State v. Whitman

Decision Date03 February 1975
Docket NumberNo. 11621,11621
Citation96 Idaho 489,531 P.2d 579
PartiesThe STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Harold D. WHITMAN, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Dwight E. Baker of Furchner, Martsch & Baker, Blackfoot, for defendant-appellant.

W. Anthony Park, Atty. Gen., James P. Kaufman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

McQUADE, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from sentences imposed by the district court following pleas of guilty and entry of judgments of conviction against the appellant. On February 7, 1974, appellant was charged with two counts of armed robbery and a charge of rape. The crimes had been committed on November 11, 1973, near Blackfoot, Bingham County. Prior to the discovery of appellant's participation in the offenses, he had been in the custody of the State Board of Corrections pursuant to a 120-day withheld judgment arising out of a burglary committed subsequent to the commission of these crimes.

The district court accepted appellant's pleas of guilty to the rape and robbery charges on February 11, 1974, and thereafter ordered a pre-sentence investigation. The trial court suggested and counsel agreed that the pre-sentence investigation report would be based upon a report made in January 1974, which was occasioned by appellant's burglary conviction. That prior report was updated by the probation department. The probation officer concluded the new report with the following evaluation:

'I agree that Whitman is likely seriously emotionally unstable but it also appears that attempts have been made to treat him over the past several years with only short periods of segregation from the community while at State Hospital South. This has not detoured (sic) his continued serious criminal involvement.

It is my very strong feeling that Harold Whitman is not a candidate for probation at this time. It is further my feeling that drastic changes will have to take place in this man before he can be reintegrated into the community.'

Copies of the new pre-sentence report were made available to counsel prior to sentencing. During the sentencing proceedings on April 2, 1974, the appellant made a statement in mitigation, as did his counsel. Appellant's counsel sought to clarify the factual circumstances surrounding the commission of the offenses, but he declined to '. . . change or question any of the objective conclusions that (were) drawn. . . .' in the pre-sentence report. Appellant was then sentenced to three concurrent terms of life imprisonment.

The appellant argues that in light of this Court's recent decision in State v. French, 1 the district court abused its discretion in sentencing him. He asks that the French holding be applied retroactively to guide the Court in a determination of this appeal. Appellant interprets French to require the trial court to have before it prior to sentencing: (1) a complete and current psychological report; and (2) a positive alternative plan for rehabilitation. Appellant argues his pre-sentence report was inadequate on both of the above grounds and that those materials were necessary for the proper exercise of the district court's sentencing discretion. Therefore, he maintains his sentence should be set aside.

The procedures used in sentencing appellant should be judged in light of the case law then applicable. The prospective or retrospective application of a decision is a discretionary determination of judicial policy made by the Court after balancing certain criteria. The Court must weigh:

(1) The purpose of the new rule;

(2) Reliance on the prior decisions of this Court; and

(3) The effect of the new rule on the administration of justice. 2

After balancing these considerations, we decline to apply French retroactively.

While we hold that French is not applicable to this case, because of some confusion that may have arisen from our decision in French, we deem it an opportune time to explain what French does not stand for. After setting out in the majority opinion the 'sketchy and unskilled' portion of French's pre-sentence report which dealt with his present mental health, the court commented:

'This offers absolutely no evaluation of or insight into the psychological makeup of the defendant which is so vital in light of the presentence report's social and economic description of the defendant. In this case the presentence report described the defendant as a family man and a dependable worker without any prior criminal record who committed a forcible rape without any explanation. This case begs for a psychological evaluation. The omission of such an evaluation in this case deprived the district court of pertinent information essential to pronouncing an appropriate judgment.' 3

Under those facts, we held that case begged for a psychological evaluation. While such an evaluation might also be necessary under other extenuating circumstances, French does not hold that a psychological evaluation is required in every criminal case where the trial judge orders a pre-sentence report.

The trial judge need not require a pre-sentence report in every criminal case. The ordering of such a report is within the discretion of the court. Where the defendant does not request the withholding or suspension of sentence and the disposition of probation, no pre-sentence investigation need be made. 4 When a defendant applies for probation, the trial judge must consider certain factors. 5 If the trial court does not require a pre-sentence report the record should affirmatively show why such an investigation was not ordered.

If the trial court does order a presentence investigation, a positive plan of rehabilitation must be formulated and included in the report. French requires no less. While we do not pass upon what must be included in a positive schedule of rehabilitation, such a plan should be formulated. In the instant...

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16 cases
  • State v. Elisondo
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • June 9, 1988
    ...trial courts and prosecutors on State v. Mee, and the effect of this new rule on the administration of justice. State v. Whitman, 96 Idaho 489, 491, 531 P.2d 579, 581 (1975). We conclude that our decision shall apply only prospectively, i.e., to this case, to future appeals, and to appeals ......
  • Murphey v. Murphey, 13374
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • October 21, 1982
    ...(on rehearing) (applying abolition of interspousal immunity to the case at issue and all others arising thereafter); State v. Whitman, 96 Idaho 489, 531 P.2d 579 (1975) (holding that the decision in State v. French, 95 Idaho 853, 522 P.2d 61 (1974), was not retroactive); Thompson v. Hagan, ......
  • In re Rhoades v. State, Docket No. 35187 (Idaho 3/17/2010)
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • March 17, 2010
    ...subsequently applied the Linkletter standard to criminal cases including collateral attacks on convictions. First in State v. Whitman, 96 Idaho 489, 531 P.2d 579 (1975), dealing with the retroactive application of State v. French, 95 Idaho 853, 522 P.2d 61 (1974), which held that a pre-sent......
  • State v. Cotton
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • November 2, 1979
    ...in this case, the appellant himself indicated to the court that there was no need for a presentence report. In State v. Whitman, 96 Idaho 489, 531 P.2d 579 (1975), this court addressed this very question and stated that when the defendant does not request the withholding or suspension of se......
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