State v. Williams, 93-493

• Decision Date: 28 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-493,93-493
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Christopher Dion WILLIAMS and Bryan Earl Smith, Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 1171

887 P.2d 1171

268 Mont. 428

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Christopher Dion WILLIAMS and Bryan Earl Smith, Defendants

and Appellants.

No. 93-493.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs April 7, 1994.

Decided June 28, 1994.

[268 Mont. 429] L. Sanford Selvey, II, Yellowstone Public Defender Office, Billings, for appellant Williams.

Curtis L. Bevolden, Billings, for appellant Smith.

Joseph Mazurek, Atty. Gen., Patricia Jordan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Helena, Susan P. Watters and Dale R. Mrkich, Deputy County Attys., Billings, for respondent.

TURNAGE, Chief Justice.

Christopher Williams and Bryan Smith appeal from an order denying their motions to The issues are whether the court should have suppressed the evidence because it was obtained as a result of an illegal search of the motel room, and whether Smith has standing to object to use of the evidence.

                suppress evidence seized from a motel room.   After the District Court for the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, ruled the evidence admissible under the "plain view" doctrine, Williams and Smith entered guilty pleas to charges of criminal possession of dangerous drugs with intent to sell.   We affirm
                

On the afternoon of October 11, 1992, Deputy Sheriff Dennis McCave of the Yellowstone County Sheriff's Office received a phone call from a known informant concerning a black Cadillac driving around in the North Park area of Billings, Montana, in a suspicious manner. According to the informant, the car was then parked at the Rimview Inn.

McCave checked records on the Cadillac and learned it was registered to Jason Hibit-Smith, a minor on whom there was an outstanding arrest warrant for sales of dangerous drugs to an informant. McCave obtained the arrest warrant and went to the Rimview Inn with Deputy Eugene Johnson. McCave was in plain clothes and Johnson was in uniform.

The Rimview Inn motel clerk told McCave that the two men who got out of the black Cadillac were in Room 122, which was registered to Chris Williams. When the deputies knocked on the door of that room, defendant Bryan Smith, in stocking feet, opened it.

McCave asked the two men in the room for their identification. Smith replied that he was Jason Hibit-Smith, and McCave advised him that he was under arrest pursuant to the arrest warrant. (Jason Hibit-Smith was actually Smith's younger brother.) Deputy Johnson handcuffed Smith, then sat him down in a chair in the room so that they could put his shoes on. The officers observed a suitcase and a pile of clothes on the floor and a stack of money on a bed. Defendant Christopher Williams was sitting on another bed.

McCave asked Williams who he was and why he was there. Williams replied that he had just arrived from Seattle, that he knew Smith from Seattle, and that Smith had picked him up from the bus and taken him to the motel. McCave, concerned that the money on the bed might be Smith's and that it might be the fruit of drug transactions, asked whose money it was. Smith and Williams both replied that the money belonged to Williams. McCave asked how much money there was, and Williams replied, "$2,000." While McCave counted the money, Smith said there was not that much there. The stack contained a little over $1,000. McCave said he intended to seize the money until its ownership was cleared up.

Deputy Johnson, meanwhile, was writing down information from the defendants' I.D.'s. Anticipating leaving with the deputies rather than in the Cadillac, Smith asked Williams to call his uncle, and began to give a phone number. Williams asked for a pen.

Johnson only had one pen, which he was using. McCave said he did not have a pen and commented that motels always have pens in the room. McCave looked at the open shelf on the telephone stand and did not see a pen there. He then opened the desk drawer, immediately exposing

three baggies that contained approximately ... 20 to 25 little folded pieces of paper with cocaine. There was also a small baggie by itself with an eighth ounce, an eight-ball of cocaine.

McCave closed the drawer and advised Williams he was under arrest.

Based upon the discovery of suspected cocaine in the drawer, the deputies obtained warrants to seize the evidence and to search the room and the Cadillac. Both Smith and Williams were charged with possession of dangerous drugs with intent to sell. Smith was also charged with obstructing a peace officer, for misidentifying himself as his brother.

At the consolidated hearing on the motions to suppress, the court heard testimony by both deputies and by defendant Williams. Smith did not appear at the hearing, although his counsel was present.

Williams's testimony differed from that of the deputies on several matters. Williams testified that when the officers first came to the door, they stated they were delivery people. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that it "could have been" that they instead said "Sheriff's Office." Deputy McCave testified that, when he knocked on the door of Room 122, he stated, "Sheriff's Office, please open the door."

Williams testified that he addressed his request for a pen to Deputy Johnson and that Johnson had several pens in his shirt. Johnson testified that he only had one pen with him in the motel room.

The court heard Smith's testimony several days later. At that time, Smith testified he had missed the suppression hearing because the thermostat went out in his car. As to the events of October 11, he testified that the officers said nothing when they knocked on the door of the motel room. He stated Deputy Johnson had "a lot of pens" in his pocket. He also testified that McCave went into the bathroom and picked up some keys by the sink and that McCave "started opening drawers" after Williams asked for a pen.

The District Court ruled that the "plain view" exception to the search warrant requirement applied to this situation, because the sheriff's deputies were lawfully in the motel room and McCave inadvertently discovered the cocaine while looking for a pen for Williams. The court also ruled that Smith lacked standing to contest the legality of the search and seizure of the cocaine in the motel room, because he had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the room.

Should the court have suppressed the evidence because it was obtained as a result of an illegal search of the motel room, and does Smith have standing to object to use of the evidence?

We first address Smith's standing to raise Fourth Amendment objections to the opening of the drawer. In Minnesota v. Olson (1990), 495 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85, the Court held that an overnight guest in an apartment had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the home. Smith argues that the Olson holding extends to him, as a guest in Williams's motel room.

Status as an overnight guest was critical in Olson:

From the overnight guest's perspective, he seeks shelter in another's home precisely because it provides him with privacy, a place where he and his possessions will not be disturbed by anyone but his host and those his host allows inside. We are at our most vulnerable when we are asleep because we cannot monitor our own safety or the security of our belongings. It is for this reason that, although we may spend all day in public places, when we cannot sleep in our own home we seek out another private place to sleep, whether it be a hotel room, or the home of a friend.

Olson, 495 U.S. at 99, 110 S.Ct. at 1689. In the present case, Smith does not claim that he intended to stay or had stayed in Williams's room overnight. He denied even taking a nap, or intending to do so, in the room. He testified that he was just "waiting for Chris to get out of the shower." We conclude that Olson is not controlling.

The idea that anyone legitimately on a premises may raise Fourth Amendment objections to a search of the premises has been rejected as "too broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth Amendment rights." Rakas v. Illinois (1978), 439 U.S. 128, 142, 99 S.Ct. 421, 429, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 400. The protections offered by the Fourth Amendment may more properly be said to extend to anyone who has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 99 S.Ct. at 430. This requires more than a subjective expectation of not being discovered.

Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.

Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144, n. 12, 99 S.Ct. at 431, n. 12.

Smith does not articulate any reason, other than his mere presence in the motel room, why he had a legitimate expectation of privacy On the other hand, Williams, as the registered guest in the room, undisputedly has standing to object to McCave looking in the desk drawer. See, e.g., State v. Ottwell (1989), 239 Mont. 150, 779 P.2d 500. We therefore proceed with our analysis of the "plain view" doctrine.

                in the desk drawer in that room.   In the absence of such a showing, we [268 Mont. 433] hold that the District Court did not err in ruling that Smith is not entitled to raise Fourth Amendment objections to Deputy McCave opening the drawer
                

The Fourth Amendment prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures is not violated when the circumstances fall within the "plain view" doctrine. The elements of the "plain view" doctrine were first defined in Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 466, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2038, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 583, as (1) the law enforcement officer had a prior justification for an intrusion; and (2) in the course of the intrusion the officer inadvertently came across a piece of evidence. Prior justification for the intrusion may consist of "a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a...