State v. Weske
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
| Writing for the Court | GROGAN, J. |
| Docket Number | 2025AP154-CR |
| Decision Date | 05 November 2025 |
| Citation | State v. Weske, 2025AP154-CR (Wis. App. Nov 05, 2025) |
| Parties | State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Richard T. Weske, Defendant-Appellant. |
This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Waukesha County: No 2023CT836 MICHAEL J. APRAHAMIAN, Judge. Affirmed.
¶1 Richard T. Weske appeals from a judgment of conviction entered following his no-contest plea to operating while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI), third offense contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a). Specifically Weske asserts the circuit court erred when it denied his pretrial motion to suppress evidence.[2] For the reasons that follow this court affirms.
¶2 Village of Hartland Police Department Officer Dillon Gurgul initiated a traffic stop in June 2023 for a suspected OWI after observing a motorist, later identified as Weske, weaving within his (Weske's) lane of traffic while traveling eastbound on State Trunk Highway 16 west of Merton Avenue in Hartland. Weske filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence asserting the investigatory traffic stop constituted an unreasonable seizure contrary to the Fourth Amendment[3] on the ground that Officer Gurgul was without authority to conduct the investigatory stop because the stop occurred outside his jurisdiction.
Weske argued that absent fresh pursuit or a request from another law enforcement agency, Officer Gurgul could not lawfully conduct an investigative traffic stop outside of his jurisdiction. The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on the suppression motion, at which only Officer Gurgul testified.
¶3 According to Officer Gurgul, while driving "eastbound [on] Highway 16 towards [the village of Hartland's] east borders" at around midnight on June 23, 2023, he observed two vehicles enter the road ahead of him from the nearest entrance ramp. He explained that although he initially intended to turn around and head back towards Hartland, he observed one of the vehicles weaving from left to right within its lane multiple times and instead followed the vehicle into a neighboring jurisdiction where he observed the vehicle begin to weave over the lane markers on Capitol Drive. Officer Gurgul explained that it was at that point that he believed he had reasonable suspicion that Weske was operating while under the influence and therefore initiated the investigatory traffic stop.[4]
¶4 Based on Officer Gurgul's testimony, Weske's counsel argued that Officer Gurgul had neither reasonable suspicion nor extra-territorial authority to conduct the traffic stop outside of Hartland's jurisdiction and that the traffic stop was therefore an unreasonable seizure for which the remedy was suppression.
¶5 After reciting its factual findings, including that it found Officer Gurgul to be credible, the circuit court immediately thereafter denied Weske's motion based on its understanding of State v. Keith, 2003 WI.App. 47, ¶¶7-9, 260 Wis.2d 592, 659 N.W.2d 403, which it said excludes suppression as a remedy for an extra-territorial traffic stop. It also clarified that there was no fresh pursuit. The court later signed a written order confirming the denial "for reasons stated on the record" and also denied Weske's subsequent motion for reconsideration. Weske ultimately pled no contest to OWI as a third offense contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a), and the court thereafter entered a judgment of conviction.[5] Weske now appeals.[6]
¶6 "[A]n order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence" presents "a question of constitutional fact, which requires a two-step analysis" on appellate review. State v. Asboth, 2017 WI 76, ¶10, 376 Wis.2d 644, 898 N.W.2d 541. State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶22, 327 Wis.2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463 (internal citations omitted).
¶7 On appeal, Weske asserts the circuit court erred in denying his suppression motion and specifically contends that the court, despite correctly determining Officer Gurgul was not in fresh pursuit at the time of the extra-territorial stop under WIS. STAT. § 175.40(2), nevertheless erred in concluding that suppression was not required pursuant to cases such as City of Brookfleld v. Collar, 148 Wis.2d 839, 436 N.W.2d 911 (Ct. App. 1989), and Keith. According to Weske, because Officer Gurgul did not conduct the traffic stop within his own jurisdiction, the stop was unreasonable and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment, thus requiring suppression as a remedy for the constitutional violation.
¶8 In response, the State argues that the circuit court did not err because Officer Gurgul had the authority to act under WIS. STAT. § 175.40(6)(a) and (d) when read together, or, alternatively, WIS. STAT. § 349.03(4). As to § 175.40(6)(a), the State says that Officer Gurgul met the statutory requirements because he was "on duty and on official business[,]" was "taking an action that he ... would be authorized to take under the same circumstances in his ... territorial jurisdiction[]" and was "acting to respond" to "[a]n emergency situation that poses a significant threat to life or of bodily harm" (drunk driving). See id. In regard to § 175.40(6)(a), the State further asserts that the limitation set forth in § 175.40(6)(d), which requires that a "peace officer's supervisory agency" is required to have undertaken certain prior activities, did not apply because Officer Gurgul's testimony confirmed that he contacted Waukesha County Communications to notify the Pewaukee Police Department that he was performing a traffic stop within its jurisdiction.
¶9 Alternatively, the State argues that WIS. STAT. § 349.03(4) unambiguously provides "that if a violation of [WIS. STAT.] § 346.03 [the OWI law] occurs within a law enforcement officer's jurisdiction, he or she may enforce the violation anywhere in the state[.]" Here, the State says, "[i]t is undisputed that Officer Gurgul was within his jurisdiction when he spotted Richard Weske's vehicle swerve within his lane at a late hour of the night" and that based on § 349.03(4) and State v. Haynes, 2001 WI.App. 266, 248 Wis.2d 724, 638 N.W.2d 82, Officer Gurgul was authorized to pursue Weske into another jurisdiction to conduct the stop.
¶10 Finally, the State also asserts that regardless of whether Officer Gurgul was authorized to conduct the extra-territorial stop, the circuit court correctly concluded that suppression was not warranted under Keith and State v. Raflik, 2001 WI 129, 248 Wis.2d 593, 636 N.W.2d 690, because Weske "failed to identify a constitutional or statutory violation requiring suppression."
¶11 Turning to WIS. STAT. § 349.03(4), that statute provides, as relevant, that "[i]f a violation under ... [WIS. STAT. §] 346.63 ... occurs within a law enforcement officer's jurisdiction, he or she may enforce the violation anywhere in the state." Section 346.63, in turn, addresses OWI violations. Weske did not file a Reply brief responding to the State's arguments; therefore, he has conceded that § 349.03(4) authorizes an extra-territorial traffic stop to investigate a suspected OWI that occurred within the officer's jurisdiction. See, e.g., State v. Chu, 2002 WI.App. 98, ¶41, 253 Wis.2d 666, 643 N.W.2d 878 (); State v. Verhagen, 2013 WI.App. 16, ¶38, 346 Wis.2d 196, 827 N.W.2d 891 ("Unrefuted arguments are deemed conceded."); State v. Pettit, 111 Wis.2d 627, 647, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (); Doe 1 v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 2022 WI 65, ¶35, 403 Wis.2d 369, 976 N.W.2d 584 (). Accordingly, under these circumstances, the only thing this court must determine is whether Officer Gurgul had the requisite reasonable suspicion that Weske was operating while under the influence contrary to § 346.63 necessary to conduct the traffic stop.
¶12 A police officer may conduct a traffic stop if he has reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has been or will be committed. See State v. Houghton, 2015 WI 79, ¶30, 364 Wis.2d 234, 868 N.W.2d 143 ("reasonable suspicion that a traffic law has been or is being violated is sufficient to justify all traffic stops."). Reasonable suspicion must be based on '"specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.'" Id., ¶21 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). If reasonable suspicion exists, the seizure is reasonable and does not offend the Fourth Amendment. State v. Adell, 2021 WI.App. 72, ¶¶14-15, 399 Wis.2d 399, 966 N.W.2d 115. "The reasonableness of a stop is determined based on the totality of the facts and circumstances." State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶13, 301 Wis.2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634.
¶13 Here, Officer Gurgul testified at the motion hearing on Weske's suppression motion, and the circuit court determined Officer Gurgul was credible. Based on that testimony, the court found that Officer Gurgul first observed Weske's vehicle "[j]ust after midnight" and that while within his jurisdiction Officer Gurgul observed Weske "weaving within the lane[.]" The court further found that Officer Gurgul, after following Weske beyond Officer Gurgul's jurisdiction, observed Weske "weaving ... on and over the lines ~ dividing lanes of travel" and noted...
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