State v. Werts, No. 01-1813.
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
Writing for the Court | CARTER, Justice. |
Citation | 677 N.W.2d 734 |
Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. LeAnn Faye WERTS, Appellant. |
Decision Date | 25 February 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 01-1813. |
677 N.W.2d 734
STATE of Iowa, Appellee,v.
LeAnn Faye WERTS, Appellant
No. 01-1813.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
February 25, 2004.
As Amended on Denial of Rehearing April 5, 2004.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary E. Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Frank Severino and Susan Cox, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
CARTER, Justice.
Defendant, LeAnn Werts, appeals from a conviction of first-degree murder in regard to the death of a twenty-one-month-old child for whom she provided day care. The court of appeals reversed the conviction based on its conclusion that prior bad-acts evidence should not have been allowed. For reasons hereinafter stated, we agree with the conclusion of the court of appeals. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed, and the judgment of the district court is reversed and remanded.
Defendant operated a day care center out of her home. She provided regular day care for Ben Vorwerk between April and November of 2000. In November 2000 Ben was twenty-one months old. On November 16, at approximately 1 p.m., defendant called 911 from her Altoona home and reported that Ben had stopped breathing. When paramedics arrived, defendant was giving Ben CPR on the floor. Emergency personnel observed that the child was comatose, his skin was ashen, and his lips were blue. When questioned by paramedics and later by police, defendant stated that Ben had choked on his lunch of macaroni and cheese and green beans.
Ben was taken to Blank Children's Hospital in critical condition. Upon arrival doctors observed no brain activity, abnormal hemorrhaging in the back of his eyes, and several bruises on his forehead, chin, and left shoulder. A swatch of hair on his left scalp looked as if it had been pulled out. Ben was declared brain-dead at 10:07 a.m. on November 17, 2000.
During the autopsy that ensued, the medical examiner found no signs of choking. The brain was very swollen, and
The medical examiner consulted with the pediatric neurosurgeon with regard to cause of death. The consulting physician did not believe that Ben had choked and concluded his injuries were caused by his head hitting something very hard just a few minutes before the paramedics arrived.
The State's evidence at trial was basically that which has been recounted above. The defense produced an expert who testified that the fatal injury was from a massive head trauma that occurred several hours or even days before the paramedics arrived. The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder. Other circumstances of note will be reviewed in our discussion of the legal issues presented.
I. The Court of Appeals Decision.
The court of appeals' reversal of defendant's conviction arose from the following circumstances. Following defendant's testimony in chief, she was questioned on cross-examination concerning a conversation that evening with Ben's parents at the hospital where Ben was taken.
Q. And then after you had a chance to talk to the doctor, you looked over at Jeff and Laura [Ben's parents], didn't you? A. I don't recall.
Q. And you admitted to them that the relationship that you had with them was not the greatest, didn't you? A. Yes.
Q. And you told them that you would never hurt Ben; is that right? A. That's true.
Based on the foregoing testimony by defendant, the State sought permission to call a rebuttal witness "for impeachment purposes." This impeachment was to consist of the testimony of a neighbor who once saw the defendant pick up Ben and slam him down on his bottom. Counsel for defendant objected to the State's intended rebuttal evidence, and in an out-of-court colloquy, the district court determined that this evidence could be admitted for impeachment purposes. In the same ruling, the court declared that the State could not use this one instance of specific conduct as a basis for an opinion by the witness as to defendant's propensity for violence. Following the court's ruling, the prosecutor called Sandra Karns, defendant's neighbor, who gave the following testimony:
Q. We've heard testimony in this case that the defendant stated that she would never hurt Ben. On the day that you were standing in your toy room and looking over at the defendant's house, did you see something that is in contradiction to what the defendant said? A. Yes, I did.
Q. Can you tell the jury what it is that you saw? A. I saw LeAnn walk up to Ben, they were standing on the front sidewalk there, and she picked him up by his arm, raised him up, and slammed him down onto his bottom and then just walked away from him.
Q. What was Ben's response to this? A. He started crying.
Q. Did it appear that Ben was in pain after he was picked up by the arm and dropped down? A. He was crying fiercely. Yeah, I'm assuming he was.
The court of appeals held that it was prejudicial error to admit Karns' testimony. It noted that defendant had not testified that she had never hurt Ben, but rather that she had told his parents "that [she] would never hurt Ben." The court of appeals concluded that Werts' testimony did not pertain to what defendant had told Ben's parents and thus did not contradict
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Zacarias, No. 19-0838
...applied against the State); State v. Tompkins , 859 N.W.2d 631, 639 (Iowa 2015) (applying the rule to the government); State v. Werts , 677 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Iowa 2004) (discussing Turecek as a limitation on the "the State"); State v. Nance , 533 N.W.2d 557, 562 (Iowa 1995) ("......
-
Giza v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. 12–2023.
...] evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice”); State v. Werts, 677 N.W.2d 734, 737–38 (Iowa 2004) (indicating the appellate court should weigh prejudicial effect against probative value where the district court did not do s......
-
Rivas v. State, No. 7-550/06-1883 (Iowa App. 10/24/2007), No. 7-550/06-1883
...id. at 879, (5) inflame or appeal to the fears, passion, and Page 9 prejudice of the jury against the defendant, State v. Werts, 677 N.W.2d 734, 7394-0 (Iowa 2004), and State v. Vickroy, 205 N.W.2d 748, 749-50 (Iowa 1973), (6) assert a personal opinion or create evidence, State v. Shanahan,......
-
Bowen v. State, No. 8-315/07-0808 (Iowa App. 10/1/2008), No. 8-315/07-0808
...down let down. Prosecutors should not make arguments calculated to appeal to the passion and prejudice of the jury. See State v. Werts, 677 N.W.2d 734, 739 (Iowa 2004). Such statements can violate a prosecutor's duty to keep the record free of undue denunciations or inflammatory utterances.......
-
State v. Zacarias, No. 19-0838
...applied against the State); State v. Tompkins , 859 N.W.2d 631, 639 (Iowa 2015) (applying the rule to the government); State v. Werts , 677 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Iowa 2004) (discussing Turecek as a limitation on the "the State"); State v. Nance , 533 N.W.2d 557, 562 (Iowa 1995) ("......
-
Giza v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. 12–2023.
...] evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice”); State v. Werts, 677 N.W.2d 734, 737–38 (Iowa 2004) (indicating the appellate court should weigh prejudicial effect against probative value where the district court did not do s......
-
Rivas v. State, No. 7-550/06-1883 (Iowa App. 10/24/2007), No. 7-550/06-1883
...id. at 879, (5) inflame or appeal to the fears, passion, and Page 9 prejudice of the jury against the defendant, State v. Werts, 677 N.W.2d 734, 7394-0 (Iowa 2004), and State v. Vickroy, 205 N.W.2d 748, 749-50 (Iowa 1973), (6) assert a personal opinion or create evidence, State v. Shanahan,......
-
Bowen v. State, No. 8-315/07-0808 (Iowa App. 10/1/2008), No. 8-315/07-0808
...down let down. Prosecutors should not make arguments calculated to appeal to the passion and prejudice of the jury. See State v. Werts, 677 N.W.2d 734, 739 (Iowa 2004). Such statements can violate a prosecutor's duty to keep the record free of undue denunciations or inflammatory utterances.......