State v. Wehde, No. 60047

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
• Writing for the Court: REYNOLDSON; MOORE; McCORMICK
• Citation: 258 N.W.2d 347
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Raymond L. WEHDE, Appellee.
• Decision Date: 19 October 1977
• Docket Number: No. 60047

Page 347

258 N.W.2d 347 STATE of Iowa, Appellant,
v.
Raymond L. WEHDE, Appellee. No. 60047. Supreme Court of Iowa. Oct. 19, 1977.

Page 348

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Asher E. Schroeder, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Dennis D. Hogan, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Ray A. Fenton, Des Moines, County Atty., for appellant.

F. Richard Lyford, Des Moines, for appellee.

Heard en banc.

REYNOLDSON, Justice.

The State has appealed a district associate judge's ruling which held unconstitutional

Page 349

§ 321.463, The Code. This statute establishes maximum axle loads for vehicles or combinations of vehicles and prescribes a graduated scale of fines for percentages of overloads. We reverse.

August 30, 1976, defendant was driving a truck tractor and semitrailer carrying compacted garbage. He was issued the two citations involved in this appeal. One was based on an overload on axles two through five specifying a statutory fine and costs of $918.80; the other was based on an overload of axles four and five specifying a statutory fine and costs of $473.00.

September 14, 1976, defendant demurred to these charges on the grounds § 321.463 violates equal protection under amendment fourteen, United States Constitution, and the traffic citations were deficient under article I, section 11, Iowa Constitution. When the demurrer was argued defendant additionally raised a due process issue.

October 1, 1976, trial court held § 321.463 vague in violation of the fourteenth amendment due process clause. It sustained the demurrer and dismissed the charges.

The State asserts trial court erred in holding § 321.463 was unconstitutionally vague. Defendant contends trial court was right on that ground and in any event it should have held the statute denied equal protection in violation of the Iowa and Federal Constitutions. In addition, defendant challenges this court's jurisdiction on the ground the State's appeal should not have been taken to this court, but to the district court pursuant to §§ 602.32, 602.60, and 762.43, The Code, 1975.

I. Jurisdiction.

Defendant argues appeal should have been taken to district court within 10 days of the district associate judge's ruling, rather than 42 days later to this court.

Section 602.32, The Code, 1975, provides appeals from judgments or orders of district associate judges exercising the jurisdiction of judicial magistrates shall be governed by laws relating to appeals from judicial magistrates. But "(a)ppeals from judgments or orders of district associate judges while exercising any other jurisdiction conferred upon them shall be governed by the laws relating to appeals from judgments or orders from district judges." Id.

Defendant posits his jurisdictional challenge on article I, section 11, Iowa Constitution, which provides no person shall be held to answer for an offense in which punishment exceeds a fine of one hundred dollars, unless on presentment or indictment. Defendant reasons because he has neither been held to answer nor charged by indictment or information, the citations issued against him must have alleged a nonindictable misdemeanor. Thus the State, under the mandate of § 602.32, above, should have appealed pursuant to the nonindictable offense provisions of § 762.43, The Code, 1975.

Defendant's contention is without merit. Classification of a § 321.463 violation as a nonindictable or indictable misdemeanor is governed by relevant provisions of § 753.15(14), The Code, 1975:

"Violations of the schedule of weight violations shall be chargeable, where the fine charged does not exceed one hundred dollars, only by uniform citation and complaint. Violations of the schedule of weight violations, where the fine charged exceeds one hundred dollars: (1) Shall, when the violation is admitted and section 753.16 applies, be chargeable upon uniform citation and complaint, indictment, or county attorney's information, (2) but otherwise, shall be chargeable only upon indictment or county attorney's information. In all cases of charges under the schedule of weight violations, the charge shall specify the amount of fine charged under the schedule. Where a defendant is convicted and the fine under the foregoing schedule of weight violations exceeds one hundred dollars, the conviction shall be of an indictable offense although section 753.16 is employed and whether the violation is charged upon uniform citation and complaint, indictment, or county attorney's information." (emphasis supplied)

Page 350

Section 753.16(1), The Code, 1975, authorizes a defendant to sign an "admission of violation" on the "citation and complaint" and deliver or mail it and the specified fine and costs to the county traffic violations office. This statute further provides "(t)he admission shall constitute a conviction."

These statutory procedures are more fully explored in the next division. It is sufficient to note here that each citation and complaint against this defendant carried a scheduled fine in excess of $100 and thus charged an indictable misdemeanor under § 753.15(14), supra.

In ruling on defendant's demurrer the district associate judge obviously was exercising jurisdiction over indictable misdemeanors. The applicable rules for appeal are therefore those relating to appeals from the district court. § 602.32, The Code, 1975.

An appeal to this court can be taken within 60 days from a district court final judgment in a criminal case involving an indictable offense. §§ 793.1 and 793.2, The Code. Plaintiff's appeal was timely. This court has the requisite jurisdiction.

II. Due process.

The State contends trial court erred in finding § 321.463 void for vagueness under the due process clause, amendment fourteen, United States Constitution.

Defendant's rationale, adopted by the district associate judge, incorporated an attack on the § 321.463 enforcement scheme established in §§ 753.15 and 753.16, supra.

Trial court found a defendant who pleads guilty to an alleged § 321.463 violation, and pays the specified scheduled fine under §§ 753.15 and 753.16, is charged with a nonindictable offense. However, a defendant who pleads not guilty to an alleged § 321.463 violation is charged with an indictable offense. This disparate treatment was held to violate due process by failing both to warn a defendant of potential consequences of a not guilty plea and to provide an explicit enforcement standard.

This result can be reached only by proceeding from a faulty premise and failing to apply well-established rules of review.

We recently summarized our pertinent rule for reviewing the constitutionality of legislative enactments...