State v. Western Transp. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 August 1950
• Docket Number: No. 47616,47616
• Citation: 241 Iowa 896,43 N.W.2d 739
• Parties: STATE v. WESTERN TRANSP. CO.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 739

43 N.W.2d 739

241 Iowa 896

STATE v. WESTERN TRANSP. CO.

No. 47616.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Aug. 1, 1950.

Carroll F. Johnson, of Clinton, and Eugene L. Cohn, of Chicago, Illinois, for appellant.

Robert L. Larson, Attorney General, Kent Emery, Assistant Attorney General, John W. Carlsen, County Attorney, and John McCarthy, Assistant County Attorney, both of Clinton, for appellee.

GARFIELD, Chief Justice.

An officer of the state motor vehicle department filed in the municipal court of the city of Clinton an information accusing defendant Western Transportation Co. of a misdemeanor in violating section 321.54, Code, 1946, I.C.A., by operating a motor vehicle within this state for the intrastate transportation of property for compensation without registering such vehicle and paying the required fee. Defendant's manager appeared without counsel, the facts were stipulated, the court found defendant guilty and imposed a fine of $100 and costs. Defendant has appealed.

It was stipulated that on July 13, 1949, a truck driver employed by defendant drove one of its tractors, registered in Illinois, to the DuPont plant within the industrial limits of Clinton, Iowa, and transported a semitrailer, also registered in Illinois, containing merchandise consigned to a point in Chicago, Illinois, to defendant's dock located in Clinton. The tractor was then disengaged and another tractor belonging to defendant transported the semitrailer to the consignee in Chicago.

It seems also to be agreed, although the stipulation does not so state, defendant is a nonresident owner of foreign vehicles operated within this state for compensation and neither tractor nor semitrailer was registered in Iowa nor a fee paid therefor.

Code section 321.54, I.C.A., provides: 'Nonresident carriers. Nonresident owners of foreign vehicles operated within this state for the intrastate transportation of persons or property for compensation * * * shall register each such vehicle and pay the same fees therefor as is required with reference to like vehicles owned by residents of this state.'

Section 321.482, I.C.A., makes violation of the quoted provision a misdemeanor punishable by fine of not more than $100 or imprisonment for not more than 30 days.

Defendant contends the stipulated facts do not show it engaged in 'intrastate transportation' of property in violation of 321.54 but that the transportation was interstate. The state concedes the shipment in question was one in interstate commerce but says there is a difference between commerce and transportation and insists defendant engaged in intrastate transportation in carrying the merchandise between the DuPont plant and defendant's dock in Clinton.

'Transportation' is defined by Webster's New International Dictionary 2d Ed., and in substance by the decisions generally as 'Act of transporting, or state of being transported; carriage; removal; * * *.' See 42 Words and Phrases, Perm. Ed., page 359 ff. Webster defines 'intra' as 'within.' Hence 'intrastate' means within the state. 48 C.J.S., page 751. 'Intrastate transportation' is therefore carriage within the state.

Intrastate transportation is usually distinguished from interstate transportation. 'Inter' is defined as 'between' or 'among.' 'Interstate' means 'Between places or persons in different states; between two or more states.' 48 C.J.S., page 116. Hence 'interstate transportation' is carriage between two or more states.

As the state suggests, 'transportation' and 'commerce' are not necessarily interchangeable. Commerce is the broader term. It means intercourse and is not limited to transportation which is a part of commerce. Commerce includes phases of intercourse other than transportation. See 42 Words and Phrases, Perm. Ed., pages 363, 364; Id., Vol. 7, page 788; 15 C.J.S., Commerce, § 1; 11 Am.Jur., Commerce, sections 3, 4. See also Shanks v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 239 U.S. 556, 558, 36 S.Ct. 188, 60 L.Ed. 436, 438, L.R.A. 1916C, 797.

The merchandise loaded at the DuPont plant in or near Clinton was of course transported by defendant between the plant and its dock in Clinton. Such transportation was either intrastate or interstate. It could not be both. Unless it appears from the stipulated facts it was intrastate transportation within the meaning of section 321.54, quoted above, defendant is entitled to a reversal. The state does not contend the portion of the movement between defendant's dock in Clinton and Chicago was intrastate. Nor does it argue that any part of the trip would be intrastate if it were not for the stop at the dock in Clinton and the change of tractors there.

We think the stipulated facts insufficient proof that defendant engaged in intrastate transportation of property between the DuPont plant and defendant's dock in Clinton.

Whether transportation is interstate or intrastate is determined by its essential character from a consideration of all pertinent circumstances. Probably the most important test--some authorities say it is controlling--is the intention of the parties in respect thereto and the manner of carrying out such intention. Mere intent by the owner to make an interstate shipment or preparatory gathering of goods at a depot for that purpose are not sufficient to constitute interstate transportation. It must appear that goods have entered upon transportation to another state or have been delivered to a carrier for that purpose. See Hughes Bros. Timber Co. v. State of Minnesota, 272 U.S. 469, 474, 475, 47 S.Ct. 170, 71 L.Ed. 359, 361, 362; Champlain Realty Co. v. City of Brattleboro, 260 U.S. 366, 43 S.Ct. 146, 67 L.Ed. 309, 25 A.L.R. 1195 and Annotation, 1201; Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co. v. Settle, 260 U.S. 166, 43 S.Ct. 28, 67 L.Ed. 189; Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U.S. 111, 33 S.Ct. 229, 57 L.Ed. 442; Railroad Commission of Ohio v. Worthington, 225 U.S. 101, 32 S.Ct. 653, 56 L.Ed. 1004; 11 Am. Jur., Commerce section 70.

It is settled by numerous decisions that a shipment is not divested of its interstate character by a temporary break in the transportation at an intermediate point to serve some necessity or convenience of the carrier. Change in the method of transportation, as from rail to boat, or in identity of the carriers, or rebilling from intermediate points do not destroy its interstate character. Such circumstances are mere incidents or 'accidents' of the transportation that do not change its essential character. See authorities last above, also United States v. Erie R. Co., 280 U.S. 98, 50 S.Ct. 51, 74 L.Ed. 187, and Annotation 187; Western Oil Refining Co. v. Lipscomb, 244 U.S. 346, 37 S.Ct. 623, 61 L.Ed. 1181; Buckingham Transp. Co. of Colorado v. Black Hills Transp. Co., 66 S.D. 230, 281 N.W. 94; 15 C.J.S., Commerce, § 25; 11 Am.Jur., Commerce, section 71.

Courts have frequently gone further in sustaining the interstate character of transportation than defendant asks of us here. We will notice a few of these decisions. In Railroad Commission of Ohio v. Worthington, supra, 225 U.S. 101, 108, 32 S.Ct. 653, 656, 56 L.Ed. 1004, 1008, coal was carried by rail from Ohio mines to lake ports in that state, there placed upon vessels and carried to upper lake ports outside the state. The carriage by rail was held to be interstate and not subject to rates fixed by the state railroad commission. The opinion says, 'By every fair test the transportation of this coal from the mine to the upper lake ports is an interstate carriage, intended by the parties to be such * * *.'

Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co., supra, 227 U.S. 111, 126, 33 S.Ct. 229, 234, 57 L.Ed. 442, 448, considers shipments of lumber from a mill in interior Texas over two railroads on local bills of lading to a point on the Gulf in the same state, destined for export to a foreign port, although the particular destination of any definite part of the lumber had not been fixed. The court holds the shipments by rail were interstate. The opinion states, 'The determining circumstance is that the shipment of the lumber to Sabine was but a step in its transportation to its real and ultimate destination in foreign countries. In other words, the essential character of the commerce, not its mere accidents, should determine.'

In Western Oil Refining Co. v. Lipscomb, supra, 244 U.S. 346, 350, 37 S.Ct. 623, 625, 61 L.Ed. 1181, 1184, plaintiff had an oil refinery in Illinois and a barrel factory in Indiana. To fill orders for its products in Tennessee it shipped two cars to Columbia, Tennessee, where the orders from that place were filled and then the cars were rebilled to Mt. Pleasant, Tennessee, where the orders from there were filled. The entire movement from Illinois and Indiana to Mt. Pleasant, Tennessee, was held to be...