State v. West

Decision Date07 June 1963
Docket NumberNo. A--57,A--57
Citation79 N.J.Super. 379,191 A.2d 758
PartiesSTATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Robert Grover WEST, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

B. Braddock Dinsmore, Jr., Trenton, for appellant.

Joseph P. Merlino, Asst. Pros., for respondent (Stanley E. Rutkowski, Mercer County Pros., attorney).

Before Judges GOLDMANN, FREUND and FOLEY.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

FOLEY, J.A.D.

This is an appeal from the denial of defendant's demand that he be discharged from confinement in the Mercer County Jail, and from a verbal order directing the extradition of defendant to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, both as shown on the minutes of the Mercer County Court.

The underlying facts, as narrated in defendant's brief, are not contested by the State. They are substantially as follows: The defendant was arrested in the City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in February 1961 upon criminal charges for crimes alleged to have been committed by him in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and also on warrants issuing from authorities in the State ofb New Jersey on criminal charges pending against him there.

He claims that he was told by police officers in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that if he would sign a written confession concerning the charges outstanding against him in Pennsylvania, and also a waiver of extradition to the State of New Jersey to be tried upon the charges pending against him there, he could upon the completion of these trials request that he be returned to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for the purpose of arraignment and trial on the charges pending against him there. He claims that he was told that in the event he should be convicted of one or more charges in both jurisdictions, it was likely that the sentence imposed in Pennsylvania would be made to run concurrently with that imposed in the State of New Jersey; and also that because of his cooperation in this manner he might expect to receive a more lenient sentence in the event of his conviction than would otherwise be the case.

Defendant gave a written confession regarding the offenses alleged to have been committed by him in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and signed a waiver of extradition to the State of New Jersey. Thereupon, he was delivered to the authorities in Mercer County. He was tried upon the charges pending against him there, convicted, and sentenced in April 1961. The sentences imposed were three terms of one year each to be served concurrently. He was committed to the Mercer County Workhouse on April 28, 1961, and remained there until the expiration of his sentences on December 26, 1961, credit being given for good behavior. He was then transferred to the Mercer County Jail where he is presently confined awaiting disposition of detainers which had been lodged against him by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on March 3, 1961.

A warrant for the arrest of the defendant was signed by the Governor of New Jersey on January 23, 1962, in compliance with a requisition for extradition executed by the Governor of Pennsylvania on December 22, 1961. Thereafter, defendant filed a complaint in the Law Division demanding a writ of Habeas corpus, and his discharge from custody. The matter was referred to the Mercer County Court and a hearing thereon resulted in the determination from which this appeal was taken.

The gist of defendant's argument below, repeated here, is that the Pennsylvania indictments became null and void because of a failure on the part of New Jersey authorities to comply with the provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, N.J.S. 2A:159A--1, L.1958, c. 12, effective April 18, 1958, N.J.S.A. Hence, argues defendant, since the Pennsylvania indictments had ceased to exist, the requisition for extradition lacked the indispensable foundation of a pending criminal charge in the demanding state. The trial court held, we think correctly, that it was without jurisdiction to determine, or even to question, the validity or subsistence of the Pennsylvania indictments, this being, in the first instance, the exclusive prerogative of the Pennsylvania court in which these indictments had been returned.

N.J.S. 2A:159A--1 Et seq., N.J.S.A., represents the legislative validation of an agreement between the executive branches of the governments of New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and grants to such agreement the force of law.

The agreement is the product of a lengthy study of the Council of State Governments. The objectives sought to be attained by it clearly appear in the findings and statement of policy set out in N.J.S. 2A:159A--1, N.J.S.A. See People v. Esposito, 201 N.Y.S2d 83, 88 (Cty.Ct.1960). N.J.S. 2A:159A--1, N.J.S.A., provides:

'* * * The party States find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party States and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints. The party States also find that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of cooperative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide such cooperative procedures.' L.1958, c. 12, p. 34 § 1 (Art. I).

The legislation adopting the agreement is obviously remedial in character and, thus, by familiar principle should be construed liberally in favor of the prisoner.

Art. III(a), N.J.S. 2A:159A--3(a), N.J.S.A., in pertinent part provides:

'Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party State, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party State any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of the imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint * * *. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the State parole agency relating to the prisoner.'

Art. III(b) provides:

'He written notice and request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, * * * having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.'

Art. III(c) provides that the warden having custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and contents of any detainer lodged against him and also inform him of his right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment, information or complaint on which the detainer is based.

Art. III(d) requires that any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to (a) shall operate as a request for final disposition of all untried...

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