State v. Williams

• Decision Date: 07 January 1936
• Citation: 182 A. 202
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. WILLIAMS.

182 A. 202

STATE

v. WILLIAMS.

Supreme Court of Vermont. Franklin.

Jan. 7, 1936.

Exceptions from Franklin Municipal Court; P. L. Shangraw, Judge.

Robert Williams was charged with selling lottery tickets. Demurrer to complaint was overruled subject to defendant's exceptions, and case was passed to Supreme Court before final judgment.

Judgment overruling demurrer affirmed, and cause remanded.

Argued before POWERS, C. J., and SLACK, MOULTON, THOMPSON, and SHERBURNE, JJ.

P. C. Warner, of St. Albans, for respondent.

John H. Webster, State's Atty., of Swanton, for the State.

SLACK, Justice.

The respondent is charged with violating P.L. 8685 which, as far as here material, provides: "A person who sells a lottery ticket or an interest therein, or a paper purporting to be a lottery ticket or an interest therein, * * * or acts as a broker or agent in buying, selling or procuring to be bought or sold or disposed of in any way such ticket or interest therein, * * * shall be fined not more than three hundred dollars." The complaint contains nine counts. The respondent demurred to each count; the demurrer was overruled subject to his exceptions, and the case was passed to this court before final judgment as provided by P.L. 2072.

Count 1 of the complaint charges that respondent "a lottery ticket, to wit, a ticket commonly known as a nigger pool ticket, did sell to one Robert Sullivan."

Count 2 charges that respondent "did sell a paper purporting to be a lottery ticket, to wit, a paper purporting to be a ticket commonly known as a nigger pool ticket to one Robert Sullivan."

Count 3 charges that respondent "did sell a lottery ticket, to wit, a ticket commonly known as a nigger pool ticket to one Bernard Dussault."

Count 5 charges that respondent, acting as agent for one Wersebe, did sell a lottery ticket, of the same tenor as the one described in count 3, to one Dussault.

Counts 4, 7, and 9 are in substance like count 2, and counts 6 and 8 are in substance like count 3.

The respondent's contention is that neither the lottery, tickets of which it is alleged that he sold, nor the tickets themselves are sufficiently described to apprise him of the charge he is called upon to answer. He says, "Every ingredient of which the offence is composed must be accurately and clearly alleged in the indictment." Generally speaking, this is true. State v. Cap-Ian, 100 Vt. 140, 150, 135 A. 705, and cases cited. He says, too, "What facts and circumstances are necessary to be stated must be determined by reference to the definitions and the essentials of the specific crimes." This, too, is true. But the word "lottery" has no technical meaning distinct from its popular signification, and may be defined as a scheme whereby one or more prizes are distributed by chance among persons who have paid or promised a consideration for a chance to win them. 38 C.J. 286; Webster's New International Dictionary (2d Ed.). Although there are a few cases to the contrary (see Comm. v. Coyle, 4 Ky. Op. 652; State v. Doughtery, 4 Or. 200; Whitney v. State, 10 Ind. 404; State v. Kennon, 21 Mo. 262, and People v. Taylor, 3 Denio [N.Y.] 91) where it was held necessary to specify the purpose of the lottery because that was part of the statutory description of the offense,...