State v. White

Citation958 P.2d 982,135 Wn.2d 761
Decision Date13 July 1998
Docket NumberNo. 64973-1,64973-1
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Washington
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Ronald E. WHITE, Petitioner.
Leo E. Poort, Seattle, for amicus curiae on behalf of Washington Ass'n of Sheriffs

Resnick, Hansen & Follis, Starck Follis, Bellingham, for Petitioner.

David McEachran, Whatcom County Prosecutor, Laura Hayes, David M. Grant, Deputy Whatcom County Prosecutors, Bellingham, for Respondent.

JOHNSON, Justice.

We review the permissible scope of a warrantless

inventory search of a locked automobile trunk under article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. The search of a locked automobile trunk was conducted during an impound proceeding following the arrest of the Defendant. In 1980, this court held police may not search a locked automobile trunk during an inventory search absent a manifest necessity, not present here. State v. Houser, 95 Wash.2d 143, 156, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980). The Court of Appeals focused on the accessibility of items in the trunk to a "would-be thief" due to the vehicle's trunk release mechanism in the glove box and held the search legal. State v. White, 83 Wash.App. 770, 924 P.2d 55 (1996). We reverse the Court of Appeals and hold article I, section 7 prohibits the warrantless search of the locked trunk of an automobile.

FACTS

The Defendant, Ronald E. White, was stopped by police in Bellingham, Washington for failing to stop at a stop sign. When questioned, White wrongfully identified himself as "Dan White" and initially said he did not own the car. The officer asked the Defendant for consent to search the vehicle, which he refused. The officer asked the Defendant to exit the vehicle and, despite the fact the officer stopped the Defendant for running a stop sign, presented "Dan White" with a citation for driving with an expired license only. The officer told the Defendant his vehicle would be impounded under RCW 46.20.435, 1 because the Defendant had an expired driver's license, and inventoried under Bellingham Police Department procedures.

The Defendant then admitted he was Ron White and told the police officer he did not properly identify himself The police officer impounded the vehicle under RCW 46.20.435 because (1) the driver was operating a vehicle with a revoked license; (2) the officer was unsure of the true ownership of the vehicle; and (3) the Defendant had many outstanding warrants for his arrest.

because of outstanding warrants for his arrest. The officer ran a second Department of Motor Vehicles search and discovered White's driving status [958 P.2d 984] had been revoked and there were six outstanding warrants for the Defendant's arrest. The officer arrested the Defendant for the outstanding warrants and for driving while license revoked and placed the Defendant in the patrol car.

The inventory search was conducted in accordance with Bellingham Police Department procedures which required police to search the trunk if it could be opened by a key or a release latch. During this search, a trunk release button was found in the unlocked glove box which opened the locked trunk. In the trunk, officers searched an unlocked fishing tackle box which, when opened, was found to contain drug paraphernalia, marijuana, lighters, smoking devices, clear wrapped currency, and clear wrapped cocaine.

The State charged White with unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in violation of RCW 69.50.401(a)(1) and driving while license suspended or revoked in violation of RCW 46.20.342. At trial, White moved to suppress the items found in his trunk. He argued the police had exceeded the scope of a lawful inventory search as set out in Houser, 95 Wash.2d 143, 622 P.2d 1218 by opening the locked trunk. The trial court agreed, suppressed the evidence, and dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals reversed and held the search valid. White, 83 Wash.App. at 782, 924 P.2d 55. We reverse.

ANALYSIS

In this case, the police conducted a warrantless inventory search of the trunk of the Defendant's automobile. In Houser, 95 Wash.2d 143, 622 P.2d 1218, we defined the permissible scope of an inventory search of an impounded vehicle. While we said inventory searches conducted under standard police procedures are reasonable, we stated "an inventory search may not be unlimited in scope." Houser, 95 Wash.2d at 154, 622 P.2d 1218. Concerned about the possibility for abuse, we limited the scope of an inventory search "to those areas necessary to fulfill its purpose." Houser, 95 Wash.2d at 155, 622 P.2d 1218. After finding there was not an unreasonable risk of theft for property left in the locked trunk of a vehicle, we explicitly held an officer may not open and examine the locked trunk of an impounded vehicle during an inventory search absent a manifest necessity for conducting the search. Houser, 95 Wash.2d at 156, 622 P.2d 1218. 2 The State argues, and the Court of Appeals agreed, the search was lawful in this case because access to the trunk was obtained via a trunk release button located in the unlocked glove box. Both suggest this release mechanism creates a situation distinguishable from Houser; we disagree.

In this case, the Court of Appeals did not read Houser as establishing a bright line rule prohibiting the police from searching a locked automobile trunk. White, 83 Wash.App. at 778, 924 P.2d 55. Rather, the Court of Appeals understood the analysis in Houser to focus on whether the potential for theft of valuables and for false claims against the police department justified the intrusion when the trunk could be opened from inside the passenger compartment. White, 83 Wash.App. at 779-80, 924 P.2d 55. The Court of Appeals focused on the prevention of theft as described in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976), rather than on the greater protection afforded to individuals under article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. The Court of Appeals misread the essential holding of Houser.

In Houser, we found police could search an unlocked glove compartment of an abandoned automobile during an inventory search because documents of ownership and registration are kept there and because the glove box is a place of temporary storage of valuables. However, in Houser we limited the scope of the search and stated:

We do not believe that it was necessary to enter the locked trunk in order to serve these purposes. We note that the inventory search which was approved in Opperman extended only to the car's unlocked glove compartment. Moreover, property locked in the trunk of an automobile, as here, presents no great danger of theft. It is apparent that a would-be thief would be unaware of the existence of property of value in the trunk. Indeed, countless numbers of automobiles with locked trunks are daily left on the city streets of this country without unreasonable risk of theft. Accordingly, we think that any need to protect property located in a locked trunk is outweighed by the countervailing privacy interests of the individual in the enclosed area of the trunk.

Houser, 95 Wash.2d at 155-56, 622 P.2d 1218 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 3 From this language, our focus was primarily on the individual privacy interests and not on the needs of police in avoiding claims, as the Court of Appeals discussed. By focusing on individual privacy interests, our analysis in Houser necessarily focused on the inquiry required by article I, section 7. This is unlike the Fourth Amendment analysis the United States Supreme Court used in Opperman.

The fact an automobile may have a trunk release mechanism does not diminish an individual's privacy interests. Inside trunk latch releases are merely a substitute for the use of a key to unlock the trunk. Whether a locked trunk is opened by a key or a latch, it is still locked. The privacy interests are the same. We hold the use of the trunk release mechanism in this case is still the warrantless search of a locked trunk, which brings this case squarely under the holding of Houser.

The Court of Appeals was correct in determining that Houser is grounded in article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. White, 83 Wash.App. at 781-82, 924 P.2d 55. Article I, section 7 provides that "[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." Under the Washington Constitution, the relevant inquiry is whether the State unreasonably intruded into the Defendant's private affairs. State v. Myrick, 102 Wash.2d 506, 510, 688 P.2d 151 (1984). The analysis under article I, section 7 focuses, not on a defendant's actual or subjective expectation of privacy but, as we have previously established, on those privacy interests Washington citizens held in the past and are entitled to hold in the future. Myrick, 102 Wash.2d at 510-11, 688 P.2d 151. The holding in Houser centered on the privacy interests of the individual; accordingly, Houser is an article I, section 7 case.

The analysis in Houser is not unusual. We have often diverged from the United States Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisdiction, and we have more narrowly defined the exceptions to the search warrant requirements. 4 We are once again confronted with the warrantless search of an automobile. However, in this case we have an analytical advantage because we know article I, section 7 provides more protection to individuals from searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment. Our inquiry is no longer whether article I, section 7 provides greater protection but, rather, does the scope of the protection apply to the facts of the case. 5 No Gunwall 6 analysis is necessary in this case because we apply established principles of state constitutional jurisprudence. We are guided in this decision by those prior cases that have defined the fact that article I, section 7 differs from the Fourth...

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