State v. White, s. 78-571

• Decision Date: 27 June 1980
• Docket Number: 78-612 and 78-613,Nos. 78-571,78-594,s. 78-571
• Citation: 97 Wis.2d 193,295 N.W.2d 346
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, v. Glen WHITE, Robin Roberts, Martin Falcon, and Lindley Thompson, Defendants- Appellants.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 346

295 N.W.2d 346

97 Wis.2d 193

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, v. Glen WHITE, Robin Roberts, Martin Falcon, and Lindley Thompson, Defendants- Appellants.

Nos. 78-571, 78-594, 78-612 and 78-613.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued June 4, 1980.

Decided June 27, 1980.

Pamela Magee-Heilprin, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), with whom on the briefs were Bronson C. La Follette, Atty. Gen., David A. Shudlick, Asst. Dist. Atty. of Monroe County, for plaintiff-respondent-petitioner.

Steven P. Weiss, Asst. State Public Defender, for defendants-appellants.

DAY, Justice.

The four defendants were convicted of offenses arising under the motor vehicle laws. Each challenged his conviction on identical grounds, therefore, their cases were consolidated on appeal. Three of the defendants, Martin Falcon, Robin Roberts, and Glen White, were charged with operating a motor vehicle after license revocation contrary to sec. 343.44, Stats. (1977). The fourth defendant, Lindley Thompson, was charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, second offense, contrary to sec. 346.63, Stats. (1977). Each defendant was found guilty of the charged offense, and sentenced to a mandatory minimum term in the county jail. ¹

The issues to be addressed on this review are:

1. When a defendant is charged with an offense which upon conviction carries a mandatory jail term, must the complaint satisfy the requirements of probable cause?

We conclude that the complaint must.

2. If the complaint must state probable cause, do the uniform traffic citations and complaints issued to these defendants state probable cause?

We conclude that they do not.

Each of the defendants was issued a uniform traffic citation and complaint, which served as the charging document for the institution of these proceedings. The defendants moved before trial to dismiss the prosecution based on the legal insufficiency of the uniform traffic citation and complaint under state statutory law, and the state and federal constitutions. The motions to dismiss were denied, and after conviction appeals were taken. The court of appeals vacated the convictions ² holding that the uniform traffic citation and complaints were insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction on the circuit court over the defendants. ³

1. WHEN A DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH AN OFFENSE WHICH UPON CONVICTION CARRIES A MANDATORY JAIL TERM, MUST THE

COMPLAINT SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF

PROBABLE CAUSE ?

The state does not contend that the defendants were not charged with crimes. A crime as defined in the statutes is ". . . conduct which is prohibited by state law and punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. Conduct punishable only by a forfeiture is not a crime." Sec. 939.12, Stats. (1977); see, State ex rel. Prentice v. County Court, 70 Wis.2d 230, 241, 234 N.W.2d 283 (1975); State ex rel. Winnie v. Harris, 75 Wis.2d 547, 553, 249 N.W.2d 791 (1977). Because a mandatory term of incarceration is part of the punishment for the offenses charged, the defendants were convicted of crimes. The criminal procedure code mandates that its provisions ". . . shall govern all criminal proceedings . . . ." Sec. 967.01, Stats. (1977).

Prosecution of a misdemeanor criminal case is to be by a complaint or an indictment. Sec. 967.05, Stats. A complaint to be valid must contain ". . . a written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. It may be made on information and belief. It shall be made upon oath before a district attorney or judge as provided in this chapter." Sec. 968.01, Stats. (1977).

The complaint in a criminal case must meet probable cause requirements to confer personal jurisdiction on the circuit court.

"The complaint issued subsequent to a valid arrest must meet probable cause requirements. . . .

'While its purpose is no longer to authorize the seizure of the person of the defendant, it is the jurisdictional requirement for holding a defendant for a preliminary examination or other proceedings. The face of the complaint and any affidavits annexed thereto must recite probable cause for defendant's detention.' " State v. Asfoor, 75 Wis.2d 411, 426, 249 N.W.2d 529, 535-36 (1977) quoting from State ex rel. Cullen v. Ceci, 45 Wis.2d 432, 442-443, 173 N.W.2d 175 (1970); State ex rel. Evanow v. Seraphim, 40 Wis.2d 223, 226, 161 N.W.2d 369 (1968).

This is a requirement of state statutory law. State ex rel. Evanow v. Seraphim, supra. A defect in the issuance of the complaint prevents the exercise of jurisdiction over the person. Scheid v. State, 60 Wis.2d 575, 579, 211 N.W.2d 458 (1973).

Conceding that probable cause is required to be stated on the face of the complaint in all other criminal proceedings, the state asserts that when the uniform traffic citation and complaint is used as a charging document in criminal cases, it does not have to recite probable cause to confer personal jurisdiction over the defendant on the circuit court. We do not agree.

Use of the uniform citation and complaint is provided for in sec. 345.11, Stats. (1977). Two subsections of sec. 345.11, Stats. are pertinent to the resolution of the jurisdictional question presented. They are:

"(1) On and after July 1, 1969 the uniform traffic citation created by this section shall in the case of moving traffic violations and may in the case of parking violations be used by all law enforcement agencies in this state which are authorized to enforce the state traffic laws and any local traffic laws enacted by any local authority in accordance with s. 394.06. . . . ⁴

"(5) Notwithstanding any other provision of the statutes, the use of the uniform traffic citation and complaint promulgated under sub. (4) by any peace officer in connection with the enforcement of any state traffic laws or any local traffic ordinances in strict conformity with the state traffic laws, shall be deemed adequate process to give the appropriate court jurisdiction over the person upon the filing with such court of the uniform traffic complaint."

The state argues that sec. 345.11(5), Stats. provides a unique exception to the otherwise uniform system of criminal procedure as applied in this state. The uniform citation is used to "enforce the state traffic laws," and its use is mandatory for "moving traffic violations." The state asserts that the defendants were charged with violations of the "traffic laws" of this state. Because they were charged with violating the traffic laws, even though these violations were also crimes, it is asserted that the uniform traffic citation and complaint standing alone would be sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the defendant on the circuit court.

Upon initial examination of the statute, it would appear that the state's argument is a strong one. However, before we will construe a statute in a manner which would create an anomaly in the procedure used to prosecute a particular class of criminal cases, we require a strong showing that this result is what the legislature in fact intended. Even when a statute appears unambiguous on its face, it can be rendered ambiguous by its interaction with and its relation to other statutes. State v. Kenyon, 85 Wis.2d 36, 49, 270 N.W.2d 160 (1978).

Because sec. 345.11, Stats. does not define the precise scope of its application, referring to the violations of traffic laws in general, reference may be made to the history of the statute and other matters beyond the statutory language to determine its purpose and effect.

When sec. 345.11, Stats. was enacted by ch. 292, Laws of 1967, violations of state laws relating to the operation and use of motor vehicles carried penalties consisting of fines or imprisonment. As structured, these violations were therefore crimes. See e.g., secs. 346.22, 346.43, 346.30, 346.49, 346.56, 346.60, 346.65, 346.82, Stats. (1969). These offenses were required to be charged by a document which was legally sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction on the appropriate court. When a complaint charged a criminal offense, it had to state probable cause. Galloway v. State, 32 Wis.2d 414, 418, 145 N.W.2d 761 (1966). As originally enacted, subsection five of sec. 345.11, Stats. stated that the uniform traffic citation and complaint was sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court. No reference was made to personal jurisdiction, undoubtedly in recognition of the fact that violations of the criminal law were to be prosecuted, and judicial proceedings instituted, in conformity with the statutes governing criminal procedure.

With the enactment of ch. 278, Laws of 1971, violations of "traffic regulations" became non-criminal forfeiture actions. A new uniform procedure was established to handle the vast majority of traffic offenses. The purpose and effect of this new procedure was described in J. Hough, Wisconsin's Uniform Traffic Court Procedure, 45 Wis. Bar B, 9, 10 (August 1972):

"Law enforcement officers, prosecutors, the courts and the people are all entitled to be subjected to only one uniform procedure for the trial of traffic cases in Wisconsin. The uniform traffic procedure, to a great extent, replaces confusion, inequity, and delay with reliance, equal treatment and greater efficiency. The new procedure spells out clearly for the first time all of the steps to be followed in the apprehension and trial of traffic violators. There will no longer be confusion as to which procedure should apply, what rights are available to the offender, etc. Traffic law has developed as a separate and distinct category of cases and are treated as such by the new uniform procedure."

The uniform traffic citation and complaint would have been an appropriate vehicle for conferring personal jurisdiction over the defendant under this newly designed traffic court system. However, sec. 345.11, Stats. had little usefulness because as it existed in 1971, it referred only to subject matter jurisdiction, which was already covered by...