State v. Wetzel

• Decision Date: 20 June 1932
• Citation: 208 Wis. 603,243 N.W. 768
• Parties: STATE v. WETZEL.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

208 Wis. 603

243 N.W. 768

STATE

v.WETZEL.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

June 20, 1932.

Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the City of Janesville, Rock County; Charles H. Lang, Municipal Judge.

William Wetzel was convicted of violating the statute regulating the length, etc., of truck-semitrailer combination, and he appeals.--[By Editorial Staff.]

Affirmed.

The judgment, which was entered May 11, 1932, convicted defendant of the violation of section 85.45 (2) (b), Stats., and imposed a fine of $25 and costs.

The defendant was an employee of W. R. Arthur & Co., a corporation engaged in interstate commerce as a private contract carrier. At the time in question defendant was operating equipment known as a truck-semitrailer combination, which was approximately sixty feet in length. Within this combination, it is undisputed that the length of the semitrailer measuring from the extreme rear thereof to the rear of the truck to which it was attached was more than thirty-three feet.

Section 85.45, after limiting the over-all length of combinations of vehicles to sixty feet, provides in subdivision (2) (b) as follows: “The over-all length of a vehicle shall not exceed thirty-three feet. The over-all length of a semitrailer shall be measured from the rear thereof to the rear of the vehicle to which it is attached.”

This is the portion of the statute which defendant concededly violated. Upon the trial the defendant raised objections: (1) That section 85.45 (2) (b) should not be construed to apply to the instruments of interstate commerce; and (2) if it were so construed, it was invalid because in conflict with the commerce clause of the federal Constitution, with the Fourteenth Amendment, and the provisions of our state Constitution.

In order to expedite the appeal in this case a stipulation of facts was entered into in lieu of a bill of exceptions. In addition to the facts heretofore referred to, it is stipulated that the combination operated by the defendant was being used in interstate commerce, and that the employer of the defendant for several years had been engaged in interstate transportation for hire as a private carrier of new automobiles from the Chevrolet plant at Janesville to buyers in Illinois and other adjoining states. It was further agreed that this method of transportation has an advantage, in that the cars are delivered new and clean, thus avoiding the necessity of having the cars driven out from the factory and employing a person to drive each car, also avoiding the chances of injury to the car from being driven upon the road.

It is further conceded that if the truck were used with a frame or body extending nine feet further to the rear, the distance between the rear of the semitrailer and the rear of the front truck would not exceed the thirty-three feet as fixed by the statute. It is further stipulated that such a combination would require extensive changes in the equipment, which, in the case of Arthur & Co., consists of twelve such truck and semitrailer combinations. A combination so constructed would not be any safer in operation on the highway, and in fact would be less safe because in going around a curve or corner the longer frame at rear of the front truck would extend out from the sides. The combination involved in this case is so constructed that there is perfect alignment of the wheels of the semitrailer with the wheels of the truck, and in going down grades it does not tend to jackknife or swing out beyond the line of travel of the front truck. If a front truck with a longer wheel base were used and the semitrailer frame shortened, the combination would be no safer on the highways and the carrying capacity would be reduced from four cars to three cars, thus increasing the expense of transportation per car, and making it impossible to conduct this type of transportation with profit.

It is further stipulated that combinations of a truck in front, of twenty-five to thirty feet in length, and a four-wheel trailer in the rear, of twenty-five to thirty feet in length, fastened to the front unit with an over-all length of sixty feet, would comply with the law, but that it would not be any safer than the combination in question; that, on the contrary, such a combination would be less safe, in that it would have a tendency to jackknife and to weave and twist upon the highway. It would be more difficult to control on a slippery highway, and would be less safe in the operation of backing.

Finally, it is agreed that if a sixty-foot combination is to be permitted, as prescribed by the statute, there is no type of sixty-foot combination which on the whole and considering all factors can be made any safer for use on the highways than the sixty-foot combination which the defendant was driving and for whose operation he was convicted.

It is further conceded or agreed that the length of a combination of vehicles or of a single vehicle has a direct relation to safety, and that the longer combination or the longer single vehicle is less safe, assuming the same construction, but in a combination of vehicles of a given length the separation of the combination into units of lesser length does not promote safety, but on the contrary renders the combination less safe for operation on the highway. It is further conceded that a combination fifty feet in length but having the same proportions as between the semitrailer and the truck would be safer than the combination adopted by the defendant, but that this combination could not be operated in competition with transportation of the same kind on the sixty-foot combinations permitted by the statute.

Upon the facts as thus agreed upon, defendant was convicted, and appeals from the judgment and sentence.

Richmond, Jackman, Wilkie & Toebaas, of Madison (Allen & Dalbey, of Danville, Ill., of counsel), for appellant.

John W. Reynolds, Atty. Gen., Samuel Bryan, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Harrey S. Fox, Dist. Atty., of Janesville (William N. Schneider, of Madison, of counsel), for the State.

WICKHEM, J.

The first contention of the defendant is that the provision under which conviction was had is void because it imposes an unreasonable burden upon interstate commerce, without any necessity from the standpoint of safety. It is asserted that the section falls within the rule as stated in Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570, 45 S. Ct. 191, 193, 69 L. Ed. 445, 36 A. L. R. 1105, in which the court said: “But it is well settled that a state has no power to fetter the right to carry on interstate commerce within its borders by the imposition of conditions or regulations which are unnecessary and pass beyond the bounds of what is reasonable and suitable for the proper exercise of its powers in the field that belongs to it.” See, also, Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U. S. 197, 35 S. Ct. 57, 59 L. Ed. 193;Bush & Sons Co. v. Maloy, 267 U. S. 317, 45 S. Ct. 326, 327, 69 L. Ed. 627;Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 37, 30 S. Ct. 190, 54 L. Ed. 370;Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163, 48 S. Ct. 502, 72 L. Ed. 833, 62 A. L. R. 45;Morris v. Duby, 274 U. S. 135, 47 S. Ct. 548, 71 L. Ed. 967;Interstate Transit, Inc., v. Lindsey, 283 U. S. 183, 51 S. Ct. 380, 75 L. Ed. 953.

The second contention is that the section, both in its relation to interstate and intrastate commerce, is unreasonable and discriminatory, and violative of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Wisconsin Constitution (article 1, § 1), in that it takes property without due process and denies equal protection of the law. Reliance is had upon the doctrine as stated in Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193, 116 N. W. 885, 888, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 486, 128 Am. St. Rep. 1061, in which this court said: “There must be reasonable ground for the police interference and also the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose in view. So in all cases where the interference affects property and goes beyond what is reasonable by way of interfering with private rights, it offends against the general equality clause of the Constitution; it offends against the spirit of the whole instrument; it offends against the prohibitions against taking property without due process of law, and against taking private property for public use without first rendering just compensation therefor.”

[1][2] Since both contentions have a common fact basis, they may properly be discussed together. It is the claim that since section 85.45 (2) (b) purports to regulate the size of vehicles in the interest of public safety upon the highways, and since it is conceded in the stipulation of facts that in limiting the length of a semitrailer to thirty-three feet the statute has forbidden the operation of the safest combination, and required the operation of combinations that are less safe, an unreasonable burden is cast upon interstate commerce and there is an unjust and unreasonable discrimination between owners of trucks upon the highway. We regard this contention to be without merit for several reasons. It is...