State v. Wilhite

• Decision Date: 14 November 1906
• Citation: 132 Iowa 226,109 N.W. 730
• Parties: STATE v. WILHITE.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

132 Iowa 226

109 N.W. 730

STATE

v.WILHITE.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 14, 1906.

Appeal from District Court, Webster County; J. H. Richard, Judge.

The indictment charged that the accused did willfully and unlawfully practice medicine, and then and there did publicly profess to cure and heal the diseases and ailments to which the flesh is heir by means of a certain system, a more particular description of the peculiar and mysterious workings of which are to this grand jury unknown; that said J. C. Wilhite then and there did advertise in the Ft. Dodge Messenger that by said system he could cure and heal tuberculosis, and cause the same to be cured, and did advertise in said paper that he is a doctor of neurology and ophthalmology with an office at No. 526 1/2 Central avenue in Ft. Dodge, Iowa, with office hours from 9 to 12 and 1:30 to 4:00, that said Wilhite did then and there maintain such office, and had placed near the entrance to such place an advertisement sign containing the words: “Dr. Wilhite, Neurologist,” and by means of such advertisement did solicit persons to meet him at his office to participate in the beneficent results arising from treatment under his system; that said J. C. Wilhite did then and there undertake to cure and heal diseases and ailments, and that said J. C. Wilhite then and there did not have a certificate nor a license from the proper authorities so to practice, nor did he file with the county recorder of Webster county, Iowa, any such certificate to practice, and has never applied therefore.” The defendant was convicted, and appeals. Affirmed.Mitchell & Hackler, for appellant.

Chas. W. Mullan, Atty. Gen., and B. J. Price, Co. Atty., for the state.

LADD, J.

Before the trial defendant objected to the indictment on three grounds: (1) For that it did not charge any offense under the laws of this state, (2) it was so indefinite as not to inform the accused of the charge against him, and (3) it attempted to charge several distinct and separate offenses. Though inartistically drawn, it is not open to any of these criticisms. It specifically alleges that the defendant practiced medicine, then averred his acts which constituted so doing, and that this was without a certificate from the proper authorities. It may be that the acts were set out with more particularity than was essential, but at the most this amounted to no more than pleading evidence. Section 2580 of the Code provides that “any person who * * * shall practice medicine, surgery, or obstetrics in this state without first having obtained and filed for record” a certificate from the state board of medical examiners, shall be punished. Section 2579 of the Code declares that “any person shall be held as practicing medicine, surgery or obstetrics, or to be a physician, within the meaning of this chapter, who shall publicly profess to be a physician, surgeon, or obstetrician, and assume the duties, or who shall make a practice of prescribing or of prescribing and furnishing medicine for the sick, or who shall publicly profess to cure or heal.” Here follow certain exceptions not involved in this case. The evident object of the pleader was to allege acts of the accused which would bring him within the definition of the section last quoted. To accomplish this the indictment alleges (1) that he publicly professed to cure and heal by means of a system unknown to the grand jury; (2) that he advertised so to do in a certain newspaper; (3) that he maintained an office with the sign of a doctor for this purpose; and (4) that he actually undertook to cure and heal. These acts are not charged as separate offenses, but as contemporaneous acts which considered together constituted the practice of medicine. The indictment as it alleged but the one offense, and pointed out the person accused, was sufficient. Section 5290, Code.

2. Dr. Kime testified that “Dunglison's Medical Dictionary, Revised Edition,” is accepted by the medical profession as authority in the definition of words, and thereupon the definitions of “anatomy,” “neurology,” “ophthalmology,” “pathology,” and “physiology” contained therein were introduced in evidence, over defendant's objection. Even though the court might have taken judicial notice of the meaning of these words it was not error to receive a standard medical dictionary in evidence, as an aid to the memory and understanding of the court. Cook v. State (Ala.) 20 So. 360. See Nix v. Hedden, 149 U. S. 304, 13 Sup. Ct. 881, 37 L. Ed. 745.State v. Main, 69 Conn. 123, 37 Atl. 80, 61 Am. St. Rep. 30, 36 L. R. A. 623; note to Lanfoar v. Mestier, 89 Am. Dec. 663;Bixby v. Ry. Co., 105 Iowa, 293, 75 N. W. 182, 43 L. R. A. 533, 67 Am. St. Rep. 299, and like cases are not in point. They hold that medical works, treating of the symptoms and cure of disease, are not admissible, not that standard authorities may not be received as proof of the meaning of medical terms.

3. The considerations now urged by counsel against the constitutionality of the statutes...