State v. Williams

• Decision Date: 30 November 1903
• Docket Number: 14,943
• Citation: 35 So. 505,111 La. 179
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. WILLIAMS et al

35 So. 505

111 La. 179

STATE v. WILLIAMS et al

No. 14,943

Supreme Court of Louisiana

November 30, 1903

Appeal from Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Landry Edward Taylor Lewis, Judge.

Resie Williams and Lee Williams were convicted of manslaughter. From the judgment, Resie Williams appeals. Affirmed.

L Austin Fontenot and John W. Lewis, for appellant.

Walter Guion, Atty. Gen., and R. Lee Garland, Dist. Atty. (Lewis Guion, of counsel), for the State.

OPINION

MONROE, J.

Resie Williams and Lee Williams having been indicted for murder and convicted of manslaughter, Lee Williams was granted a new trial, and Resie Williams was sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor. From this sentence she has appealed, and presents her case to this court by means of certain bills of exception, viz.:

Bill No. 1, to the ruling of the trial judge in permitting the prosecuting attorney to ask Millie Slater, a witness for the state, whether she had not, before the coroner's jury made a statement at variance with the testimony which she had just given on the trial.

The trial judge gives the following reason for his ruling, to wit:

"The above question was permitted because when a party puts a witness on the stand and is surprised by the answers of the witness, he or she may be asked if he" (or she) "has not made statements at variance with his" (or her) "present statements."

It is well settled that, where a party is bona fide surprised at the unexpected testimony of his witness, he may be permitted to interrogate as to previous declarations inconsistent with the testimony given, the object being to test the witness' recollection, and lead him, if mistaken, to review what he has said. State v. Vickers, 47 La.Ann. 1576, 18 So. 639, and authorities there cited.

Bill No. 2, to the ruling of the court in permitting the prosecuting attorney to ask Millie Slater, a witness for the state, "Didn't you see a burnt place on the little boy's ear?" (meaning Albert Miller, who resided with the defendants), which question was asked for the purpose of showing acts of cruelty, such as terminated in the death of the deceased, to the said Albert Miller, and which question was objected to on the ground "that it was irrelevant, and was an attempt to prove an offense disconnected with the litigated act." The judge states that he overruled the objection because the defendants, in their cross-examination of the witness, who was a sister of the accused, Resie Williams, elicited from her testimony to the effect that her sister's treatment of the children under her charge, of whom the deceased was one, was kind and humane, and that she never knew her to ill-treat them.

The defense having, upon the cross-examination, elicited new matter prejudicial to the prosecution, it was competent for the state upon redirect examination to interrogate the witness fully concerning the same. Enc. Pl. & Pr. vol. 8, p. 125.

Bill No. 3, to the ruling of the court in permitting the prosecuting officer to ask, upon cross-examination of a witness for the defense, "Did you not see marks, bruises, or burns on the little fellow's ear?" (meaning the boy Albert Miller), the purpose of the question and the objection being the same as stated above, and the reason given by the judge for his ruling being that the "defendants, in their examination of the witness in chief, elicited from her that the defendant's treatment of the children under her charge was kind and humane, and that she had never seen the defendants maltreat these children. These questions," says the judge a quo, "were permissible to test the credibility of the witness."

The ground stated sufficiently sustains the ruling as made. Beyond, this, however, whilst, as a general rule, a distinct crime, unconnected with the one charged in the indictment, cannot be given in evidence, exceptions to this rule arise when it becomes necessary to rebut the possible inference of accident, or to prove the intent with which the act charged was committed. A. & E. Ency. of Law, vol. 11, p. 513; State v. Patza, 3 La.Ann. 513; State v. Rohfrischt, 12 La.Ann. 382; State v. Mulholland, 16 La.Ann. 377; State v. Thomas, 30 La.Ann. 600; State v. Porter, 45 La.Ann. 664, 12 So. 832.

Bill No. 4, to the ruling of the judge in excluding the question, propounded by the counsel for the defense to Albert Miller, a witness for the prosecution, "If Kutch, your brother, who says you and he came into the room together, testifies that Resie was sitting down on the girl, bumping her head on the floor, he is mistaken?" on the ground, as stated by the judge, that "the witness can be asked to detail facts as they were observed by him, and it is the duty of the jury to determine which of the witnesses testifying before them is mistaken. To permit this witness to decide this issue of fact is to rob the jury of its province. It is the duty of the jury to reconcile the testimony of witnesses." The ruling complained of was obviously correct.

Bill No. 5, to the ruling of the court in admitting the testimony of Kutch Miller, a witness for the prosecution, over the objection that he was incompetent, being only eight years of age. For the ruling thus complained of the judge assigns the following reasons, viz.: "That, in the exercise of the discretion vested in the judge a quo, I was of the opinion that the witness was competent, and that the jury could give such weight to his testimony as they saw fit; in other words, I permitted the witness to testify because it was necessary in the interest of public justice."

There are annexed to and made part of this bill the following questions and answers, propounded to and given by the witness on his voir dire:

"Q. How old are you? A. I don't know. Q. What parish do you live in? A. Iota. Q. What will become of you if you tell an untruth? A. They will put me in jail. Q. Anything else happen to you? A. They will hang me. Q. Did you ever say any prayers? A. No. Q. Has anybody ever taught you to say your prayers? A. No. Q. Have you ever been to church or Sunday school? A. No. Q. Has anybody ever taught you about God or heaven? A. No. Q. Do you know what an oath is? A. No. Q. When the clerk made you hold up your hand just now, what did you tell him you would do? A. Tell the truth. Q. You are a little colored boy? A. Yes. By the Court: Q. Do you believe that you will be punished if you tell what is not so? A. Yes. Q. Who do you believe will punish you? A. The sheriff. Q. Do you believe God will punish you? A. Yes. Q. Do you understand, then, that by putting you on the stand that you are to tell the truth, and nothing but the truth, and that you will be punished if you don't tell the truth? A. Yes."

Under Act No. 29, p. 39, of 1886, which (so far as it need be here quoted) reads, "That the competent witness in all criminal matters shall be a person of proper understanding," it has been held that persons who have been convicted of infamous crimes, and have served out the sentences imposed therefor, are competent witnesses, provided they meet the requirements of the statute in the matter of understanding. State v. Mack, 41 La.Ann. 1082, 6 So. 808; State v. McManus, 42 La.Ann. 1194, 8 So. 305.

In the last-cited of these cases the defendant was being tried for perjury, and, having offered himself as a witness in his own behalf,...