State v. Welch

Decision Date19 February 2020
Docket NumberNo. E2018-00240-SC-R11-CD,E2018-00240-SC-R11-CD
Citation595 S.W.3d 615
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
Parties STATE of Tennessee v. Abbie Leann WELCH
OPINION

Roger A. Page, J.

This appeal concerns the propriety of the defendant’s burglary conviction. A Knox County grand jury indicted the defendant, Abbie Leann Welch, for misdemeanor theft in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-103, and burglary, a Class D felony, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-402, for her involvement in a scheme to enter a Walmart retail store, steal merchandise, and have another individual return the merchandise for a gift card. The defendant previously had been banned from Walmart retail stores for prior acts of shoplifting. In this case, because the defendant entered Walmart without the effective consent of the owner—said consent having been revoked by letter—and committed a theft therein, the State sought an indictment for burglary rather than criminal trespass. We hold that the plain language of the burglary statute does not preclude its application to the scenario presented in this case and that, because the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, we need not review the legislative history to ascertain its meaning. Application of the burglary statute in these circumstances does not violate due process or prosecutorial discretion. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1

On October 7, 2015, the defendant, together with friends Krista Brooks and Tonya Cooper, drove to the East Towne Walmart in Knoxville, Tennessee. Seconds before entering the store, the defendant informed Ms. Brooks that she intended to steal items from the store so that Ms. Cooper could then return the items for a gift card. Against the advice of Ms. Brooks, the defendant entered Walmart, exited with purloined merchandise concealed in her purse, and handed the items to Ms. Cooper. Ms. Cooper placed the items in a bag and went inside to return the items while Ms. Brooks purportedly entered Walmart to use the restroom. Ms. Brooks rejoined Ms. Cooper, but before they could exit the store, two men intercepted them and instructed the women to follow them to the loss prevention office where they were questioned.

Ms. Brooks and Ms. Cooper acknowledged that they knew about the defendant’s scheme. At that time, security cameras in the loss prevention office showed the defendant driving her van through the parking lot and then into the parking lot of a nearby fast food restaurant. The security system captured video of the defendant sitting in the van while parked in the restaurant’s parking lot.

Matt Schoenrock, an asset protection officer with Walmart, explained that he was walking along the sales floor with another associate and observed the defendant "quickly exiting the store with a large purse that looked to be full of merchandise." Based upon his experience and the defendant’s demeanor, Mr. Schoenrock reviewed the video of the defendant while she was inside the store. He recognized the defendant and knew her name because he had "prior incidents" with her. As he reversed the video, he observed the defendant select various articles of clothing and conceal them in her purse.

The video showed that the defendant then exited the store, where she entered a vehicle in which two female occupants were seated. After sitting for several minutes, two females left the vehicle, entered the store carrying bags of merchandise, and approached the service desk to obtain a refund for the merchandise. When the transaction had been completed, Mr. Schoenrock and an associate intercepted the women and escorted them into the asset protection office. He placed a call to the Knoxville Police Department, and officers apprehended the defendant in the restaurant’s parking lot. After she was brought to the asset protection office, the defendant admitted her guilt and apologized for her actions. Police officers arrested the defendant and issued citations to Ms. Brooks and Ms. Cooper. Mr. Schoenrock identified a document—a "trespass form"—that he issued to the defendant on January 6, 2015. This form precluded the defendant from entering the store because of prior shoplifting episodes. The defendant previously had received other trespass forms from East Towne Walmart and other stores in the area dating back to 2010.

The State reasoned that entering Walmart after being "trespassed" was equivalent to entering the store without the effective consent of the owner and, therefore, sought an indictment against the defendant for burglary rather than criminal trespass. In January 2016, a Knox County grand jury indicted the defendant for one count of theft of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor,2 Tenn. Code. Ann. §§ 39-14-103, -105(a)(1) (2018), and one count of burglary, a Class D felony, id. § 39-14-402. Specifically, the grand jury indicted the defendant pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-402(a)(3), which provides that "[a] person commits burglary who, without the effective consent of the property owner[,] [e]nters a building and commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft or assault[.]" Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the burglary charge, asserting that the burglary statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied. The trial court denied the motion, and the defendant was convicted as charged at the conclusion of her May 24, 2017 bench trial. The trial court denied all of the defendant’s post-trial motions and imposed concurrent sentences of six years for burglary and eleven months, twenty-nine days for theft to be served on supervised probation.

The Court of Criminal Appeals, in a divided opinion, affirmed the defendant’s convictions and sentences. State v. Welch , No. No. E2018-00240-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 323826 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 23, 2019). The majority, authored by Judge Timothy L. Easter,3 reasoned, "[T]he statute is clear that when a person enters any building that is not a habitation, including one otherwise open to the public, without the effective consent of the owner and commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft, or assault therein, they may be prosecuted for burglary pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-402(a)(3)." Id. at *4 (emphasis removed). Moreover, although "retail establishments may generally consent to entry by members of the public at large during normal business hours, such consent is clearly revoked when an individual has been notified in writing that they are no longer allowed on the property." Id. Finally, the court noted that simply because prosecutors have not routinely charged repeat shoplifters in this manner does not prevent their ability to do so under the plain language of the statute. Id.

Judge Camille R. McMullen dissented, reasoning that "the burglary statute’s application to the Defendant, that of a shoplifter previously banned from a retail store, bears no relationship to the common law’s and the Model Penal Code’s definition of burglary." Id. at *6 (McMullen, J., dissenting). Citing an explanatory note to Model Penal Code sections 221.1 and 221.2, the dissent explained "that the continued survival of the offense of burglary ‘reflect[ed] a considered judgment that especially severe sanctions are appropriate for criminal invasion of premises under circumstances likely to terrorize occupants’ " and that "[a]pplication of the burglary statute to shoplifting cases like this simply runs counter to the time-honored belief that burglary is meant to punish a harmful entry." Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the dissent would have found the burglary statute "vague and unenforceable." Id.

We granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to consider whether her conviction for burglary violates her right to due process.

II. ANALYSIS

The defendant’s argument asserts that the burglary statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied in this case to the extent that it implicates due process rights. Accordingly, this case involves an issue of statutory construction.

A. Standard of Review

Because statutory construction of a statute presents questions of law, we review such questions de novo with no presumption of correctness. State v. Dycus , 456 S.W.3d 918, 924 (Tenn. 2015) (citing State v. Springer , 406 S.W.3d 526, 532-33 (Tenn. 2013) ; State v. Marshall , 319 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tenn. 2010) ; State v. Wilson , 132 S.W.3d 340, 341 (Tenn. 2004) ); Carter v. Bell , 279 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Tenn. 2009).

When engaging in statutory interpretation, "well-defined precepts" apply. State v. Frazier , 558 S.W.3d 145, 152 (Tenn. 2018) (quoting Tenn. Dep't of Corr. v. Pressley , 528 S.W.3d 506, 512 (Tenn. 2017) ); State v. Howard , 504 S.W.3d 260, 269 (Tenn. 2016) ; State v. McNack , 356 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Tenn. 2011). "The most basic principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute’s coverage beyond its intended scope." Howard , 504 S.W.3d at 269 (quoting Owens v. State , 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995) ); Carter , 279 S.W.3d at 564 (citing State v. Sherman , 266 S.W.3d 395, 401 (Tenn. 2008) ). In construing statutes, Tennessee law provides that courts are to avoid a construction that leads to absurd results. Tennessean v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville , 485 S.W.3d 857, 872 (Tenn. 2016) (citing Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher , 312 S.W.3d 515, 527 (Tenn. 2010) ). "Furthermore, the ‘common law is not displaced by a legislative enactment, except to the extent required by the statute itself.’ " Wlodarz v. State , 361 S.W.3d 490, 496 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Houghton v. Aramark Educ. Res., Inc. , 90 S.W.3d 676, 679 (Tenn. 2002) ), abrogated on other grounds by, Frazier v. State , 495 S.W.3d 246 (Tenn. 2016).

"When statutory language is clear and...

To continue reading

Request your trial
42 cases
  • Stewart v. Town of Rossville
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee
    • August 18, 2022
    ...(Id. at PageID 555-56.) (citing Watters Decl., ECF No. 24-3 ¶¶ 13-16, 19, 23-48; Black's Law Dictionary (11th Ed. 2019); State v. Welch, 595 S.W.3d 615, 622 (Tenn. 2020); Williams v. Town of Morristown, 32 Tenn.App. 274, 222 S.W.2d 607 (1949).) They additionally assert that "Plaintiff conce......
  • State v. Deberry
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • August 30, 2022
    ...the rule of lenity operates as a "tie-breaker" and requires us to resolve the ambiguity in the defendant's favor, State v. Welch , 595 S.W.3d 615, 623 n.4 (Tenn. 2020) (quoting State v. Marshall , 319 S.W.3d 558, 563 (Tenn. 2010) ).B. The criminal savings statute is a legislative abrogation......
  • In re Angelleigh R., M2020-00504-COA-R3-JV
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • May 19, 2021
    ...presume that the legislature's choice to omit such verbiage from section 37-1-102(b)(13)(C) was intentional. See State v. Welch, 595 S.W.3d 615, 623 (Tenn. 2020) (quoting State v. Loden, 920 S.W.2d 261, 265 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)) ("The canon of statutory construction expressio unius est e......
  • Falls v. Goins
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • June 29, 2023
    ... ... for Davidson County, arguing that Tennessee Code Annotated ... section 2-19-143(3) requires the state to re-enfranchise ... persons convicted of out-of-state infamous crimes as soon as ... said persons are "pardoned or restored to the ... restricting ... or expanding a statute's coverage beyond its intended ... scope." State v. Welch , 595 S.W.3d 615, 621 ... (Tenn. 2020) (quoting State v. Howard , 504 S.W.3d ... 260, 269 (Tenn. 2016)). We must interpret a statute "as ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT