State v. Weems

• Decision Date: 20 November 2012
• Docket Number: No. 20,Sept. Term, 2012.,20
• Citation: 429 Md. 329,55 A.3d 921
• Parties: STATE of Maryland v. Latresha L. WEEMS.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

429 Md. 329

55 A.3d 921

STATE of Maryland

v.Latresha L. WEEMS.

No. 20, Sept. Term, 2012.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 20, 2012.

Robert Taylor, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for petitioner.

Brian L. Zavin, Asst. Public Defender (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, BARBERA and McDONALD, JJ.

BARBERA, J.

To be convicted of theft, a person must take property belonging to someone else with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of it. Maryland's consolidated theft statute includes property that is lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake. See Md.Code (2002, 2012 Repl.Vol.), § 7–104(d) of the Criminal Law Article.¹

Following a bench trial before the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Latresha L. Weems, Respondent, was convicted of theft for cashing a counterfeit check and not returning the money. She appealed the conviction to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction because the State did not prove that she obtained control over the proceeds of the check knowing the money was delivered by mistake. The Court of Special Appeals agreed and reversed the conviction. We granted the State's request for a writ of certiorari and, for reasons we shall explain, affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

I.

Respondent went to Anchor Check Cashing in Annapolis on February 17, 2009, in order to cash a check. Since 2008, she had been a customer of the business, which is licensed by the State to cash checks and provide other consumer financial services. The check stated that it was payable to the order of Respondent in the amount of $3,250, drawn from an attorney escrow account at SunTrust Bank in Atlanta, Georgia. An Anchor employee made a photocopy of the check and told Respondent that Anchor would have to place a phone call to verify that there were funds available before giving Respondent the money.

Marie Coulter, owner of Anchor Check Cashing, arrived later that same day and examined the check for several hours. Coulter also questioned Respondent about why she had the check and Respondent told Coulter that Respondent's uncle had given her the check.² Coulter called SunTrust Bank, which verified that the check was “good,” and she also called a number provided by Respondent and talked to someone about the check.³ As a result of that phone call, Coulter testified that she decided to accept the check and release the money to Respondent. Coulter later submitted the check to Anchor's bank, Branch Banking and Trust, for payment. Several days later, the bank returned the check to Anchor, having marked it with a “counterfeit” stamp. Coulter called Respondenttwice, explaining that the check was counterfeit, that it was a crime to have cashed the check, and that it would be in Respondent's best interest to return the money. Respondent never returned the money and had no further contact with Anchor.⁴

The State charged Respondent by criminal information with theft of more than $500, uttering a forged document, and possession of a forged document. The case came on for a bench trial on October 22, 2009. The State called two witnesses, Coulter and her employee. In addition, the State introduced the copy of the check presented by Respondent and records from the firm named on the check indicating that the check was not one of the checks issued by the firm on that date. The trial court found Respondent guilty of theft but acquitted her of the remaining charges.

In rendering its verdict of acquittal on possessing and uttering a forged document, the trial court stated that it was “not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that [Respondent] necessarily knew that it was a counterfeit check at the time that she tendered it. There is some circumstantial evidence that that might be the case, but did she know it? ... I don't think the State has proven that she knew it was counterfeit.” The trial court ruled, however, that, under § 7–104(d), Respondent was guilty of theft based on a “mistake as to the nature of the property,” given that she retained the funds after being told the check was counterfeit. The court sentenced Respondent to one year of incarceration, but suspended all of the sentence except for one day that already had been served. The court also imposed two years of probation and ordered that restitution be paid to Anchor.

Respondent appealed to the Court of Special Appeals claiming the evidence was not sufficient to sustain her conviction. Weems v. State, 203 Md.App. 47, 36 A.3d 977 (2012). Specifically, Respondent argued that § 7–104(d), which states that “a person may not obtain control over property knowing that the property was ... delivered under a mistake as to the identity of the recipient or nature or amount of the property,” required that the State prove Respondent knew the check was counterfeit at the time she presented it to Anchor. Id. at 53, 36 A.3d 977. The State disagreed, arguing that the statute applies whenever a person obtains control of property without knowing of a mistake as to its ownership, but later learns of the rightful owner and decides not to return the property. Id. at 53, 36 A.3d 977. The Court of Special Appeals noted that, under § 7–104(d), it appeared that knowledge of the mistake must coincide with when a person first obtains control of the property. Id. at 58, 36 A.3d 977. Given the uncertainty about the General Assembly's intent regarding when a person must have knowledge of the mistake, the Court reversed Respondent's conviction. Id. at 58, 61, 36 A.3d 977. The Court further held that the State had the burden to prove that Respondent failed “to take reasonable measures to restore the property to the owner,” id. at 59, 36 A.3d 977, reasoning that the State had not presented evidence that Respondent remained in possession of the money, and the trial court erred in inferring this fact based on the available evidence, id. at 60–61, 36 A.3d 977.

The State filed with this Court a writ of certiorari to answer the following questions:

1. Are the requirements of § 7–104(d) met if it is shown that a defendant knew that she had obtained property by mistake, learned the identity of the owner, failed to take any measures to restore the property to the owner, and intended to permanently deprive the owner of the property?

2. Was the finder of fact entitled to infer that when [Respondent]—a regular customer of Anchor prior to this incident—learned that she was not entitled to the funds, and yet still refused to return them, she failed to take “reasonable measures” to return the funds?

We granted the petition. State v. Weems, 426 Md. 427, 44 A.3d 421 (2012). Because we affirm the Court of Special Appeals and answer “no” to the first question, we do not address the second question.

II.

The State argues that the Court of Special Appeals erred in its interpretation of § 7–104(d) by placing undue emphasis on the statute's use of the “present-tense” version of the word “obtain” in the language “may not obtain control over property knowing that the property was lost, mislaid, or was delivered under a mistake.” The State submits that the intermediate appellate court ignored the General Assembly's intent in enacting the consolidated theft statute, which was to eliminate the common law requirement that a person who received property improperly was guilty of theft only if the person knew at the time of receipt that the property was lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake. The State contends that a person may obtain property without knowing it was lost, mislaid, or delivered under a mistake and still violate the statute.

The State claims that the Court's interpretation renders portions of § 7–104(d) nugatory. The State points to § 7–104(d)(1), which applies to a person who “knows or learns the identity of the owner ... or learns of a reasonable method of identifying the owner” as evidence of the General Assembly's intent to apply the statute to those who learn property was lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake and develop a larcenous intent to steal it after taking possession of the property. Additionally, the State notes that § 7–104(d)(3) applies to a person who “intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property when the person obtains the property or at a later time.” The State argues that this subsection must be read in context with the continuing obligations of subsections 1 and 2 that require a person to take reasonable measures to restore property to an owner once learning of the owner's identity. The State adds that, if the statute only targeted people who knew at the time that they received property that it was wrongful, there would be no need for the continuing obligation to identify the owner, and restoring the property would be irrelevant.

The State points to comments from the drafters of Maryland's consolidated theft statute in support of the notion that the legislature wished to change the common law and impose criminal liability on those who develop an intent to steal after receiving lost, mislaid, or misdelivered property. The State additionally notes that § 7–102(b) defines “knowingly” as the state of mind “when the person is aware of the conduct or that the circumstance exists.” The State claims that Respondent had the requisite knowledge as soon as she was informed that the check was counterfeit. In the State's view, Respondent could no longer fall back on an affirmative defense of good faith once she was made aware of the check's fraudulent status and decided to keep the money.

Respondent, not surprisingly, agrees with the rationale and holding of the Court of Special Appeals.

III.

We rely on the often-cited rules of statutory interpretation in construing the requirements of § 7–104(d):

The cardinal rule of statutory...