State v. Wenthe

• Decision Date: 25 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. A12–0263.,A12–0263.
• Citation: 845 N.W.2d 222
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Christopher Thomas WENTHE, Appellant.

845 N.W.2d 222

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.Christopher Thomas WENTHE, Appellant.

No. A12–0263.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

April 7, 2014.

Review Granted June 25, 2014.

Syllabus by the Court

Where there is evidence of alternative acts of sexual conduct occurring on different days, and each act may support the single-meeting element of clergy sexual conduct, the jury must unanimously agree on the act that constitutes the offense.

The crime of clergy sexual conduct during the course of a single meeting requires proof that the defendant has knowledge of the religious or spiritual purpose of the meeting.

Evidence of an adult complainant's sexual history may be admitted into evidence, despite rape-shield laws, when the state has opened the door by eliciting testimony from the complainant that portrays herself as sexually inexperienced.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, MN, for respondent.

Paul Engh, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.

Considered and decided by ROSS, Presiding Judge; HOOTEN, Judge; and CRIPPEN, Judge.

OPINION

CRIPPEN, Judge.^*

Following appellant's conviction of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, he asserts district court errors in (1) failing to instruct the jurors that they must unanimously agree that one of several proven acts constituted the single meeting in which the victim sought or received religious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort; (2) failing to instruct the jury that the state must prove that appellant knew the complainant sought or received religious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort during a meeting in which sexual conduct occurred; and (3) excluding evidence of the complainant's sexual history where the state opened the door to the topic during her direct testimony and in closing argument. Because there is merit in these assertions of error, we reverse and remand for a new trial. There is no reversible error on other issues—in the district court's exclusion of appellant's proposed expert testimony or in the court's denial of appellant's request to instruct the jury that the state must prove that the “primary purpose” of the meeting was to seek religious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort.

FACTS

Appellant Christopher Thomas Wenthe was a newly ordained Roman Catholic priest serving a St. Paul parish when he first met A.F. in July 2003 at a church picnic. A.F., an adult member of the parish, had recently converted to Catholicism and was enthusiastic about her new faith. After the picnic, A.F. offered appellant a ride to the rectory. They chatted for 15–20 minutes in the parking lot. A.F. felt that they had much in common. In late September 2003, A.F. asked appellant to serve as her regular confessor, and appellant agreed, although he had never before served in this role. Appellant heard A.F.'s confession at the rectory the evening of October 5.

In the ensuing weeks, a personal friendship developed between A.F. and appellant.They spent time together, called each other, and shared concerns about their personal lives. A.F. shared her personal struggles with an eating disorder and sexual abuse as a child, and appellant confided in A.F. about his insecurities and anxieties regarding the priesthood. On one occasion they watched a movie together in appellant's private quarters at the rectory. In mid-October, A.F. met appellant's family when she drove appellant to his childhood home to collect hunting equipment. When appellant was ill, A.F. brought soup to him. They often talked late into the night. In early November 2003, A.F. went to appellant's private quarters to give him a book about a struggling Catholic priest in a rural parish, which she believed would help ease his anxieties.

On November 8, 2003, A.F. invited appellant to her apartment for dinner to celebrate his birthday. They had wine with dinner and talked for many hours. On November 12, 2003, they had a telephone conversation that lasted until early the next morning. The conversation focused on topics of religion and sexuality, including Pope John Paul II's commentary on the Theology of the Body about Roman Catholic views on marriage and sexuality. Because they talked through the night, appellant canceled his hunting trip. A.F. was nervous about a counseling session she had later that day with her therapist, and appellant encouraged her to go. Appellant testified that, at the end of the phone call, they agreed to meet that night. A.F. testified that appellant invited her to call after her session, and that when she did so, he invited her to his residence. Sexual conduct occurred during the course of this meeting.

A.F. testified that a second incident occurred on November 14, 2003, at a meeting she initiated to talk about what happened the previous night and to discuss why this could not happen again. Appellant denied the contact on November 14 but testified that a second sexual incident occurred at his private residence about two weeks later. A.F. testified that a pattern of sexual behavior developed in which the sexual encounters occurred about every two weeks over the course of a year, generally at A.F.'s apartment. Appellant testified that the encounters were less frequent and that they had “periods of abstinence.” The final sexual encounter occurred in January or February of 2005 before A.F. entered a treatment program for her eating disorder.

A.F. did not contact police to report the sexual conduct until April 2010; she explained that the delay was due to her dissatisfaction with the way the diocese handled her disclosure of the sexual conduct. Based on these events, the state charged appellant with one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1( l )(ii) (2002), for sexual conduct that occurred while the victim was meeting with the defendant on an ongoing basis for spiritual counsel—“to seek or receive religious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort in private.” The state subsequently amended the complaint to include a second count under subdivision 1( l )(i) (2002), alleging sexual conduct that occurred during the course of a single meeting “in which the complainant sought or received religious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort from the actor in private.” The district court instructed the jury that their verdict must be unanimous, but the court did not tell the jurors they had to unanimously agree on which act comprised the single-meeting element of clergy sexual conduct. The jury acquitted appellant of count one but convicted him of count two.

Appellant raised several issues on direct appeal. This court initially reversed appellant's conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the clergy-sexual-conduct statute, as applied, violated the Establishment Clause because excessive evidence regarding religious doctrine or internal church practices was introduced at trial. State v. Wenthe, 822 N.W.2d 822 (Minn.App.2012). The supreme court reviewed our decision and held that the clergy-sexual-conduct statute does not facially violate the Establishment Clause and that appellant failed to prove that the statute, as applied, violated the Establishment Clause. State v. Wenthe, 839 N.W.2d 83 (Minn.2013). The supreme court reversed and remanded to this court to consider appellant's additional assertions of error. Id. at 95 n. 5.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court commit reversible error by failing to instruct the jurors that they must unanimously agree on the single-meeting element of clergy sexual conduct?

II. Did the district court abuse its discretion in failing to instruct the jury that appellant must know that A.F. sought or received spiritual or religious advice, aid, or comfort at the single meeting?

III. Did the district court abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of A.F.'s sexual history, despite rape-shield laws, where the state opened the door to this evidence?

IV. Did the district court abuse its discretion by excluding testimony to explain A.F.'s delayed reporting, or in failing to instruct the jury that the state must prove the “primary purpose” of the single meeting?

ANALYSIS

I.

Appellant argues that the district court erroneously denied his constitutional right to a unanimous verdict by failing to instruct the jury that each juror must agree on the event satisfying the single-meeting element of clergy sexual conduct. The charge of conviction, third-degree criminal sexual conduct, alleged sexual penetration during a single meeting that occurred “[o]n or between the 1st day of November, 2003 and the 31st day of December, 2003.” Trial testimony described at least three possible meetings during this time that might satisfy the single-meeting element of the offense: November 13, when A.F. accepted an invitation to appellant's rectory apartment; a second encounter, identified by A.F. but denied by appellant, on November 14, when A.F. asked to discuss avoiding what had happened on November 13; and an encounter approximately two weeks after the November 13 encounter, identified by appellant.

Although appellant objected to the amendment of the complaint to add this count on the ground of lack of specificity concerning the date of the meeting, he did not request an instruction advising the jury that they must unanimously agree on which of the meetings constituted the single-meeting element, nor did he object to the district court's general unanimity instruction. During final argument, the prosecutor specifically referenced the first incident on November 13, but the prosecutor also told the jury they could find appellant guilty if any of the meetings during the relevant time period involved religious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort. The state argued that A.F.

has talked about many meetings where she talked about receiving religious advice and comfort where there was sexual penetration, but, specifically, there's definitelythat very...