State v. Williams.

• Decision Date: 06 April 1943
• Citation: 31 A.2d 369
• Parties: STATE v. WILLIAMS.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

31 A.2d 369

STATE

v.WILLIAMS.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

April 6, 1943.

Transferred from Superior Court, Strafford County; Johnston, Judge.

John A. Williams was indicted for a felony. To the denial of defendant's motion to quash the indictment, the defendant excepted. The case is transferred in advance of trial by Johnston, J.

Exception overruled.

Indictment, for a felony. The alleged offence is charged to have been committed in 1934 and the indictment was found in 1942.

On arraignment the defendant pleaded not guilty and at the same time filed a motion to quash the indictment on the ground that it was not found within six years after the date of the offence. During the entire period the defendant had no local residence and was in the state only temporarily from time to time.

To the denial of the motion the defendant excepted.

Transferred in advance of trial by Johnston, J.

Stephen M. Wheeler, Atty. Gen., and John F. Beamis, Jr., Co. Sol., of Somersworth (Mr. Wheeler orally), for the State.

Samuel A. Margolis, of Manchester, by brief and orally, for defendant.

ALLEN, Chief Justice.

The statute, P.L. c. 367, § 13, R.L. c. 427, § 13, relied upon by the defendant provides time limits for finding informations and indictments. The limits are extended by this clause: “but the time during which the party charged was not usually and publicly resident within this state shall not be reckoned as part of the time aforesaid”. The time limit for an offence such as is charged against the defendant is six years.

The defendant takes the position that the clause above quoted is applicable only to residents of the state, arguing that the word “usually” implies local residence which may be interrupted. In other words, when residence is not usual, it must be predicated upon local residence as a departure from it.

Common law bars to indictments and prosecutions for crime by reason of delay in finding and advancing them have never existed. They have been set up only by legislation. If delay as a hardship to the accused is not also a disadvantage to the state, the common law has declared no policy of regulation in establishing limits. All felonies are statutory, the punishments and penalties for them are statutory, and the courts may only pass upon the validity and effect of the legislation. Even in the view that a statute may become adopted as a part of the common law, the present day judicial attitude is to apply common law rules only in ascertainment of its meaning, and not to modify it. Especially when a statute enters a field unoccupied by the common law, that law, except for its general principles of construction rarely aids in determining the scope, effect and application of the statute.

If the rule that doubts are to be resolved in favor of the accused remains extended to statutory construction (State v. Barter, 58 N.H. 604, 607), it is not to be employed to defeat or interfere with the legislative direction. Ascertainment of the direction is controlling in construing legislation pertaining to crime as well as upon other subjects. “What did the words mean to those who used them?” State v. Downes, 79 N.H. 505, 506, 112 A. 246, 247. Legislation making conduct a public offence is in exercise of the policy to promote the general welfare. Its scope is not to be extended beyond its fair import and its fair import is not to be modified by favor to the accused. He is entitled to the benefit of a doubt only when it is so serious and substantial as to make it fairly uncertain what the meaning of the statute is.

Thus construed, the statute here examined erects no bar as contended by the defendant. The legislative thought and will was broadly that absence from the state beyond occasional...