State v. Williams

• Decision Date: 04 September 2001
• Citation: 778 A.2d 186,258 Conn. 1
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: (Conn. 2001) STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHARLES WILLIAMS (SC 16415)

778 A.2d 186 (Conn. 2001)

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHARLES WILLIAMS

(SC 16415)

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Argued May 30

September 4, 2001

Counsel Robin S. Schwartz, special deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James Thomas, state's attorney, and George Ferko, assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state). Carlos E. Candal, special assistant public defender, with whom, on the brief, was Mark Rademacher, assistant public defender, for the appellee (defendant).

Sullivan, C. J., and Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Zarella, Js.

Norcott, J.

Opinion

The state appeals, following a grant of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the conviction of the defendant, Charles Williams, on the charge of criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) §§ 53a217. ¹ The state claims that the Appellate Court improperly determined that the trial court inappropriately had refused the defendant's requested jury instruction regarding the doctrine of nonexclusive possession. ² State v. Williams, 59 Conn. App. 771, 785, 758 A.2d 400 (2000).

The state also claims that the trial court's failure to provide the jury with the requested instruction, if improper, was harmless. We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the defendant was not entitled to an instruction regarding the doctrine of nonexclusive possession and, therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court contains the following facts that a jury reasonably could have found. ''On January 26, 1999, Officer Andrew Lawrence of the Hartford police department was driving in his patrol car when he observed the defendant drive through a stop sign. Lawrence activated his lights and siren, called for backup and pursued the defendant. The defendant pulled into a driveway, got out of the car and knocked on the door or rang the doorbell of a [private] home. Soon thereafter, the defendant walked away from the house and proceeded down the street, leaving the car in the driveway.

''Lawrence did not follow the defendant. Instead, while monitoring the defendant as he was walking away, Lawrence approached the vehicle and looked through the car window. Inside, he saw a .38 caliber semiautomatic pistol on the driver's seat. Once backup officers arrived, Lawrence pursued the defendant while the car was secured by the other officers. Lawrence caught up with the defendant, who had since rounded a street corner, and arrested him.

''The state filed a two count information alleging that the defendant used a motor vehicle without the owner's permission in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-119b (a) (1) ³ and that the defendant was in criminal possession of a firearm in violation of §§ 53a-217 (a) (1). On May 25, 1999, the defendant filed a motion to suppress all items seized by the police. ⁴ The trial court's signed oral decision on the motion to suppress focused on the issue of whether the 'viewing of a weapon in plain view of the driver's seat of a vehicle [constituted] probable cause to arrest the operator of said vehicle for the crime of weapon in a motor vehicle in violation of [General Statutes] §§ 29-38 ⁵ ....'Thecourt denied the motion on July 16, 1999.'' State v. Williams, supra, 59 Conn. App. 773. A jury trial commenced on July 20, 1999.

''At the end of the state's case, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on both counts. The trial court granted the motion as to the first count of using a motor vehicle without the owner's permission, but denied the motion as to the second count of criminal possession of a firearm.'' Id., 774.

Thereafter, the defendant presented evidence ''to dispute the issue that the weapon found in the car was in his exclusive possession. ⁶ At the time of his arrest, the defendant [allegedly had been seen by Lawrence] driving a rental car owned by National Car Rental. Tammy Dinatale, a representative of National Car Rental, testified that at the time the weapon was found in the car, the vehicle was rented to another individual, [Kirk] Scott.

''The defense also presented Madeline Williams, the defendant's sister, as a witness. Williams testified [that at] approximately 9 a.m. on the morning of the defendant's arrest, Williams drove herself and the defendant out to breakfast in her own car. Afterwards, the defendant asked Williams to bring him to a friend's house, Scott, to get a compact disc [that he previously had loaned to Scott].'' Id., 783±n84. According to Williams, she and ''the defendant drove to Scott's house, and Williams accompanied the defendant to Scott's residence. Scott handed the defendant a key to the rental car. Williams and the defendant then proceeded to the rental car to retrieve the compact disc from the vehicle. At that point, before Williams and the defendant reached the vehicle, the officer approached the defendant and arrested him.'' Id., 784.

''On July 20, 1999, the defendant filed a request to charge the jury on the theory of nonexclusive possession, which was denied the following day by the court. ⁷ The jury returned a guilty verdict on July 21, 1999.'' Id., 774. The defendant then filed a post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal. Id. The trial court denied that motion and rendered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict sentencing the defendant to five years imprisonment.

The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court improperly had: (1) denied his motion to suppress; (2) denied his motion for judgment of acquittal; and (3) refused to instruct the jury concerning the defense of nonexclusive possession. Id., 772. The Appellate Court held that the trial court properly had denied the defendant's motion to suppress and his motion for judgment of acquittal. Id., 776, 778.

The Appellate Court concluded, however, that the trial court improperly had refused to instruct the jury on the defendant's theory of nonexclusive possession. Id., 778. According to the Appellate Court, the testimony of Williams ''contradicted the sequence of events offered by the state and raised the issue of the defense of nonexclusive possession.'' Id., 784. The Appellate Court, therefore, reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. Id., 785. This certified appeal followed.

We granted the state's petition for certification to appeal limited to the following issues: ''(1) Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the defendant was entitled to a jury instruction regarding the doctrine of nonexclusive possession? (2) If the answer to question one is 'yes,' was the error harmless?'' State v. Williams, 254 Conn. 952, 762 A.2d 906 (2000). We conclude that the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction regarding the doctrine of nonexclusive possession and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court. ⁸

The state contends that a jury instruction regarding the doctrine of nonexclusive possession was not warranted because there was no evidence produced at trial to support the claim that the defendant and at least one other individual shared joint access to the weapon. The defendant, however, insists that the Appellate Court properly determined that he was entitled to the requested instruction because there was evidence presented that, if believed, would support a finding that he did not have exclusive possession of the vehicle in which the weapon was found. We agree with the state.

''Where the defendant is not in exclusive possession of the premises where the [illegal item is] found, it may not be inferred that [the defendant] knew of the presence of the [illegal item] and had control of [it], unless there are other incriminating statements or circumstances tending to buttress such an inference. Evans v. United States, 257 F.2d 121, 128 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 866, 79 S. Ct. 98, 3 L. Ed. 2d 99, reh. denied, 358 U.S. 901, 79 S. Ct. 221, 3 L. Ed. 2d 150 (1958) . . . .'' (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Delossantos, 211 Conn. 258, 277, 559 A.2d 164, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 866, 110 S. Ct. 188, 107 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1989); see also State v. Berger, 249 Conn. 218, 225, 733 A.2d 156 (1999) (same); State v. Alfonso, 195 Conn. 624, 633, 490 A.2d 75 (1985) (same). The doctrine of nonexclusive possession ''was designed to prevent a jury from inferring a defendant's possession of [an illegal item] solely from the defendant's nonexclusive possession of the premises where the [illegal item was] found.'' State v. Nesmith, 220 Conn. 628, 636 n.11, 600 A.2d 780 (1991). When the doctrine applies, an instruction focuses the jury's attention on the defendant's knowledge and intent to possess, precluding it from inferring possession from the mere fact that the defendant, along with others, occupied or had access to the premises wherein the contraband was found. See United States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1291 (10th Cir. 2000) (proof of nonexclusive constructive possession alone insufficient to justify implication of knowledge; state must present some corroborating evidence of knowledge); Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736, 740 (Fla. 1996) (same); see also State v. Hill, 201 Conn. 505, 516, 523 A.2d 1252 (1986) (''[t]he essence of exercising control is not the manifestation of an act of control but instead it is the act of being in a position of control coupled with the requisite mental element'').

''As a general rule, a defendant is entitled to have instructions on a defense for which there is evidence produced at trial to justify the instruction, no matter how weak or incredible the claim.'' State v. Varszegi, 236 Conn. 266, 282, 673 A.2d 90 (1996); see State v. Havican, 213 Conn. 593, 597, 569 A.2d 1089 (1990) ('' '[i]f the defendant asserts a recognized legal defense and the evidence indicates the availability of that defense, such a charge is obligatory and the defendant is...