State v. Wenthe
| Decision Date | 26 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. A12–0263.,A12–0263. |
| Citation | 822 N.W.2d 822 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Christopher Thomas WENTHE, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Unconstitutional as Applied
M.S.A. § 609.344(1)( l )(ii).
Syllabus by the Court
Minnesota's third-degree criminal sexual conduct statute, which criminalizes clergy sexual conduct that occurs during the course of a meeting in which the complainant seeks or receives spiritual counsel, does not violate the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution on its face because it enunciates secular standards. Despite its facial validity, application of the clergy sexual conduct statute violates the Establishment Clause when the conviction is based on excessive evidence regarding religious doctrine or internal church practices.
Paul Engh, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, MN, for respondent.
Considered and decided by ROSS, Presiding Judge; HOOTEN, Judge; and CRIPPEN, Judge.
*
Appellant argues that the clergy sexual conduct statute violates the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution on its fact. He further argues his conviction of third-degree criminal sexual conduct rests on production of evidence that was excessively entangled with religion, in violation of the Establishment Clause. We affirm the district court's determination that the statute enunciates secular standards and therefore does not violate the Establishment Clause on its face. But because appellant's conviction was based on evidence that was excessively entangled in matters of religion, the application of the clergy sexual conduct statute violated the Establishment Clause in this case; accordingly, we reverse appellant's conviction and remand for a new trial.
Appellant Christopher Wenthe was a Roman Catholic priest in a St. Paul parish when he first met A.F., a parishioner, in July 2003. In October 2003, appellant heard A.F.'s confession and agreed to serve as her regular confessor. Appellant heard A.F.'s confession anonymously approximately three or four more times.1
It is undisputed that a friendship developed between A.F. and appellant in the ensuing weeks. They often spent time together in various social contexts. They shared their personal concerns and struggles and often talked for hours about theological matters.
On the evening of November 12, 2003, A.F. entertained appellant at her apartment. They talked for many hours until early the next morning. The conversation centered on topics of religion and sexuality, including the “theology of the body,” a commentary by Pope John Paul II about Roman Catholic views on marriage and sexuality.
The prosecution focused primarily on the events of the next evening, November 13, 2003. A.F. visited appellant at his private quarters in the church rectory at his invitation. It is undisputed that sexual conduct occurred during the course of the evening.
The parties differ as to the next date of sexual conduct in November 2003, 2 but it is undisputed that sexual conduct occurred thereafter about once every two weeks in the course of the next year. The last sexual encounter occurred in February 2005. A.F. first reported the sexual conduct to church officials in early 2005. She ultimately reported the affair to the police in April 2010.
Based on these events, the state charged appellant with one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn.Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1( l ) (ii) (2002), for sexual conduct that occurred while the complainant was meeting with the defendant on an ongoing basis for spiritual counsel. The state subsequently amended the complaint to include a second count under subdivision 1( l )(i) (2002), alleging sexual conduct that occurred during the course of a single meeting in which the complainant sought or received spiritual counsel.
Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the clergy sexual conduct statute was unconstitutional on its face. The district court denied the motion.
Appellant also filed a motion in limine, seeking to prevent the state from adducing evidence of Roman Catholic doctrine. At a pretrial hearing, the state assured the district court that it would not present evidence regarding church doctrine, policy, or remedial action. Based on these assurances, the district court denied appellant's request for an instruction directing the jury not to apply church doctrine or religious law.
Following a trial in November 2011, the jury acquitted appellant of the count alleging sexual conduct when seeking religious advice or assistance in private “during a period of time in which the complainant was meeting on an ongoing basis with the [cleric].” Minn.Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1( l )(ii). The jury convicted appellant on the later-added count alleging that sexual conduct occurred “during the course of a meeting” where religious advice or assistance was sought or received in private. Id., subd. 1( l )(i).
Clause of the U.S. Constitution on its face?
Whether a statute violates a constitutional provision on its face is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. See State v. Netland, 762 N.W.2d 202, 207 (Minn.2009) ().
The Establishment Clause provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. Const. amend. I. This clause applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See McCreary Cnty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 852–53 n. 3, 125 S.Ct. 2722, 2729 n. 3, 162 L.Ed.2d 729 (2005).
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause to forbid state action that (1) lacks a secular purpose, (2) advances or inhibits religion, or (3) fosters excessive entanglement with religion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). The third prong requires courts to apply “neutral principles of law”—that is, “rules or standards that have been developed and are applied without particular regard to religious institutions or doctrines.” Odenthal v. Minn. Conf. of Seventh–Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 426, 435 (Minn.2002) (quotation omitted).
The Minnesota Supreme Court, without a majority decision on the subject, previously affirmed our determination on the facial validity of the clergy sexual conduct statute. State v. Bussmann, 741 N.W.2d 79, 92 (Minn.2007). 3 In Bussmann, three justices favored striking down the statute as facially unconstitutional, and three favored upholding it.4See id. at 84–92, 95. Two of the justices who favored upholding the statute on its face viewed it as a legislative act creating secular standards. See id. at 89–92, 95. Writing separately, Chief Justice Russell Anderson similarly declared that the statute set forth secular standards, and concluded that the defendant-priest in that case was essentially tried on a secular question regarding the existence of an ongoing clergy/counselee relationship. See id. at 96–100 (Anderson, Russell, C.J., dissenting).
The legal effect of the division among the members of the court was a conclusion that “the statute does not facially violate the Establishment Clause.” Id. at 92. Bussmann affirmed the decision of this court, which had relied on Doe v. F.P., 667 N.W.2d 493 (Minn.App.2003), review denied (Minn. Oct. 21, 2003). See State v. Bussmann, No. A05–1782, 2006 WL 2673294, at *5 (Minn.App. Sept. 19, 2006) (), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,741 N.W.2d 79 (Minn.2007). In Doe, this court considered the constitutionality of the clergy sexual conduct statute in the context of a civil claim based on a violation of that statute. 667 N.W.2d at 495–96. We observed that courts regularly apply secular standards to determine whether a person sought religious advice, aid, or comfort from a member of the clergy in the context of the clergy privilege. Id. at 499. Applying a presumption of constitutionality, we concluded that because the statute established neutral principles, its application would not result in excessive entanglement of government and religion in all cases. See id. at 499–500.
Thus, Doe and the supreme court's divided decision in Bussmann hold that the clergy sexual conduct statute does not violate the Establishment Clause on its face. Appellant is not entitled to relief on that basis.
Appellant also argues that the application of the clergy sexual conduct statute violated the Establishment Clause as applied, because his conviction was based on religious evidence regarding Roman Catholic doctrine, internal church policies, and church views of priesthood.
In Bussmann, a supreme court majority reversed the defendant-priest's conviction and remanded, holding that the application of the clergy sexual conduct statute under the circumstances of that case violated the Establishment Clause.5741 N.W.2d at 92–95. Characterizing the conviction itself as the relevant state action, the majority concluded that the conviction was “based on” extensive evidence regarding church doctrine. Id. at 94. The state “relied heavily” on the evidence; the evidence “bolstered the state's claims”; it was “irrelevant to any secular standard”; and the effect of the evidence was to “engraft[ ] religious standards onto the statute.” Id. at 92–93. As a result, the conviction was excessively entangled with religion. See id. at 94 ().
The “extensive” religious evidence in Bussmann included testimony regarding the following: (i) the...
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State v. Wenthe, A12–0263.
...conduct statute, as applied in this case, violated the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. State v. Wenthe (Wenthe I ), 822 N.W.2d 822, 829–30 (Minn.App.2012). The State appealed and we reversed, holding that the clergy sexual conduct statute does not violate the Establi......
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State v. Wenthe, A12–0263.
...as applied to him. The court of appeals held that the clergy-sexual-conduct statute is not facially unconstitutional. State v. Wenthe, 822 N.W.2d 822, 826 (Minn.App.2012). But the court of appeals found that the statute was unconstitutionally applied to Wenthe because religion was excessive......
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State v. Wenthe
...Clause because excessive evidence regarding religious doctrine or internal church practices was introduced at trial. State v. Wenthe, 822 N.W.2d 822 (Minn.App.2012). The supreme court reviewed our decision and held that the clergy-sexual-conduct statute does not facially violate the Establi......
-
State v. Wenthe
...Clause because excessive evidence regarding religious doctrine or internal church practices was introduced at trial. State v. Wenthe, 822 N.W.2d 822 (Minn. App. 2012). The supreme court reviewed our decision and held that the clergy-sexual-conduct statute does not facially violate the Estab......