State v. White

• Decision Date: 27 April 2009
• Docket Number: No. 26642.,26642.
• Citation: 676 S.E.2d 684,382 S.C. 265
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Gary A. WHITE, Petitioner.

676 S.E.2d 684 382 S.C. 265 The STATE, Respondent,
v.
Gary A. WHITE, Petitioner. No. 26642. Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard February 4, 2009. Decided April 27, 2009. Rehearing Denied May 28, 2009.

[676 S.E.2d 685]

Appellate Defender LaNelle C. DuRant, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Senior Assistant Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, Jr., all of Columbia, and Solicitor Warren Blair Giese, of Columbia, for Respondent.

Justice KITTREDGE:

We granted a writ of certiorari to review a court of appeals opinion upholding the admissibility of Rule 702, SCRE, expert testimony related to dog tracking evidence. State v. White, 372 S.C. 364, 642 S.E.2d 607 (Ct.App. 2007). We affirm the court of appeals in result.

I.

This case arises from an armed robbery of a convenience store in Columbia, South Carolina. After midnight on April 19, 2004, Gary White and Anthony Morris were riding in a car driven by Roy Wiggins. As Wiggins drove past a convenience store, White told Wiggins to turn around and go back to the store. Wiggins complied. Wiggins drove to the store and parked behind it. White and Morris exited the car, with Wiggins staying behind in the driver's seat. White was carrying a gun.

White and Morris entered the convenience store. Gwen Anthony, the store manager, was restocking the grill area when White and Morris entered suddenly. Anthony described the robbers' entry as a "flash."

White, armed with the gun, grabbed Anthony, put his arm around her, and pointed the gun to her neck. Morris moved through the store stealing cash, lottery tickets and an 18-pack of beer while White continued to hold Anthony at gunpoint. While Morris was at the beer cooler, White, while standing up, apparently lost consciousness.

Anthony testified that White's head fell to her shoulder, and the gun dropped from her neck. Although he was unconscious for only a few seconds, Anthony observed that White's breath smelled like alcohol, his gun was black with a silver top, and his jeans were baggy and dark in color. With the 18-pack of beer in hand, Morris ran up the aisle toward the door and screamed at White, waking him. White, still holding Anthony, returned the gun to her neck and began to move toward the door, forcing her to accompany him. As they exited the store, White pushed Anthony away and ran in the opposite direction. At that very moment, Officer Rouppasong of the Columbia Police Department pulled into the store parking lot on a routine break.

Upon his arrival on the scene, Officer Rouppasong saw two people: Anthony, waving and flagging him down and another person running away from the store. Rouppasong described the man he saw running as a black male, wearing a white t-shirt and dark colored pants, holding or carrying something in one of his hands. Rouppasong remained in his vehicle and followed White. As he followed him around the corner of the store, Rouppasong saw a car parked on the street. Rouppasong saw a black male (later identified as White) exit the car on the passenger side and flee. Rouppasong did not give chase; instead, he stayed with the vehicle and Wiggins. Officer Gunter, with the K9 unit, was called to the scene to search for the suspect.

Officer Gunter arrived on the scene approximately thirty minutes after the robbery. Once there, Rouppasong relayed the necessary information that allowed Gunter to know where to initiate the track. Gunter and his tracking dog, Aurie, began tracking and soon found White nearby sleeping next to some bushes, gun in hand. Rouppasong testified that the man he saw lying by the bushes, asleep, was the same man he saw exiting the store and fleeing the crime scene. There were two other in-court eyewitness identifications of White. Wiggins testified that White left his car with a gun, returned to his car a short time later, and then fled when police arrived. The second identification came from Morris.

White was convicted of two counts of armed robbery and kidnapping; he was sentenced

676 S.E.2d 686

to life without parole.¹ The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting the contention that dog tracking evidence must satisfy the standard for "scientific based" expert testimony under State v. Jones, 273 S.C. 723, 259 S.E.2d 120 (1979). The court of appeals noted a distinction between two types of expert testimony, "scientific evidence versus experience-based knowledge." White, 372 S.C. at 381, 642 S.E.2d at 615. With regard to nonscientific expert testimony (which includes dog tracking evidence), the court of appeals found that "questions about the reliability of [the dog handler] go only to the weight [of his testimony], but not admissibility." Id. at 376, 642 S.E.2d at 613. Because of the suggestion that an initial determination of reliability is not part of the trial court's gatekeeping role, we granted White's petition for a writ of certiorari.²

II. A.

A trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony will not be reversed absent a prejudicial abuse of discretion. State v. Price, 368 S.C. 494, 498, 629 S.E.2d 363, 365 (2006).

White concedes the dog handler met the Rule 702, SCRE, qualifications due to his experience and training.³ White contends the trial court failed in its gatekeeping role to vet the reliability of the dog's tracking skills, thus leaving the jury to speculate about the dog's reliability. We agree with White's premise that all expert testimony under Rule 702, SCRE, imposes on the trial courts an affirmative and meaningful gatekeeping duty. To the extent the court of appeals opinion may be construed as excluding a gatekeeping role for trial courts in connection with nonscientific (or experienced based)⁴ expert testimony, such construction is rejected.

All expert testimony must satisfy the Rule 702 criteria, and that includes the trial court's gatekeeping function in ensuring the proposed expert testimony meets a reliability threshold for the jury's ultimate consideration. Rule 702 provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

"This language makes no relevant distinction between `scientific' knowledge and `technical' or `other specialized' knowledge. It makes clear that any such knowledge might become the subject of expert testimony.... Hence, as a matter of language, the Rule applies its reliability standard to all `scientific,' `technical,' or `other specialized' matters within its scope." Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). Reliability is a central feature of Rule 702 admissibility, and our jurisprudence is in complete accord. State v. Jones, 343 S.C. 562, 572, 541 S.E.2d 813, 818 (2001) (finding error in the trial court's decision to admit "unreliable" expert evidence); State v. Council, 335 S.C. 1, 20, 515 S.E.2d 508, 518 (1999) (noting that before expert

676 S.E.2d 687

evidence is admitted the trial court must determine it is reliable).

With regard to dog tracking evidence, this Court's jurisprudence (even prior to the adoption of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence in 1995) speaks to the reliability foundational requirement of such...