015 ME 50, ¶ 8, 115 A.3d 92 (quotation marks omitted).

[¶13] If probable cause were present here before the blood draw, in what were clearly exigent circumstances, or if the special needs doctrine...