State v. Williams

• Citation: 38 N.E. 339,139 Ind. 43
• Parties: STATE v. WILLIAMS.
• Decision Date: 11 October 1894
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

139 Ind. 43

38 N.E. 339

STATE

v.WILLIAMS.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Oct. 11, 1894.

Appeal from circuit court, Huntington county; O. W. Whitelock, Judge.

Philip T. Williams was convicted of uttering a forged note. The court sustained a motion in arrest of judgment, and the state appeals. Reversed.

S. E. Cook, Pros. Atty., and H. C. Underwood, for the State. Branyan, Spencer & Branyan, for appellee.

HOWARD, J.

The appellee was found guilty of uttering a forged and counterfeit promissory note with intent to cheat and defraud, as charged in the following count of indictment, to wit: “And the grand jury as aforesaid, for a second count, on their oaths further charge and present that one Philip T. Williams, late of said county, on the 1st day of January, 1892, at said county and state aforesaid, did then and there unlawfully, falsely, fraudulently, and knowingly utter, publish, and pass to one John G. Price, the agent of Bertha Delorme, and thereby to said Bertha Delorme, as true and genuine, a certain false, forged, and counterfeit promissory note purporting to have been made and executed by said Philip T. Williams, Daniel G. McClarnon, and Levi Arnold for the payment of money to said Bertha Delorme, which false, forged, and counterfeit promissory note is of the following tenor, to wit [setting out the forged note], with intent,” etc. On the return of the verdict the appellee filed a motion in arrest of judgment, for the reason, as stated in the motion, that “the second count in the indictment-the one on which the verdict is based and returned-is insufficient, defective, and does not charge a public offense.” This motion was sustained, and the judgment was arrested, over the exception and objection of the prosecuting attorney.

Appellee has filed no brief on this appeal, but we learn from the brief of the prosecuting attorney that, in the court below, counsel for appellee contended that the second count of indictment, on which the conviction was had, “did not allege that the defendant knew the promissory note uttered was false and forged, and on this ground the court arrested judgment.” The second count of the indictment was based upon the concluding clause of section 2354, Rev. St. 1894 (section 2206, Rev. St. 1881), relating to the uttering of forged instruments, and to the knowledge which is a necessary element of the crime, and making one guilty who “utters or publishes as true any such instrument or matter, knowing the same to be false,” etc. The allegation in the indictment, as we have seen, is that the appellee “did then and there unlawfully, falsely, fraudulently, and knowingly utter, publish, and pass, * * * as true and genuine, a certain false, forged, and counterfeit promissory note,” etc. If we understand the contention upon which the ruling of the court was based, it is that the word “knowingly” does not sufficiently express the guilty knowledge necessary to charge the crime of uttering a forged instrument; that it is not enough to allege that the appellee knowingly uttered the forged note, but that it is necessary to allege that he uttered and published a note which he knew to be forged. In section 1806, Rev. St. 1894 (section 1737, Rev. St. 1881), it is declared that “words used in the statute to define a public offense need not be strictly pursued, but other words conveying the same meaning may be used.” See State v. Chandler, 96 Ind. 591;Trout v. State, 111 Ind. 499, 12 N. E. 1005. In 1 Bish. Cr. Proc. § 504, it is said that “the words ‘knowingly’ or ‘well knowing’ will supply the place of a positive...