State v. Wersland
| Decision Date | 15 April 1994 |
| Docket Number | 20453,Nos. 20402,s. 20402 |
| Citation | 873 P.2d 144,125 Idaho 499 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Shirley WERSLAND, Defendant-Appellant. (Two Cases) Twin Falls, November 1993 Term |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Larry EchoHawk, Idaho Atty. Gen., Myrna A.I. Stahman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise (argued).
This is an appeal from a sentence of vehicular manslaughter and order denying an I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence. We affirm.
On June 20, 1991, the Appellant Shirley H. Wersland played in a golf tournament at the Clear Lake Country Club. Upon completing the round, Wersland returned to the clubhouse where during the next six hours she consumed five alcoholic beverages. Wersland was on the Clear Springs Grade Road in Gooding County, Idaho, returning to her home in Mountain Home when her car crossed the imaginary centerline and collided with an oncoming car driven by fifteen-year-old Angela Jackson, causing her death. Two passengers in Jackson's car, Michelle Revels and Jori Sexton, were also injured.
On September 17, 1991, Wersland was charged with one count of vehicular manslaughter in violation of I.C. § 18-4006(3)(a) or (b). On February 7, 1992, Wersland pled not guilty to the charge and a jury trial was scheduled. Wersland changed her plea to guilty on September 17, 1992, and a presentence report was ordered and a sentencing hearing scheduled.
After the presentence report was completed, Wersland objected to the inclusion of impact statements of certain alleged non-victims. Included in the presentence report were written statements of Michelle Revels; her stepfather, Ron Revels; Jori Sexton; and her parents, Don and Cathye Sexton. On November 12, 1992, a telephonic conference call hearing was conducted on Wersland's "Motion for an Order Striking from the Presentence Report all Input from Other than the Victim," which was denied by the district court.
The sentencing hearing was conducted on November 16, 1992, at which time the district court took the testimony of Julie Jackson the victim's mother; Joe Torres, the victim's natural father; Wersland and her husband; and the arguments of counsel. The district court then sentenced Wersland for the crime of vehicular manslaughter in violation of I.C. § 18-4006(3)(a) or (b) for a determinate period of three (3) years, and an indeterminate period of two (2) years in the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections.
On December 9, 1992, Wersland moved the court for a reduction of sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35. The district court denied the motion without prejudice at the conclusion of the hearing. On February 1, 1993, Wersland filed a Notice of Appeal from the district court's Order on Rule 35 Motion; a Motion for Release of Defendant Pending Appeal; and a second Motion for Reduction of Sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35. A hearing was held on these motions on February 8, 1993, at which time the district court took testimony regarding the impact of Wersland's conviction and sentence on her husband's emotional and physical health. The district court denied both of Wersland's motions.
Wersland raises the following issues on appeal:
1. Whether the district court properly exercised its discretion in denying Wersland's motion to strike from the presentence report the statements of the two girls who were injured in the auto collision and the statements of their parents.
2. Whether at sentencing, the district court gave proper weight to, and properly exercised its discretion in considering, the statements of Jori Sexton, Michelle Revels, and their respective parents.
3. Whether the district court properly exercised its discretion in weighing the character and history of Wersland against the nature of her offense in sentencing Wersland to three years determinate and two years indeterminate on her guilty plea to vehicular manslaughter.
4. Whether the district court properly exercised its discretion in denying Wersland's Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence.
Wersland claims that the district court should not have allowed the two girls who were injured in the auto accident in which Angela Jackson was killed, Michelle Revels and Jori Sexton, and their respective parents, to submit statements to be included in the presentence report. Our standard of review on this issue is whether the district court acted with manifest disregard for I.C.R. 32 by permitting the inclusion of the statements of the girls and their parents in the presentence report. We must determine whether these statements were beyond the scope of I.C.R. 32 and whether the court abused its discretion by relying upon this information at sentencing.
Wersland contends that the statements of Michelle Revels, Jori Sexton and their parents should not have been included in the presentence report because they were not "victims" of Wersland's crime as that term is defined in I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e). This section governs restitution for crime victims. It defines "victim" as "a person or entity, named in the complaint, information or indictment, who suffers ... injury as the result of the defendant's criminal conduct and shall also include the immediate family of a minor."
I.C. § 19-5306 governs the rights of victims during the investigation and prosecution of a crime and allows for victims of felonies to have included in presentence reports a statement of the impact the defendant's criminal conduct has had upon the victim. I.C.R. 32 sets forth the standards and procedures governing presentence investigations and reports. I.C.R. 32(b) provides that whenever a full presentence report is ordered by the district court, it shall contain the victim's version of the offense where relevant to the sentencing decision.
Wersland argues that pursuant to these two code sections and the above rule, the only "victims" allowed to provide impact statements for the presentence report are Jackson's parents, step parents and grandparents, as they represent Jackson's immediate family. She argues that pursuant to the definition of victim in I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e), since Jori Sexton and Michelle Revels were not named in the complaint and information, they are not victims for purposes of contributing to the presentence report. The state argues that for purposes of the presentence investigation and report, the term "victim" is not limited to the definition of "victim" under I.C. § 19-5304. We agree with the state and affirm the district court's order denying Wersland's motion to strike the statements from the presentence report.
I.C. § 19-5304 does not prevent Jori Sexton, Michelle Revels and their parents from being characterized as victims. The definition of "victim" in I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e) governs the restitution for crime victims, and does not by its terms apply to presentence investigations governed by I.C.R. 32. Wersland's argument that the girls riding in Jackson's car were not victims is without merit. They were injured and hospitalized as a result of Wersland's criminal conduct (driving under the influence of alcohol) and were also witnesses to the death of their friend. Further, the fact that these girls were not named in the complaint and information is irrelevant for purposes of their impact statements. Jackson was the only victim named because Wersland was charged with vehicular manslaughter, a crime in which a death must have occurred, and Jackson was the only one in the car who died. Jori Sexton and Michelle Revels are still victims of Wersland's crime of driving under the influence of alcohol. I.C. §§ 18-8004 and 18-8006. Thus, pursuant to I.C.R. 32(b)(1), the information contained in the presentence report conformed with the requirements of Idaho law.
Wersland also argues that the district court's discretionary decision to deny her motion for an order striking from the presentence report all input from other than Jackson's family was based upon an erroneous legal principle. Wersland claims that she based her motion on I.C.R. 32(b)(1) and that the district court denied the motion based upon I.C.R. 32(e). She argues that I.C.R. 32(e) serves as a modifier of 32(b), i.e., that while I.C.R. 32(b) sets forth the "contents" of the presentence report, I.C.R. 32(e) provides that within the "contents" of the presentence report, information of a hearsay nature may be included, if reliable, and that the sentencing judge has the discretion to consider material "contained" in the presentence report that would have been inadmissible under the rules of evidence applicable at trial. Wersland argues that what I.C.R. 32(e) does not do is empower the district court with discretion to modify the "contents" provision of I.C.R. 32(b) by allowing non-victims' statements to be included in the presentence report. We disagree.
Contrary to Wersland's assertion, nowhere does the record before the Court reflect that the district court denied her motion to strike based upon I.C.R. 32(e). This is an erroneous statement. Second, Wersland's argument that the district court's discretionary decision was based upon an erroneous legal principle is irrelevant because of this Court's holding above that Michelle Revels and Jori Sexton are victims of Wersland's crime, and that they and their parents' statements were properly included in the presentence report and considered by the district court.
Wersland contends that the district judge abused his discretion in sentencing by considering, as he stated, "vindicating the victim and reassuring...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Moore
...require reversal of Moore's conviction. X. SENTENCING Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994). Moore contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to twenty years with seven years fixed. Moor......
-
State v. Brumfield, 26388.
...plea for leniency, and a decision on such a motion is committed to the sound discretion of the sentencing court. State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 504, 873 P.2d 144, 149 (1994); State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 845, 828 P.2d 871, 874 (1992); State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117, 822 P.2d 101......
-
State v. Hurst
...the circumstance where an oral motion for reduction of sentence was followed by a written motion. See State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 501, 504–05, 873 P.2d 144, 146, 149–50 (1994) ; State v. Heyrend, 129 Idaho 568, 569, 572, 929 P.2d 744, 745, 748 (Ct.App.1996).We note that Rule 35 does n......
-
State v. Kerchusky
...949, 950 (Ct.App.1992). A motion to reduce a lawful sentence is also committed to the trial court's discretion. State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 504, 873 P.2d 144, 149 (1994); State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 845, 828 P.2d 871, 874 (1992); State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117, 822 P.2d 1011......