State v. White

• Court: Utah Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Before Judges McHUGH, THORNE, and CHRISTIANSEN.
• Citation: State v. White, 256 P.3d 255, 2011 UT App 155 (Utah App. 2011)
• Decision Date: 12 May 2011
• Docket Number: No. 20090279–CA.,20090279–CA.
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-appellee,v.James Benjamin WHITE, Defendant, Appellee, and Cross-appellant.

256 P.3d 255

2011 UT App 155

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-appellee,

v.James Benjamin WHITE, Defendant, Appellee, and Cross-appellant.

No. 20090279–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

May 12, 2011.

Mark L. Shurtleff and Ryan D. Tenney, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.Ronald Fujino, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.Before Judges McHUGH, THORNE, and CHRISTIANSEN.

OPINION

THORNE, Judge:

¶ 1 The State of Utah appeals from the district court's final order dismissing, with prejudice, one third degree felony count of criminal nonsupport against James Benjamin White. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 76–7–201 (2008) (establishing crime of criminal nonsupport). White cross-appeals from that same order. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 In January 2001, the State charged White with one count of criminal nonsupport, alleging that he had failed to provide support for his two minor daughters from mid–1994 through 2000. Over the next several years, the case was delayed for multiple reasons, including White's incarceration in Colorado on an unrelated matter, his repeated conflicts with numerous attorneys appointed to represent him, and his filing of hundreds of pages of motions, both through counsel and pro se.

¶ 3 In December 2008, the district court stayed the proceedings and ordered a competency evaluation for White. After a March 2009 competency hearing, the district court found White incompetent to stand trial. In a March 24, 2009 written order, the district court made various findings relating to White's competency, including his “disjointed thought processes,” “distorted perceptions of both the judicial system and reality in general,” and “inability to factually or rationally understand proceedings against him.” The district court also found that White was unable to “consult with counsel and participate in his defense with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.” After spending some ten pages reciting White's inabilities to understand the legal system or work with counsel, the district court concluded that “[White] is absolutely incompetent to proceed to trial on the criminal non-support charge, dated 1994–2000.”

¶ 4 Having found White incompetent to stand trial, the district court recognized that, “[u]pon an adjudication that a defendant is not competent to proceed, [Utah Code section 77–15–6] directs the procedure to restore competency.” ¹ The court then stated its opinions that section 77–15–6 “addresses cases where medication and treatment at the State Hospital are likely to be beneficial,” that the statute gives priority to defendants charged with more serious crimes, and that the charge against White “carries less weight.” Turning to the likelihood of restoring White's competency, the court found no indication that White would cooperate with treatment, that treatment would be beneficial, or that any restoration to competency was likely or could occur within a reasonable period of time.

¶ 5 Despite these findings, the district court observed that “[t]he controlling statute is clear that [White's] non-compliance is not a basis for dismissal.” “But,” the court continued, “my responsibility as Judge requires I weigh all applicable factors.” The court then stated,

The allegations in this case are nine to fifteen years old. The evidence is sufficiently stale that neither party is likely to get a fair trial. The minor children are approaching majority. There is no likelihood that restitution ever would be paid, even if defendant were tried and convicted.

There simply are not sufficient interests to justify expending any more resources on this case or allowing it to proceed any further.

In light of these factors, and based on its conclusion that White was incompetent and unlikely to become competent within a reasonable time, the court dismissed the charge against White with prejudice.

¶ 6 The State filed a timely motion to alter or amend the judgment, asserting that Utah Code section 77–15–6 contains mandatory language that required the court to commit White for an attempt at competency restoration prior to dismissing the case. The district court denied that motion,² and the State appeals. White also filed an appeal and has been deemed the cross-appellee in this matter.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7 The only issue properly before this court is the State's argument that the district court erred in dismissing White's case instead of committing White into custody for purposes of an attempt at competency restoration pursuant to Utah Code section 77–15–6.³ We review the district court's dismissal of a criminal case for abuse of discretion. See Utah R.Crim. P. 25(a) (stating that a trial court may dismiss a criminal matter “[i]n its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance of justice”).

ANALYSIS

I. The State's Appeal

¶ 8 The State is appealing only the district court's dismissal order and is not challenging the court's competency determination. We first address this court's jurisdiction to consider the State's appeal and then turn to the question of whether the district court properly dismissed the case against White.

A. Jurisdiction

¶ 9 As an initial matter, this court requested the State to brief the question of “whether it is entitled to appeal the district court's dismissal of the case under Utah Code section 77–18a–1(3), as opposed to the determination of competency.” In response, the State argues that it has the statutory right to appeal both the competency determination and the dismissal order. We agree with the State that section 77–18a–1(3) confers jurisdiction over the State's appeal.

¶ 10 Section 77–18a–1(3) lists several types of judgments and orders that the State “may, as a matter of right, appeal from,” including “a final judgment of dismissal” and “an order adjudicating the defendant's competency to proceed further in a pending prosecution.” See Utah Code Ann. § 77–18a–1(3)(a), (g) (2008). Thus, the State is correct that it could have appealed from the district court's competency determination regardless of whether that determination resulted in a dismissal. See id. § 77–18a–1(3)(g). When the district court did proceed to dismiss the case, however, the State was also entitled to appeal from the final judgment of dismissal.⁴ See id. § 77–18a–1(3)(a). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over the State's appeal from the district court's final judgment of dismissal.

B. The District Court's Dismissal of White's Case

¶ 11 A trial court's dismissal of a criminal case without trial is governed by rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 25(a) states, “In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance of justice, the court may, either on its own initiative or upon application of either party, order an information or indictment dismissed.” Utah R.Crim. P. 25(a).

¶ 12 Explaining rule 25(a)'s grant of discretion, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that criminal proceedings “are in the interests of and for the protection of the public” and that dismissing a criminal case constitutes a “serious responsibility.” See Salt Lake City v. Hanson, 19 Utah 2d 32, 425 P.2d 773, 775 (1967) (applying rule 25's predecessor, Utah Code section 77–51–4); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77–51–4 (1953) (“The court may, either of its own motion or upon the application of the district attorney, in furtherance of justice order an action, information or indictment to be dismissed.”). Because the dismissal of a criminal case is such a serious matter, rule 25 expressly requires a dismissing court to state its reasons for dismissal on the record “[so] that all may know what invokes the court's discretion and whether its action is justified.” Hanson, 425 P.2d at 775; see also Salt Lake City v. Dorman–Ligh, 912 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (stating that dismissals grounded solely on prosecutorial misconduct are “rarely appropriate”). “A dismissal in furtherance of justice, upon review, must show that there has been the exercise of a valid legal discretion, amounting to more than the substitution of the predilections of a judge for the alleged predilections of the peace officers.” People v. Beasley, 5 Cal.App.3d 617, 85 Cal.Rptr. 501, 528 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 13 The district court clearly complied with the requirement that it state its reasons for dismissal on the record. In two lengthy written rulings, the district court “weigh[ed] all applicable factors” and concluded that dismissal was warranted. The district court's reasons for dismissing White's case included the court's conclusion that White was incompetent and unlikely to become competent within a reasonable time; the age of the case; that “neither party [was] likely to get a fair trial” due to the staleness of the evidence; the approaching majority of the children whose support was at issue; the low probability that White would ever pay restitution; and the State's ability to bring a similar charge based on more recent evidence.

¶ 14 The State does not argue that the district court's stated reasons for the dismissal of White's case fail to meet the “substantial cause and in furtherance of justice” standard or that, under the circumstances, the dismissal exceeded the bounds of the district court's discretion.⁵ Rather, relying on Utah Code section 77–15–6(1), the State argues that once the district court found White incompetent to stand trial, it was required to commit him into custody for the attempted restoration of his competency. With certain exceptions not applicable here, section 77–15–6(1) states that if, after a hearing, a person is found incompetent to stand trial, “the court shall order the defendant committed to the custody of the executive director of the Department of Human Services or his designee for the purpose of treatment intended to restore the defendant to competency.” Utah Code Ann. § 77–15–6(1) (2008) (emphasis added).

¶ 15 We agree with the State that commitment for competency restoration is...