State v. Williams
| Decision Date | 18 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2019-0250,2019-0250 |
| Citation | 173 N.H. 540,243 A.3d 900 |
| Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire v. Laura WILLIAMS |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Gordon J. MacDonald, attorney general (Susan P. McGinnis, senior assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State.
Christopher M. Johnson, chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the brief and orally, for the defendant.
The defendant, Laura Williams, appeals orders of the Circuit Court (Tenney, J.) denying her petitions to annul records of conviction and arrest, as well as charges not resulting in conviction, because she had subsequent convictions. We vacate the trial court's denial of the defendant's petitions to annul: (1) two charges that did not result in conviction; and (2) convictions from October 2007 and November 2012 for simple assault. We remand for the court to exercise its discretion to determine whether granting the petitions will assist in the defendant's rehabilitation and is consistent with the public welfare. See RSA 651:5 (Supp. 2019) (amended 2020); State v. Baker, 164 N.H. 296, 300, 55 A.3d 1001 (2012).
The record supports the following facts. In August 2018, the defendant sought to annul the following: (1) two November 1, 2012 convictions for simple assault; (2) an October 1, 2007 conviction for simple assault, which was originally a charge of first-degree assault before being amended by the State; (3) a charge for breach of bail conditions, which was nol prossed on October 1, 2007;1 and (4) a charge of simple assault, which was nol prossed on October 1, 2007. In November and December 2018, the trial court denied each petition to annul because it found that the defendant had subsequent convictions on her record. The defendant unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. In the order denying the defendant's reconsideration motion, the court stated that "[t]he subsequent offenses of drug possession and theft are not minor offenses and both occurred as recently as 2012." This appeal followed.
At the outset, the State argues that the defendant's appellate arguments are not preserved because she did not raise them, in the first instance, with the trial court. The defendant counters that the State's arguments on appeal are similarly not preserved given that the State did not object or otherwise respond to any of her annulment petitions filed with the trial court. Nevertheless, preservation is a limit upon the parties to an appeal, not upon the reviewing court. See State v. Kardonsky, 169 N.H. 150, 152, 144 A.3d 58 (2016). Under the circumstances of this case, and given that the appeal raises questions of statutory interpretation requiring no further factual development and the statute in question has not been the subject of substantial appellate review, we exercise our discretion to consider the parties’ arguments to the extent set forth below.
The parties disagree as to the grounds upon which the trial court rested its decision. The defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied her petitions as untimely under RSA 651:5, III. The State asserts that the trial court exercised its discretion and implicitly denied the defendant's petitions as inconsistent with the public welfare. See RSA 651:5, I. Although the interpretation of a trial court order presents a question of law, which we review de novo, see Fischer v. Superintendent, Strafford County House of Corrections, 163 N.H. 515, 519, 44 A.3d 493 (2012), we are unable to discern the statutory grounds upon which the trial court denied the defendant's petitions. Under these circumstances, therefore, we vacate the trial court's orders. Cf. Stowell v. Andrews, 171 N.H. 289, 299-300, 304, 194 A.3d 953 (2018) ().
In the interests of judicial economy, we address the arguments of the parties that are likely to arise on remand. See Auger v. Town of Strafford, 156 N.H. 64, 67, 931 A.2d 1213 (2007) ; State v. Robinson, 158 N.H. 792, 795-96, 973 A.2d 277 (2009). Analyzing the issues in this appeal requires that we engage in statutory interpretation. We review the trial court's statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Bobola, 168 N.H. 771, 773, 138 A.3d 519 (2016). We are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. Id. When examining the language of the statute, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used. Id. We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. We also interpret a statute in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation. Id. Our goal is to apply statutes in light of the legislature's intent in enacting them, and in light of the policy sought to be advanced by the entire statutory scheme. Id.
The defendant first addresses her petitions to annul the records of arrests or charges that did not result in convictions. She contends that if the trial court denied those petitions, either because it found them to be untimely under paragraph III of the statute, or because it improperly applied paragraph VI(b), then it erred. We agree.
Petitions to annul charges that do not result in convictions are governed by RSA 651:5, II. That provision allows such petitions to be brought "at any time." RSA 651:5, II. In State v. Skinner, we explained that "an individual whose arrest has resulted in an acquittal or whose charges have been nol prossed or dismissed may petition to annul the arrest record ‘at any time.’ " State v. Skinner, 149 N.H. 102, 103, 818 A.2d 1248 (2003) (quoting RSA 651:5, II). We also explained that paragraph VI(b) does not apply to petitions to annul records of arrests or charges that do not result in convictions. Skinner, 149 N.H. at 104, 818 A.2d 1248. Rather, paragraph VI(b) applies only to "individuals seeking to annul convictions." Id. Thus, if the trial court deemed the defendant's petitions to annul the charges that did not result in convictions untimely under paragraph III, it erred. Similarly, if the trial court applied paragraph VI(b) to those petitions, it also erred.
The State "does not dispute that the time requirements in paragraph III do not apply to petitions brought pursuant to paragraph II." In addition, the State agrees, as a general matter, that paragraph VI(b) does not apply to such petitions. However, ...
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