State v. Wells

• Decision Date: 04 October 1892
• Citation: 20 S.W. 232,111 Mo. 533
• Parties: STATE v. WELLS.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

20 S.W. 232

111 Mo. 533

STATE v. WELLS.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

October 4, 1892.

CRIMINAL LAW — INSTRUCTIONS — REASONABLE DOUBT — TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED.

1. Defendant is not entitled to single out each material fact in a criminal action for an instruction as to acquittal, in case merely of a reasonable doubt as to the evidence in regard to such fact, but the doubt must be upon the whole case.

2. An instruction that a reasonable doubt must be a substantial doubt, based upon the evidence or lack of evidence on the whole case, and not a mere possibility of innocence, is unobjectionable, aside from its verbosity, and as favorable as any one would have a right to ask.

3. An instruction that one accused of crime is a competent witness in his own behalf and is to be treated the same as if he were not interested, or a party, except that he is not liable to cross-examination, and that the court is bound to recognize such testimony, and declare the law arising thereon the same as for any other witness, but that the jury may take into consideration any interest, prejudice, or bias, is not objectionable in commenting unfavorably upon the testimony of such a person.

Appeal from circuit court, Monroe county; THOMAS H. BACON, Judge.

Indictment against Ben Wells for assault with intent to ravish. Judgment of conviction. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.

R. N. Bodine, for appellant. John M. Wood, Atty. Gen., for the State.

THOMAS, J.

The defendant was convicted in the circuit court of Monroe county in November, 1891, for an assault upon Rose Vivian with intent to ravish her, and was sentenced therefor to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of two years, and he has appealed to this court. The only error assigned for the reversal of the judgment is giving the following instructions to the jury. "As to the law arising upon any testimony in the case tending to prove or disprove anything in issue, it is the duty of the court to instruct irrespective of any question as to the credibility of any witness on whose testimony such instruction may be founded, and irrespective of the probabilities of such testimony, and irrespective of the value of the evidence furnished by such testimony. It is not the duty of the court to give, and the court in no case undertakes to give, any instruction hypothecating anything which no testimony in the case in any wise tends to prove. But all questions of credibility, probability, and value aforesaid are exclusively for the determination of the jury, and it is for the jury alone to say whether or not the proof makes out the case put by a hypothetical instruction. No such instruction is to be taken as any intimation that anything has been proved or disproved, and no instruction is to be taken as either in commendation or disparagement of any testimony or evidence in the cause. The defendant testifying in the case is a competent witness in the cause. As such competent witness, such defendant is to be treated the same as if such defendant were not a party and not interested, and to be so treated in all respects, except that such defendant, as such witness, is not liable to cross-examination or reflection as to any matter not referred to in such defendant's examination in chief. The instructions are bound to...