State v. West

• Decision Date: 19 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. A98A2333.,A98A2333.
• Citation: 514 S.E.2d 257,237 Ga. App. 185
• Parties: The STATE v. WEST.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

514 S.E.2d 257

237 Ga. App. 185

The STATE v.WEST.

No. A98A2333.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 19, 1999.

Roger Queen, District Attorney, John G. Wilbanks, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for appellant.

John R. Jackson, Cumming, for appellee.

ELDRIDGE, Judge.

Nineteen-year-old Jamie West lived rent-free with his mother and stepfather in his mother and stepfather's house.Based on a tip from a concerned citizen that West had marijuana plants in his bedroom, the police went to the house without a warrant to ask for consent to search the room.West was not at the house when the police arrived, but his mother and stepfather were there.When informed of the purpose for the officers' visit, West's mother stated "[s]he didn't want nothing in her home and if we found anything, she wanted it out."West's mother signed a consent-to-search form: "I understood it to be that it would be okay for them to search my house....I didn't have any intention of him [officer] not searching."West's bedroom door was locked, so West's stepfather got the key to unlock the door.The police found marijuana plants inside the bedroom.

West was charged with possessing and manufacturing marijuana.He filed a motion to suppress the evidence of marijuana found in his room.The trial court granted the motion, finding that West's mother did not have authority to consent to a search of a locked bedroom:

I am going to grant the motion[.]... In that Mr. West by locking his door had expectation of privacy and that the officer should have, after getting the consent to search the house, either waited until Mr. West appeared or gone and got a search warrant in order to search a room which had been locked by the person residing in that room.

The State appeals from the ruling.Held:

Permission to search may be obtained from one who "possess[es][ (a) ] common authority over or [ (b) ] other sufficient relationship to the premises ... sought to be inspected."United States v. Matlock,415 U.S. 164, 171-172, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242(1974)("Matlock ").The Matlock analysis, then, is two-pronged, i.e., a "common authority" prong, or a "sufficient relationship to the premises" prong.

Matlock, itself, involved a co-habitating couple in a bedroom rented from a third party.The Matlock Court examined the "common authority" of the one whose name was not on the lease to consent to a search of the rented bedroom.Such "common authority" analysis necessarily involved aspects of each individual's expectation of privacy in the bedroom.Thus, factors such as "access" to and "mutual use" of the bedroom were relevant.

However, the application of Matlock's prong-one "common authority" analysis to the facts of this case would be inappropriate.Instead, in this case, we examine a resident homeowner's authority to permit a search of her own home, including an adult child's bedroom which the homeowner permits the child to use for free.

An examination of cases from other jurisdictions convinces us that it is the general rule that the voluntary consent of the head of a household to the search of premises owned or controlled by such head of the household is sufficient to authorize a search of the premises without a search warrant[.]

Tolbert v. State,224 Ga. 291, 293, 161 S.E.2d 279(1968).To that end:

[E]ven if the son, living in the bosom of a family, may think of a room as "his," the overall dominance will be in his parents....Given the nature of the home as a family dwelling and the fact that the mother, as owner and head of the single-family household, designated what use, if any, could be made of the premises including the bedroom in question, we think it was reasonable to recognize that the mother had the authority to permit the inspection in her own right.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.)United States v. Peterson,524 F.2d 167, 180-181(4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1088, 96 S.Ct. 881, 47 LE2d 99(1976).

As a resident homeowner granting consent to a search of her own home, including her adult son's rent-free bedroom, West's mother satisfies the second prong of the Matlock analysis in that she possesses a "sufficient relationship to the premises" sought to be inspected.¹Accordingly, factors such as "access" to the bedroom and "mutual use" of the bedroom are not relevant enquiries.Thus, regardless of whether West locks his bedroom door and regardless of his mother's reluctance to enter the bedroom, she has the right to enter and she may assign that right, as she did in this case:

[The mother] had control of the premises, undiminished by any kind of less-than-fee interest possessed by [West].This fact stands in contrast to the hotel or rental situations.²The situation strikes us as being no different, factually, than if [the mother] herself had brought the seized item, it being properly in her possession, to the authorities.They came to the home, it is true, but they obtained it by freely allowed access to the house.

(Punctuation omitted.)United States v. Peterson,supra at 180, citingMaxwell v. Stephens,348 F.2d 325(8th Cir.1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 944, 86 S.Ct. 387, 15 L.Ed.2d 353(1965), reh. denied382 U.S. 1000, 86 S.Ct. 532, 15 L.Ed.2d 490(1966).

Because West's mother had the authority to consent to a search of her home, including the bedroom she permitted her son to use for free, such consent was valid.The trial court's ruling to the contrary is erroneous.

Judgment reversed.

McMURRAY, P.J., ANDREWS and BLACKBURN, JJ., concur.POPE, P.J., concurs specially.

BEASLEY, P.J., and RUFFIN, J., dissent.

POPE, Presiding Judge, concurring specially.

I fully concur with the majority opinion that West's mother gave valid consent to the search of the bedroom and that the trial court's ruling to the contrary must be reversed.Because the majority relies primarily on federal case law, I write separately in order to emphasize the Georgia cases on point.

A warrantless search of a residence may be authorized by the consent of any person who possesses common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises to be searched.[Cits.]`Common authority' is defined as: mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their own number might permit the common area to be searched.[Cit.]

(Punctuation omitted.)Smith v. State,264 Ga. 87-88(2), 441 S.E.2d 241(1994).³

This Court has previously held that a parent, as the head of the household, has the authority to consent to the search of the room of a child who lives in the parent's home free of rent.SeeHoward v. State,207 Ga.App. 125, 126(1), 427 S.E.2d 96(1993);Williams v. State,166 Ga.App. 798, 800(2), 305 S.E.2d 489(1983);Montgomery v. State,155 Ga.App. 423, 424(1), 270 S.E.2d 825(1980).In Howard v. State,we ruled: "it was uncontroverted that the appellant's mother was a co-owner of the premises, and there was no landlord/tenant relationship between the appellant and his parents.Accordingly, we find that she was authorized to permit the officers to conduct the search."(Citations and punctuation omitted.)Howard v. State,207 Ga.App. at 126, 427 S.E.2d 96.See alsoFord v. State,214 Ga.App. 284(1), 447 S.E.2d 334(1994)(holding that appellant's sister, who rented an apartment and was allowing appellant to stay in a bedroom in the apartment, could consent to a search of appellant's bedroom).

In the instant case, it is true that West tried to maintain some privacy by locking his bedroom door.That fact, however, does not end the inquiry.West's attempts at privacy and the authority of his mother to consent to the search are different issues.The trial court and the dissent have incorrectly focused on West's privacy expectation in evaluating whether the search was valid.The dispositive question in this case is not merely if West tried to have privacy by locking his bedroom, but whether his mother had such authority over, or relationship to, the premises that she had the right to allow inspection of the room and that West assumed the risk that she might permit the room to be searched.SeeSmith v. State,supra.Pertinent to this inquiry are the facts that West's mother and stepfather are co-owners of the house; that there is no landlord/tenant relationship because West was allowed to stay in the house without paying rent; and that West's mother and stepfather have a key to the room.Given all the circumstances, it is clear that West's mother had sufficient authority over her own house, that she had the right to consent to a search of the room and that West assumed the risk that she might permit the room to be searched.

[T]he voluntary consent of the head of a household to the search of premises owned or controlled by such head of the household is sufficient to authorize a search of the premises without a search warrant, and such search does not violate the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Tolbert v. State,224 Ga. 291, 293(2), 161 S.E.2d 279(1968).Because the consent to search given by West's mother was valid, the trial court's ruling to the contrary is erroneous.

BEASLEY, Presiding Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent because the trial court's order does not contravene the law.

In reviewing an order on a motion to suppress evidence, three principles guide examination of the facts.One, the judge sits as the trier of facts.The findings should not be disturbed if there is any evidence to support them.Second, the trial court's resolution of questions of fact and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous.Third, the appellate court must construe the evidence most favorably to the upholding of the trial court's order.Tate v....