State v. White

Decision Date06 July 2022
Docket NumberID. No. 1703022008
Citation278 A.3d 680
Parties STATE of Delaware, v. Richard C. WHITE
CourtDelaware Superior Court

Diana A. Dunn, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for the State of Delaware.

Mr. Richard C. White, pro se.

OPINION

WALLACE, J.

Richard C. White is serving a sentence of life imprisonment following a guilty plea to a single count of Rape in the Second Degree. In his present postconviction relief motion, Mr. White asks the Court to set aside its judgment of sentence and strike his plea. He says the Court can and should do this because of a purported fatal deficiency in his plea colloquy.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

In September of 2017, a grand jury indicted Mr. White for 11 counts of Rape in the Second Degree, one count of Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child, one count of Dangerous Crime Against a Child, five counts of Sexual Exploitation of a Child, one count of Dealing in Child Pornography, and six counts of Possession of Child Pornography.2

These 25 felonies arose from a five-year course of sexual abuse that began when the victim, an acquaintance of one of Mr. White's children, was just twelve years old. The victim described how their contact began in November 2012 when Mr. White—then a 36-year-old father of twin boys—started texting her. Within a few months, Mr. White regularly picked up the prepubescent victim from her home or school, took her back to his house, and engaged in multiple acts of intercourse and sexual penetration with her. Mr. White would, at times, use still photography and cellphone video to record what became weekly sessions.

Eventually, when Mr. White lost his home, he would take his victim to parking lots, parks, and other secluded public places for sexual encounters. As the victim grew older and more resistant to Mr. White's actions, he would use manipulation or threats to continue having sex with her.

The victim was terrified to tell anyone of Mr. White's exploitation. She explained that she felt trapped for the five years of abuse and simply did not know how to get out; every time she would mention stopping the sexual routine with Mr. White, he would threaten to tell people about their "relationship," or threaten either suicide or publication of the videos and photographs. The abuse ended in March 2017 when the victim finally confided to her softball coach what Mr. White had been doing.

Mr. White pleaded guilty to a single count of second-degree rape.3 He did so in exchange for dismissal of all of the remaining charges and the State's favorable capped sentencing recommendation.4 The guilty plea colloquy confirms that Mr. White's decision to enter his guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and the product of an intelligent decision made with an adequate opportunity to discuss all aspects of his case with counsel.5 Most importantly here, Mr. White confirmed both verbally and in writing that he was well-aware he faced a minimum mandatory term of 25 years imprisonment and the potential of a life sentence.6

Following a presentence investigation, Mr. White was sentenced.7 The Court considered his counsel's presentation, his background, his expressions of remorse both before and at sentencing, the devastation visited on Mr. White's family by his acts, the many letters of familial support, and "every piece of sentencing information in this case."8 The Court considered those many factors in light of the aggravators present and determined that Mr. White should serve the rest of his natural life in prison.9 And the Court, as it usually does, articulated its reasons for such sentence both at the sentencing hearing and in its sentencing order.10

Mr. White docketed a timely direct appeal. After considering his counsel's Rule 26(c) briefing and the several arguments he himself raised, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Mr. White's conviction and sentence.11

While that appeal was pending, Mr. White had filed a timely pro se motion under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b) requesting reduction of the Level V term of his sentence.12 Through that motion, Mr. White sought reduction of his term of imprisonment "to anything other than natural life" because: (a) he believed he had now been properly diagnosed and medicated for mental health issues; (b) he believed there were irregularities in the presentence investigation process; (c) he said was truly remorseful; (d) he believed he received "ineffective representation" when accepting his plea and at sentencing; (e) his family was experiencing great hardship; and (f) his rough comparison of what he said were comparable cases suggests he is serving a disproportionate sentence.13 Once Mr. White's case was returned to this Court after direct appeal, his Rule 35 motion was considered on its merits. Mr. White had an opportunity to then supplement his sentence-reduction plea and the State was given an opportunity to respond. The Court denied Mr. White's motion to reduce his sentence.14

Now pending is his Motion for Postconviction Relief filed under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.

II. MR. WHITE'S POSTCONVICTION CLAIM

Mr. White's single claim on postconviction is that his plea colloquy was somehow inadequate and, therefore, his guilty plea cannot stand.15 Distilled further, Mr. White asserts that the Court omitted a sine qua non caution he believes was required by Superior Court Criminal Rule 11 in his case, thus representing a "structural error" invalidating his plea.16 To be sure, where there is "a recommendation [by the attorney general] ... for a particular sentence",17 Rule 11 prescribes an advisory that "if the court does not accept the recommendation ... the defendant nevertheless has no right to withdraw the plea."18 Now fixated on an absence of such an explicit warning in the record of his plea colloquy,19 Mr. White contends this is a sufficient basis for striking his plea and starting over from square one.20

III. APPLICATION OF RULE 61 ’s PROCEDURAL BARS

Before the Court can consider the substance of any postconviction claim, it must first address Criminal Rule 61 ’s procedural requirements.21 The procedural bars in Rule 61 are timeliness, repetitiveness, procedural default, and former adjudication.22

Here, Mr. White's postconviction motion was filed less than a year after his judgment of conviction became final. So, it's timely. This is also Mr. White's first motion for postconviction relief. So, it's not repetitive. But the procedural default and former adjudication hurdles bear further discussion.

IV. MR. WHITE'S SOLE POSTCONVICTION CLAIM IS RESOLVED VIA APPLICATION OF RULE 61 ’S PROCEDURAL BARS

One striking anomaly in this postconviction proceeding—what Mr. White is not arguing. Notwithstanding certain allusions to purported deficiencies by counsel in earlier filings,23 Mr. White now has made it clear both in writing24 and when directly questioned that he is not leveling a charge of ineffective assistance of counsel:

THE COURT: So you're not claiming [trial/plea or appellate counsel] was ineffective either as far as the plea or on appeal?
MR. WHITE: Negative.25

So Mr. White raises no ineffective assistance of counsel claim but instead urges the Court to simply apply the standards that otherwise govern its criminal rules—including Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ’s bars.26

A. PREVIOUS ADJUDICATION FINDING MR. WHITE ENTERED HIS GUILTY PLEA KNOWINGLY , INTELLIGENTLY , AND VOLUNTARILY .

Under Rule 61(i)(4) : "[a]ny ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is thereafter barred."27

Mr. White asserts one claim in his Rule 61 motion: that his plea cannot stand because the Court did not expressly warn him that it was not bound by the State's sentencing recommendation and that he would have no cause to withdraw his guilty plea if that recommendation were rejected.28 The State contends that Rule 61(i)(4) procedurally bars this claim because it was, in essence, formerly adjudicated on direct appeal.29 Mr. White counters in few words—"involuntary plea was not considered a ground on his direct appeal."30 So the Court must resolve the applicability of this (and any other) Rule 61 procedural bar.31

During his direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, Mr. White was represented by the same attorney he had during the plea proceedings here. And during his appeal, Mr. White's counsel filed a brief and motion to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26(c). Counsel averred that, based upon a complete and careful examination of the record, there were no arguably appealable issues to raise on direct appeal. In response, Mr. White exercised his right to supplement his counsel's presentation and penned eight issues for the Supreme Court's consideration—some of which, at their core, required the Court to determine whether he entered his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.32

"Justice does not require that an issue that has been previously considered and rejected be revisited simply because the claim is refined or restated."33 In effect, the Supreme Court has already addressed arguments questioning the validity of Mr. White's plea that are so closely related to that made here as to trigger Rule 61(i)(4) ’s former adjudication bar.

At times when assessing a certain postconviction claim a court might find its underlying issues to have been fully addressed in an earlier adjudication of a related claim in the case and "conclude that the interests of justice would not be served by any further consideration of them."34 No doubt, a postconviction court is often urged by a Rule 61 petitioner to address a claim close but not identical to one that was substantively resolved—i.e. , formerly adjudicated—on direct appeal.35 And, in the right instance, such a latter postconviction claim might properly be deemed procedurally barred...

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