State v. Western Union Teleg. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 January 1910
• Docket Number: Nos. 16,239 - (208<SMALL><SUP>2</SUP></SMALL>, 3<SMALL><SUP>3</SUP></SMALL>).,s. 16,239 - (208<SMALL><SUP>2</SUP></SMALL>, 3<SMALL><SUP>3</SUP></SMALL>).
• Citation: State v. Western Union Teleg. Co., 111 Minn. 21 (Minn. 1910)
• Parties: STATE v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

111 Minn. 21

STATE v.WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY.¹

Nos. 16,239 - (208², 3³).

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

January 7, 1910.

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Actions in the district court for Ramsey county under Laws 1891, p. 70, c. 8, to enforce the payment of unpaid balances of the taxes levied by the state board of equalization for each year from 1901 to 1905, both inclusive, upon defendant for its lines and equipment within the state of Minnesota.The actions were consolidated during the trial thereof by stipulation.The total balance claimed by the state was $40,564.07.

The answer alleged the act of congress of July 24, 1866, "An act to aid in the construction of telegraph lines, and to secure to the government the use of the same for postal, military and other purposes"(14 St. c. 230) and the amendments thereto (R. S. §§ 5263-5269); the acceptance of the terms of that act by the defendant, by which it became entitled to all the rights and privileges thereof; that all of its lines in Minnesota had been constructed and operated upon the military and post roads of the United States and upon the public domain; that thereby defendant in the use of its lines became and was an instrument of interstate commerce, and engaged as an agency of the United States government in the transmission of telegrams between the several departments of the government of the United States and their agents and officers for military, postal and other purposes of said government.It also alleged that the valuation of one million dollars made by the state board of equalization was a grossly excessive valuation and, in fact, included a valuation of franchises and property owned and used by defendant outside of Minnesota, and in consequence said valuation was null and void; that the value of its lines and property in the state of Minnesota was not more than $600,000.It also alleged and claimed immunity under section 8 of article 1 of the federal constitution from taxation directly or indirectly by the state of Minnesota on account of any receipts from its business, or on account of any property within the state of Minnesota, arising from the carrying on of interstate business or commerce by defendant, or because its property in Minnesota was used in carrying on interstate commerce, and claimed immunity by reason of said constitutional provision and of the federal statutes, particularly the act of congress before mentioned; that the franchises, rights and privileges granted by that act and its amendments, and employed by defendant, were not either directly or indirectly taxable by the state of Minnesota, and that no part of its property outside of Minnesota was either directly or indirectly taxable by the state.The answer also alleged that the enforcement of Laws 1891, c. 8, as amended byLaws 1901, c. 180, by a judgment against defendant in these actions would deprive it of its property without due process of law, would be a regulation both directly and indirectly by the state of Minnesota of interstate commerce and the taxation of franchises, rights and privileges belonging to, and enjoyed by, defendant by virtue of the federal constitution and statutes; and that said statute of Minnesota, as so construed, would be repugnant to section 8 of article 1 of the federal constitution and section 1 of amendment 14 and said laws of the United States.

The case was tried before Hallam, J., who made findings and ordered judgment in favor of plaintiff for the amount demanded.From the judgment entered pursuant to the order, defendant appealed.Modified.

C. M. Ferguson and Brown, Albert & Guesmer, for appellant.

George T. Simpson,Attorney General, George W. Peterson, Assistant Attorney General, Royal A. Stone and Charles W. Somerby, for the State.

JAGGARD, J.

The state of Minnesota, plaintiff and respondent, brought an action against the defendant and appellant under chapter 8, p. 70,Laws 1891, as amended bychapter 180, p. 251,Laws 1901, to enforce taxes for the years 1901-1904.A second action was brought under the same statute to recover taxes for 1905.By stipulation, both actions were tried together.The assessment made by the board of equalization for each of the five years in question was approximately one million dollars.Statements had been made by defendant as required by the statute concerning the extent of lines, poles and instruments and duly filed each year.Warrants were drawn for the payment of the full amount of taxes each year.They were only partially paid by defendant on the ground that the assessment in each year was excessive and illegal, and that the fair cash value of the property assessed was about $600,000.Judgment was entered for plaintiff against defendant for the sum of $49,047.63.From that judgment this appeal was taken.

1.Chapter 8, p. 70,Laws 1891, provided for the taxation of telegraph and telephone companies as a system.The validity of the law was sustained in State v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 Minn. 13, 15, 104 N. W. 567.Section 5 of this law was amended by chapter 180, p. 251,Laws 1901, the only effect of which was to change this particular section.Chapter 314, p. 581,Laws 1897, was entitled "An act to provide for the imposition and collection of a proportionate earnings tax upon the gross earnings of all property within the state of Minnesota of all telephone companies or owners whose lines are in or extend into or through said state, in lieu of other taxes."That law contained this proviso: "All acts inconsistent with the provisions hereof are hereby repealed."

Defendant's contention is: This, expressly, not impliedly, repealed the law of 1891."Where the meaning of a statute is plain, it is the duty of the courts to enforce it according to its obvious terms.In such case there is no necessity for construction."Thornley v. U. S., 113 U. S. 310, 313, 5 Sup. Ct. 491, 28 L. Ed. 999.And seeDoe v. Considine, 6 Wall. 458, 479, 18 L. Ed. 869;Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 188, 6 L. Ed. 23;City of Beardstown v. City of Virginia, 76 Ill. 34, 40;Hills v. City of Chicago, 60 Ill. 86, 90, 91;Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U. S. 112, 115, 25 L. Ed. 782;Crozer v. People, 206 Ill. 464, 69 N. E. 489, 491;Perteet v. People, 65 Ill. 230, 233;Newell v. People, 7 N. Y. 9, 98.The act of 1897 expressly and clearly repealed the law of 1891.There is no reason or justification for so misconstruing these plain words of repeal as to permit it to survive in part or in whole.

This argument of defendantwe have not been able to regard as sound.The title of the act of 1897 previously quoted did not purport to relate to the taxation of telegraph companies.It was not broad enough to cover that subject.The construction for which defendant contends would render it unconstitutional.It is elementary that laws must be construed so as to effectuate legislative intention.This court has done this with respect to this law, and it previously sustained the act of 1897 as applicable to telephone companies only, and the law of 1891 as applicable in 1900 to telegraph companies only.CompareState v. Western Union Tel. Co., supra, withState v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., 107 Minn. 390, 120 N. W. 534.It was the obvious intention of the legislature to tax the telephone companies on their gross earnings and to leave telegraph companies taxed as they had been on their valuation as a whole.This natural construction was evidently in the minds of the legislature when in 1901 it amended a section of the law of 1891, which it treated as then existing despite the passage of the law of 1897.State taxing officials and this defendant itself have so practically construed the law.This accords with the principle that: "A subsequent act of parliament will * * * control the provisions of a prior statute, if it were intended to have that operation; * * * that where the intention of the legislature was apparent that the subsequent act should not have such an operation, there, even though the words of such statute, taken strictly and grammatically, would repeal a former act * * * [it will] not receive such a construction."Per Lord Kenyon, Williams v. Pritchard, 4 T. R. 2, approved inMongeon v. People, 55 N. Y. 613, at page 617.

In State v. Moorhouse, 5 N. D. 406, 67 N. W. 141, the court was called upon to construe a provision in a taxing law similar to the one at bar.In that caseMr. Justice Corliss said: "It is obvious that the broad letter of this repealing act is in conflict with the whole spirit and purpose of the revenue law passed at the same time.As both cannot stand, it is obvious that we must give effect to that which expresses the true legislative purpose.* * * To give effect to that purpose we must limit the broad language of the repealing act so that it will not defeat such purpose."The facts in that case have especial significance here.We conclude that the absolute repeal must be construed as a qualified or partial repeal where, as here, the statute construed as a whole shows such to have been the real intent.1 Lewis, Sutherland, St. Const. 521, and see Home v. Nolan, 21 Mont. 205, 53 Pac. 738.In re Rochester Water Commissioners, 66 N. Y. 413, and seepage 422.

2.The defendant further contends that, if these two laws be construed as being both in force as hereinbefore set forth, the taxation of telegraph companies as a system is void because it discriminates in favor of telephone companies and is therefore void at least to the extent of the excess claimed.We are at a loss to see how this view can be logically sustained.It is practically conceded that each law was valid by itself.Defendant has failed to show why the later, and not the earlier, legislation should be invalidated.The courts have recognized the right of the statelegislature to determine for itself within wide limits matters of taxation pertaining to the classification of property and corporations and the methods of fixing their respective...