State v. Wilder, s. 69108
Decision Date | 03 June 1997 |
Docket Number | Nos. 69108,71295,s. 69108 |
Citation | 946 S.W.2d 760 |
Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Ronald K. WILDER, Appellant. Ronald K. WILDER, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Ellen H. Flottman, Asst. Public Defender, Columbia, for appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, Fernando Bermudez, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, for respondent.
Before RHODES RUSSELL, P.J., and SIMON and KAROHL, JJ.
Defendant, Ronald Wilder, was charged, jury tried and convicted of four felonies. He appeals after sentencing. We review his direct appeal and his appeal after denial of Rule 29.15 post conviction relief without a hearing.
In point one defendant argues the trial court lost jurisdiction because it denied his federal and state constitutional rights to a speedy trial. That point is rejected because Wilder's position before trial was based entirely on the failure of the trial court to provide a trial within 180 days of his request for disposition of detainers authorized by § 217.460 RSMo 1994. Wilder failed to raise the constitutional issues until his motion for new trial. Constitutional issues must be raised at the earliest opportunity, otherwise they are waived. Moreover, Wilder's appellate argument does not refer to any procedural facts which would support an argument that constitutional speedy trial rights were violated. The lapse of time between charge and trial does not suggest any unconstitutional delay. The trial court did not lose jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction. Point denied.
In support of an argument for new trial defendant asserts:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING DEFENSE COUNSEL'S OBJECTION TO THE PROSECUTOR'S PRESENTING EVIDENCE REGARDING RON'S FAILURE TO MAKE AN EXCULPATORY STATEMENT AFTER HIS ARREST, BECAUSE SUCH EVIDENCE VIOLATED RON'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION GUARANTEED BY THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTION, IN THAT THE PROSECUTOR WAS PERMITTED TO ASK RON DURING CROSS-EXAMINATION IF HE HAD TOLD POLICE OFFICERS OF HIS ALIBI AND RON ANSWERED THE QUESTION AFTER HIS ATTORNEY'S OBJECTION WAS OVERRULED.
Defendant testified that at the time of the commission of the charged crimes, between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. on February 1, 1994, he was with a girlfriend at her home. The girlfriend also testified and corroborated his alibi.
During cross-examination of defendant, the following occurred:
Q. And you were arrested in [Ste.] Genevieve with a car with a stolen plate on it?
A. It had stolen plates on it. It had stolen plates, yes, it did.
....
Q. At some point since February 1st, 1994--I mean, you knew what time this happened; you've seen three police reports, is that true?
A. Absolutely.
....
Q. But on February 10th, when you were arrested in [Ste.] Genevieve, you knew that you had been at Rachel Johnson's house on February 1st?
A. On February 10th when I was arrested?
Q. (BY [Prosecutor] ) And they told you that you had been charged with this robbery and homicide.
A. They asked me. I didn't--
Q. When did you first find out--
A. --I didn't have any discussion with the police whatsoever. They arrested me. They took me to the county jail.
Q. When was the first time you found out that you had been charged with the robbery and homicide at the pawn shop on February 1st, 1994?
A. When I was at Ferguson. When I was in the Ferguson Police Department.
Q. (BY [Prosecutor] ) Did you tell the police to contact Rachel Johnson?
A. No, I didn't.
Defendant preserved his objection in his motion for new trial. He alleged:
[t]he trial court erred during the state's cross-examination of Ronald Wilder in overruling defense's objection to the state asking Ronald Wilder whether he provided the police, after his arrest, with the names of alibi witnesses. Allowing the prosecutor to comment on Mr. Wilder's post-arrest silence prejudiced Mr. Wilder, and deprived him of his rights under the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments under the U.S. Constitution, and under Article I, sections 2, 10, 15, and 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution.
The state has argued, generally, the trial court has discretion in controlling cross-examination and that control is reviewable only for abuse of discretion. It also has argued that when a defendant testifies, he may be cross-examined and impeached like any other witness. These general propositions are valid but do not apply to cross-examination of defendant on a subject that is protected by constitutional guarantees, particularly when there is a timely objection. Our Supreme Court held in State v. Zindel, 918 S.W.2d 239, 241-244 (Mo. banc 1996) that admission of a defendant's post-Miranda silence violated defendant's due process rights and that the violation is reviewable as a matter of plain error. In the present case defendant's issue is a matter of preserved error. During cross-examination of defendant, the prosecuting attorney attempted to establish for the jury that defendant was aware on February 10, when interrogated at the Ferguson Police Department, that the charged crimes occurred at a particular time. The question attributed defendant's knowledge to his review of police reports. Anticipating the course of the examination, defendant's counsel objected and requested an opportunity to approach the bench. The court rejected the request. It denied defendant an opportunity to make an offer of proof that the police reports referred to by the prosecutor contained an acknowledgment that defendant had been advised of his Miranda rights, on one or more occasions before the interrogation, and before defendant chose to remain silent.
The state has argued, and the defendant does not disagree, that
[t]he correct rule is that the State may not use a defendant's post-arrest silence, following the receipt of Miranda warnings, as either substantive evidence of guilt or for impeachment. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 1312, 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 68-69 (Mo. banc 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 1755, 100 L.Ed.2d 217 (1988); State v. Shaw, 915 S.W.2d 775, 781 (Mo.App. W.D.1996); State v. Anthony, 857 S.W.2d 861, 868 (Mo.App. W.D.1993); State v. Smith, 824 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Mo.App. S.D.1992); State v. Hill, 823 S.W.2d 98, 100 (Mo.App. E.D.1991); State v. Stolzman, 799 S.W.2d 927, 934 (Mo.App. S.D.1990); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 11-12 (Mo.App. E.D.1989); State v. Masslon, 746 S.W.2d 618, 626 (Mo.App. E.D.1988).
Due process is not violated by the use of a defendant's pre-Miranda silence, even though the defendant is under arrest. Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 607, 102 S.Ct. at 1312; Robinson, 834 S.W.2d at 248.
By reply, defendant agrees,
[r]espondent correctly notes that references to a defendant's failure to make an exculpatory statement pre-Miranda are not errors of constitutional proportion. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 1312, 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982); State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 68-69 (Mo. banc 1987).
The trial court erred in overruling the objection without evidence to support a finding defendant's silence was pre-or post-Miranda and in denying defendant's request to make a complete record. Post-arrest silence is inadmissible, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d at 68-69 (Mo. banc 1987) cert. denied; State v. Leonard, 606 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Mo.App.1980). There is no dispute the silence occurred long after arrest by a different and remote police department and during interrogation. Over timely objection, the state was entitled to develop the silence issue only if it was pre-Miranda. The state offered no evidence to support a finding that defendant's silence was before or after Miranda warnings.
Defendant's other claims of error are rejected. He argues error in joinder, error in not severing his case from charges against a co-defendant, and error in admission of evidence. We have reviewed these issues and find they are moot or without merit. An extended opinion on these claims would have no precedential value. They are rejected. Rule 30.25(b). Error in admitting a photograph of victim's family, if it was error, was not prejudicial given the charges and previously admitted testimony of a witness which described, without objection, all the relationships depicted in the photo. If there is a retrial, the issue may be avoided. A Rule 29.15 issue, related to the remand issue, is moot.
The following may be helpful to the court and the parties. It is certain that the state had copies of police reports. The question attributing defendant's knowledge of the time of the charged crimes to his review of police reports established their relevance on the silence issue. Defendant has furnished this court with a copy of a three-page report that a Ferguson police officer filed on February 18, 1994, at 7:00 p.m. It was not a trial court exhibit and there is no evidence the trial court was ever told the substance of the report. It contains no relevant evidence on the charged crimes and was not admissible as an exhibit. The preparing officer recorded that the Ferguson Police Department received advice on February 10, 1994, that Ronald K. Wilder was in the custody of the Ste. Genevieve County, Missouri, Sheriff's Department. Two officers proceeded to Ste. Genevieve...
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