State v. Wheaton.
| Citation | 130 Conn. 544,36 A.2d 118 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
| Decision Date | 10 February 1944 |
| Parties | STATE v. WHEATON. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; McLaughlin, Judge.
Marjorie Wheaton was convicted of the crime of practicing naturopathy without a license, and she appeals.
No error.
Fairfield County; January Term, 1944.
Philip Reich and Sigmund L. Miller, both of Bridgeport, for appellant (defendant).
Lorin W. Willis, of Bridgeport (Otto J. Saur, of Bridgeport, on the brief), for appellee (state).
Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, DICKENSON, and DALY, JJ. (Judge EDWARD J. DALY of the Superior Court sat for Judge ELLS).
The complaint in this action contains two counts. In the first count the defendant is charged with practicing naturopathy without a license and administering therapeutic treatments to one Samuel Rome on March 10, 1943. In the second count she is charged with administering therapeutic treatment to one Henry Mayo on March 26, 1943, without a license. The case was tried to a jury who returned a verdict of guilty on the first count and not guilty on the second count. The defendant moved to set aside the verdict of guilty on the first count as countrary to law and to the evidence and inconsistent with the finding of not guilty on the second count, and that she be adjudged not guilty upon the verdict rendered. These motions were denied and the court imposed sentence. The defendant has appealed from the denial of the motions and from the judgment and has assigned error in rulings on evidence, in comments by the state's attorney during argument and in the charge.
General Statutes, § 2775, prohibits the practice of or the attempt to practice naturopathy by an unlicensed person. Section 991e of the Cumulative Supplement of 1939 defines the practice of naturopathy as ‘the practice of the psychological, mechanical and material sciences of healing as follows: The psychological sciences, such as psycho-therapy; the mechanical sciences, such as mechano-therapy, articular manipulation, corrective and orthopedic gymnastics, neuro-therapy, physio-therapy, hydro-therapy, electro-therapy, thermo-therapy, photo-therapy, chromo-therapy, vibro-therapy, concussion and pneumato-therapy, and the material sciences, such as dietetics, and external applications; but shall not mean internal medication or the administering of any substance simulating medicine or the form of medicine, except dehydrated foods.’ The expression in both statutes is ‘practice.’ Complaint of a single therapeutic treatment by the means specified, standing alone, would not be a proper charge of a violation of the statute. State v. Faatz, 83 Conn. 300, 304, 76 A. 295. The second count was deficient in this respect, but in view of the verdict this is immaterial.
The defendant produced no witnesses and the jury could reasonably have found the following facts: No. 8 Elmwood Avenue, Bridgeport, has the appearance of being a single house on a corner in a residential section. Affixed to its porch railing was a sign which read: ‘Institute of Electro-Hydro-Therapeutic Treatments, Scientific Massage.’ In a window on the first floor was a sign which read: ‘Wheaton Health Institute, Pine Needle Baths, Bakes, Massage.’ A sign on the front door read: ‘Walk In.’ Inside the door was a large room in which were a desk and telephone. Beyond was a dressing room and adjoining this was a room with an examining table and with charts of the human body on the wall. A state police officer, Rome, acting on a complaint from the state license board went to the house on March 10, 1943, in plain clothes. He opened the door marked ‘Walk In’ and entered the large room in which were the desk and telephone, and shortly thereafter the defendant entered. He saw no one else on the premises during his stay. He asked the defendant if she treated people ‘the same as a chiropractor does' and she said ‘Yes, be seated.’ At all times in her presence he feigned a limp. He did not otherwise complain of an ailment nor did she ask him if he had one. She conducted him to the dressing room and told him to strip to the waist. He did so and was led to the room containing the examining table and told to lie on this on his back. The defendant flexed his legs by bending the knees and ankles and then held the legs together and said ‘That's it.’ The officer asked her what she meant and she replied that one leg was two inches shorter than the other and this condition might cause kidney, liver and bladder troubles. She then had him lie prone and applied a heat lamp to his back. Following this she applied an ice-cold towel to it, massaged it with alcohol and ran an electric tube up and down his spine, causing a pricking sensation. She then had him sit up and flexed his shoulders and arms. She told him to come again in three days and that her fee was $3, which he paid. He asked her what to do in case of severe pain and was told to take aspirin before retiring. The officer was in good health when he went to thedefendant and was suffering no ailments. He returned on March 26, entered the house and took a seat in the outer room. Presently the defendant appeared and asked him how he felt. The defendant had no license to practice naturopathy. The use of electricity, heat, water, vibration and muscular articulation for therapeutic purposes constitutes such practice.
The main contention of the defendant is that these facts show but a single treatment, that this was not for therapeutic purposes and that in any event it was not enough to warrant a verdict of practicing naturopathy, relying on State v. Faatz, supra. In that case it was said that the performance of one or more dental operations was by no means the same as practicing dentistry. There the question was one of pleading. The court pointed out (page 304 of 83 Con n., page 297 of 76 A.) that it was alleged in the complaint that the defendant performed dental operations, whereas the statute prohibited the practice of dentistry without a license to do so; that...
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