State v. Wells
| Citation | 173 N.E.3d 1054 (Table) |
| Decision Date | 09 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-CR-89 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
| Parties | STATE of Indiana, Appellant, v. Rashad Deandru WELLS, Appellee. |
Attorneys for Appellant: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen H. Meilaendar, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorney for Appellee: Jennifer L. Koethe, Navarre, Florida
[1] In this interlocutory appeal, the State of Indiana challenges the trial court's grant of Rashad Deandru Wells's motion to depose alleged child victim. We affirm.
[2] In June 2020, the State charged Wells with child molesting and attempted child molesting as level 1 felonies, incest and child molesting as level 4 felonies, and contribution to the delinquency of a minor as a class B misdemeanor involving Victim 1, who was under fourteen years of age at the time of the charged offenses.1
[3] Prior to the State charging Wells, Victim 1 was interviewed at the Michigan City Police Department on April 24, 2020, and she provided a statement which indicated that Wells had molested her. Also according to the probable cause affidavit, Victim 1 was interviewed a second time at a later date.
[4] On September 28, 2020, Wells filed a petition for authorization to depose Victim 1, indicating a "13 year old victim should be able to provide a better time frame than one month," "[t]he Statute now in effect requires a defendant to establish that a deposition is in the interest of justice and that extra-ordinary circumstances exist in the case," and "[e]xtra-ordinary circumstances is not defined, is vague, and will not sustain a due process challenge." Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 48. The petition also asserted that preparation of rebuttal and/or impeachment witnesses was impossible if a victim could not be deposed and that the "innocence or guilt of a person who may be incarcerated between 20 and 40 years certainly outweighs the risk of harm to a 13 or 14 year old alleged victim." Id. at 49.
[5] Following the filing of the State's response, the trial court held a hearing on Zoom on October 22, 2020, at which Wells's counsel argued he had a police report and two interviews of Victim 1, "none of which [he] could use for impeachment, because they weren't made under oath," and that, "without a deposition this child is free to come in and say whatever she chooses to say, and that will be the truth of the day," which he could not defend against. Transcript Volume II at 10. At a November 5, 2020 hearing on Zoom, the court indicated it would allow the deposition on a "[r]egular course of conduct ... as long as it is going okay" and stated that it would permit the defendant's counsel to "start it and if there's something that happens during the middle of that deposition that is uh, under which the victim who – or the deponent is, you know, under too much stress" "[o]r is panicking or there's some emotional trauma to that victim," it could "always change [its] mind in mid-deposition." Id. at 16-17. It also stated its desire to protect the victim's rights and indicated that the prosecutor, who would be present, would have an opportunity "to say, stop," and "change the terms and conditions under which the Defendant's presence ... is here." Id. at 17. In its order granting Wells's motion, the court indicated it permitted the deposition "as long as the victim is not under too much stress or deposition creates a traumatic event" and for Wells to be present at the deposition. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 66.
[6] On December 6, 2020, the State filed a Motion to Reconsider or to Certify Order for Interlocutory Appeal, and on December 31, 2020, filed a notice that stated it had been notified on December 17, 2020, that Victim 1 had been admitted to Michiana Behavioral Health for suicidal ideation. Following a hearing on Zoom, the court denied the State's motion to reconsider and granted its motion for certification for interlocutory appeal.
[7] The State argues that the trial court violated Ind. Code § 35-40-5-11.5 by authorizing Wells to depose Victim 1 and that he did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there were any extraordinary circumstances such that the interest of justice rendered the deposition necessary. It also argues the trial court's order did not comply with statutory requirements and failed to describe the reasons for granting the petition and setting forth the manner in which the deposition would be conducted.
[8] The Indiana Supreme Court "has recognized on multiple occasions that the Indiana Trial Rules ‘are designed to allow liberal discovery.’ " Beville v. State , 71 N.E.3d 13, 18 (Ind. 2017) (quoting Richey v. Chappell , 594 N.E.2d 443, 445 (Ind. 1992) (some internal quotations omitted)). "Trial courts have broad discretion on issues of discovery." Id. (citing Hardman v. State , 726 N.E.2d 1201, 1206 (Ind. 2000) ). The "standard of review in discovery matters is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion." Hale v. State , 54 N.E.3d 355, 357 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Crawford v. State , 948 N.E.2d 1165, 1169 (Ind. 2011) ). Matters of statutory interpretation present pure questions of law and are thus reviewed de novo. Matter of M.S. , 140 N.E.3d 279, 282 (Ind. 2020) (citing In re Adoption of B.C.H. , 22 N.E.3d 580, 584 (Ind. 2014) ). We "presume[ ] that the legislature intended for the statutory language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the statute's underlying policy and goals." Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. State , 129 N.E.3d 789, 793 (Ind. 2019) ).
Ind. Code § 35-40-5-11.5(c) - (g). The section provides a list of factors for the trial court to consider in ruling upon a request for an authorization of the deposition of a child victim under subsection (f) or (g). See Ind. Code § 35-40-5-11.5(h).3
[10] "This Court has found that [ Ind. Code § 35-40-5-11.5 ] is a procedural law, meaning that ‘[it] prescribe[s] the manner in which ... rights and responsibilities may be exercised and enforced in a court.’ " Church v. State (filed June 28, 2021), Ind. App. No. 21A-CR-68, slip op. at 3 (). See State ex rel. Blood v. Gibson Cir. Ct. , 239 Ind. 394, 400, 157 N.E.2d 475, 478 (1959) (), reh'g denied ; see also Mounts v. State , 496 N.E.2d 37, 39 (Ind. 1986) ") (emphases provided).
[11] "It is a fundamental rule of Indiana law that when a procedural statute conflicts with a procedural rule adopted by the supreme court, the latter shall take precedence." Key v. State , 48 N.E.3d 333, 339 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Bowyer v. Ind. Dep't of Nat. Res. ,...
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