State v. Wenzel
| Decision Date | 07 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-0925 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NEIL MARK WENZEL, Defendant-Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dickinson County, Andrew J Smith, District Associate Judge.
A defendant appeals the denial of his motion to suppress. AFFIRMED.
Matthew G. Sease of Sease &Wadding, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Heard by Bower, C.J., and Vaitheswaran, Tabor, Greer, Ahlers Badding, and Chicchelly, JJ.
Did a second test for controlled substances and drugs on blood drawn pursuant to a warrant, initially tested just for blood alcohol content (BAC), violate Neil Wenzel's constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8? Prefacing this as an important case of first impression, Wenzel appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress the results of a chemical analysis for controlled substances and drugs, as well as his subsequent conviction of operating while intoxicated (OWI), second offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2(1) and (2)(b) (2020).[1] To narrow the focus, he contends that while the initial stop, blood draw, and test for alcohol were proper, a second test for controlled substances and drugs was not. Drilling down further, Wenzel argues the separate test for controlled substances was not supported by probable cause, thus it violated both his federal Fourth Amendment and state article I, section 8 constitutional rights. The State asserts that probable cause existed but, even so, individuals lose their expectation of privacy to the intoxicants in their blood after it has been lawfully removed, and so the chemical analysis is not a distinct search for our constitutional analysis. And, the State contends seizing blood under a valid search warrant to test for intoxication, followed by testing for drugs, is reasonable. We do not address head on Wenzel's argument that the chemical analysis is part of a constitutional search; instead, we hold the blood test for controlled substances was both authorized by the warrant and the testing did not exceed the scope authorized by the issuing judge as supported by probable cause, and so we affirm Wenzel's conviction and sentence.
No one contests the facts. In May 2020, Wenzel was pulled over by Deputy Shawn Syverson after failing to yield to an emergency vehicle. When Deputy Syverson spoke to Wenzel, he noticed Wenzel's watery and bloodshot eyes, his slurred speech, and the smell of alcohol. Wenzel admitted he had a beer earlier in the day. With those observations and Wenzel's admission, Deputy Syverson asked Wenzel to complete field sobriety tests; Wenzel refused. After Deputy Syverson requested Wenzel submit to a breath test, Wenzel again refused. Rather than invoking implied consent, Deputy Syverson applied for a search warrant to draw and test Wenzel's blood. To obtain the warrant, Deputy Syverson filled out several pages of the warrant application. He specifically requested a blood specimen after confirming on the form that there was probable cause to believe a traffic violation under Iowa Code section 321J.2 occurred. In the first attachment to the application, the provided language on the form stated the need for testing was to aid the investigation and determine what role the use of alcoholic beverages, controlled substances, or drugs played in the traffic offense.
Next, Deputy Syverson completed a second attachment-"A-2 OBSERVATIONS OF IMPAIRMENT"-and on this form the application provided boxes to check for observations of different indicators of impairment. Here, it was noted that Wenzel refused all field sobriety tests. Deputy Syverson checked several items that were "observations of Suspect establishing probable cause that Suspect is under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, and/or controlled substance and/or drug." He checked boxes for bloodshot eyes, watery eyes, slurred speech, smell of alcohol coming from the suspect, judgment impaired, and poor driving behavior.
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Below that section, there was also a group of boxes to check under the heading "controlled substances" that allowed disclosure of controlled substances or drug paraphernalia found. The final box referenced "Reasonable grounds to believe the Suspect is under the influence of a controlled substance or drug based on the following observations," followed by space for a narrative. While Deputy Syverson marked behavioral indicators for impairment that applied to Wenzel at the top of the form, he did not write a narrative or check any of the boxes in the controlled-substances section.
As a final part of the warrant application, Deputy Syverson attached a written narrative describing the stop. That narrative read:
Wenzel failed to yield to my police vehicle when I had emergency lights activated as I was attempting to turn around on the highway. Wenzel was the lone occupant and driver of the vehicle. Wenzel had bloodshot and glassy eyes and slurred speech while I was speaking to him. I had the suspect step out of the vehicle and sit with me in my patrol car where I could smell an odor of alcoholic beverages coming from his person. I requested Wenzel perform the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests but he refused. I asked him if he would take a preliminary breath test and he refused.
With this written documentation before it, the issuing court granted the search warrant to take a blood sample to determine if Wenzel violated section 321J.2(1) by operating while under the influence of alcoholic beverages, controlled substances, or drugs. Meanwhile, Wenzel was arrested and charged with OWI, second offense. Initially, the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) only tested for BAC, which came back below .04. See Iowa Code § 321J.2(1)(b) (). A month later, DCI ran a second test covering controlled substances-this test came back positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine.
Wenzel moved to suppress the test for controlled substances. At the suppression hearing, Wenzel conceded the stop of his car and the search warrant were all above board. But, he argued, because the warrant was premised only on reasonable suspicion that he was under the influence of alcohol, not controlled substances, the second blood test was outside the scope of the search warrant and violated both the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. Conceding he was not trained as a drug recognition expert,[2] Deputy Syverson testified the basis of the application was premised on the suspicion Wenzel had been drinking alcohol as those were the overt signs observed. But he explained that asking for both tests is common practice because of the difficulty with knowing if there is any other type of substance causing an impairment in combination with alcohol use.
The district court ultimately denied the suppression motion. After reviewing the application and the warrant, as well as hearing testimony from the deputy, the district court found that probable cause existed because Deputy Syverson saw Wenzel commit a traffic violation combined with observations of Wenzel's condition and considering his admission to drinking a beer earlier. The court noted "[a]ll of these factors established probable cause for the issuance of the warrant." Yet, the district court determined that "the application for the warrant is devoid of any basis [Wenzel] was operating a motor vehicle while impaired by something other than alcohol." Going further, the court said:
Deputy Syverson did not include any facts to support that conclusion within the narrative contained in the application, nor did he check any of the items with respect to purported reasonable grounds to believe [Wenzel] was under the influence of a controlled substance or drug. Additionally, the application is devoid of any information upon which to base a conclusion that Deputy Syverson is qualified to determine whether a person is operating a motor vehicle while impaired by drugs or controlled substances.
Still, the district court concluded Wenzel had no expectation of privacy in the sample once the blood was drawn, finding the subsequent testing was not a separate or distinct event under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, in the court's view, the drawing of Wenzel's blood was the constitutionally significant event, and the subsequent testing was not a violation of Wenzel's privacy rights nor an unreasonable search.
Following a trial on the minutes, Wenzel was found guilty. Wenzel now appeals, arguing the district court erred in denying his suppression motion.
As framed by him, Wenzel's claims come under the Fourth Amendment[3] of the Federal Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. They each function "to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); accord State v. King, 867 N.W.2d 106, 110-11 (Iowa 2015) (). Both protect against unreasonable searches and seizures and require that a search warrant be based on probable cause. State v. Moriarty, 566 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa 1997). A warrantless search is presumed unreasonable, and when a defendant challenges a warrantless search, the State bears the burden of proving the search falls into an exception such as consent or exigent circumstances. Id.
Wenzel argues that the second test conducted on his blood was a warrantless, unreasonable search that violated both his Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8 constitutional rights. Beca...
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