State v. Williams

• Decision Date: 11 February 1974
• Docket Number: No. 19769,19769
• Citation: 262 S.C. 186,203 S.E.2d 436
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Jimmy B. WILLIAMS, Appellant.

Page 436

203 S.E.2d 436

262 S.C. 186

The STATE, Respondent, v. Jimmy B. WILLIAMS, Appellant.

No. 19769.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Feb. 11, 1974.

Kale R. Alexander, Columbia, for appellant.

Sol., William Hare, Chester, and Asst. Atty. Gen., Dudley Saleeby, Jr., Columbia, for respondent.

MOSS, Chief Justice:

Jimmy B. Williams, the appellant herein, was tried and convicted at the 1973 June Term of the Court of General Sessions for Fairfield County, South Carolina, for unlawfully having in his possession 69.7 pounds of marihuana, a controlled substance, with intent to distribute the same, in violation of Section 32--1510.49 of the Code. The appellant prosecutes this appeal from his conviction and sentence.

It is the contention of the appellant that the only evidence against him, sufficient to support a conviction, was obtained by virtue of a search warrant issued in violation of Article I, Section 16, of the 1895 Constitution of South Carolina, and the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The appellant challenges the sufficiency of the affidavit for the search warrant on the ground that it was devoid of any proof or showing of probable cause and hence would not support the issuance of a legal search warrant. The appellant argues that the warrant under which the search of his premises was conducted should have been quashed and the evidence obtained as a result thereof suppressed.

Article I, Section 16 of the Constitution of South Carolina, and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, are identical and read as follows:

'Searches and seizures.--The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.'

Section 17--271 of the 1962 Code of Laws, as amended, provides that a search warrant for unlawful drugs shall be issued upon affidavit establishing the grounds for the warrant and sufficient facts must be stated in the affidavit to form the basis of a judgment by the issuing officer that probable cause exists. State v. York, 250 S.C. 30, 156 S.E.2d 326.

In order to justify the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause must be shown, but the term 'probable cause' does not import absolute certainty. In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of probable cause, each case stands on its own facts. The evidence need not be sufficient to support a conviction, or a verdict of guilty, or to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; nor need the proof be positive, it being enough if it is such as to induce in the mind of the issuing officer an honest belief that the facts set forth exist, or as would lead a man of prudence to believe that the offense has been committed. State v. Bennett, 256 S.C. 234, 182 S.E.2d 291.

The appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction relying principally on the cases of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723, and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637. The appellant asserts that the affidavit upon which the search warrant was issued was insufficient in that it did not state the underlying circumstances constituting probable cause for the issuance of the warrant as required by the test set out in Aguilar and later explained and referred to as a 'two-pronged test' in Spinelli.

In Aguilar the test for determining probable cause in those many instances where the affidavit is based solely or substantially upon an informant's tip was set forth as follows: (1) the affidavit must describe some of the underlying circumstances necessary to enable a neutral and detached magistrate to judge the validity of the informer's conclusion that the narcotics were where he claimed they were; (2) the affidavit must describe some of the underlying circumstances from which such magistrate can determine that the affiant officer's unnamed informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, was credible or his information reliable. In Spinelli it was held that in the absence of a statement by the informer detailing the manner in which he gathered his information, it is especially important that he describe the accused's criminal activities in sufficient detail that the magistrate may know that he is acting on something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or the accused's general reputation.

In the Aguilar case, a portion of which was quoted in our York case, it is said:

'Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, 78 A.L.R.2d 233, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, see Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 84 S.Ct. 825, 11 L.Ed.2d 887, was 'credible' or his information 'reliable.' Otherwise, 'the inferences from the facts which lead to the complaint' will be drawn not 'by a neutral and detached magistrate,' as the Constitution requires, but instead, by a police officer 'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,' Giordenello v. United States, supra, 357 U.S. (480) at 486 (78 S.Ct. 1245, 1250) 2 L.Ed.2d (1503) at 1509; Johnson v. United States, supra, 333 U.S. (10) at 14 (68 S.Ct. 367, 369) 92 L.Ed. at 440, or, as in this case, by an unidentified...