State v. Williams

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Kansas
Citation430 P.3d 448
Docket NumberNo. 108,394,108,394
Parties STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Isaac D. WILLIAMS Jr., Appellant.
Decision Date30 November 2018

Randall L. Hodgkinson, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.

Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Luckert, J.:

Isaac D. Williams Jr. raises six challenges to his convictions for aggravated burglary, aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and domestic battery. We reject his challenges and hold:

1. Sufficient evidence supports Williams' aggravated burglary conviction because, when we view the record in the light most favorable to the State, it contains sufficient evidence for a rational fact-finder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams entered the victim's dwelling without authority;
2. Williams' convictions for aggravated burglary and domestic battery are not mutually exclusive or logically inconsistent because the elements of one offense do not nullify those of the other and the jury could have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams lacked authority to enter the victim's home—a necessary element of aggravated burglary—while also being convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he had committed battery against someone with whom he was living or with whom he had previously lived;
3. The district court did not invade the province of the jury when it instructed the jury that the State had to prove Williams committed aggravated assault by using "a deadly weapon, a baseball bat" because the instructions, when read as a whole, left for the jury's consideration whether the bat was calculated or likely to produce death or serious injury;
4. Under the facts of this case, the district court erred by failing to instruct on assault as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault and on battery as a lesser included offense of aggravated battery, but neither error was clear error requiring reversal of Williams' aggravated assault or aggravated battery convictions;
5. Kansas' aggravated battery statute, K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5413(b)(1)(B), requires the battery be one where great bodily harm "can be inflicted," and that requirement is not unconstitutionally vague; and
6. Cumulative error did not deprive Williams of a fair trial.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 24, 2011, Williams called Tanya R. Robinson and told her he planned to come to her residence after work. Robinson discouraged Williams from coming over, and an argument ensued. Despite Robinson's discouragement, Williams showed up at Robinson's home. He knocked on the door, but Robinson did not answer. He continued knocking for "a long period of time." Robinson finally went to the door, but she did not let Williams enter. After a verbal exchange, Williams walked away and Robinson locked the door. Williams soon returned and began pounding on the door. Robinson was talking on the phone with a friend, who could hear Williams' pounding. Williams then broke a glass pane on the door and forced it open.

Williams entered the house, grabbed Robinson, strangled her, and "head-butted" her by hitting his head on her forehead. He then picked up a baseball bat she kept by the front door for protection. He held the bat above his head and threatened to hit Robinson and damage her possessions. Robinson fled through the front door. Robinson's friend, who had remained on the phone, called 911.

Police soon arrived. They observed marks on Robinson's neck consistent with strangulation. Officers questioned Robinson about her relationship with Williams. She said they were dating and Williams sometimes spent the night. Williams told the officers he had lived with Robinson for about two weeks. But a search of the home revealed items consistent only with an overnight stay—a shaving kit and one change of clothes. Williams told officers he received mail at a different address.

Witnesses testified at trial that Williams and Robinson had purchased furniture and appliances together, and Williams had placed the electricity and water services at the address in his name. These utilities were turned on about two weeks before the crimes were committed, which coincides with Williams' statements to the police that he had lived with Robinson for two weeks.

The State charged Williams with aggravated burglary, aggravated battery, aggravated assault, domestic battery, and criminal trespass. The jury convicted him of all charges except criminal trespass, and the district court sentenced him to 142 months' imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions. See State v. Williams , No. 108394, 2015 WL 8174299 (Kan. App. 2015) (unpublished opinion). We granted Williams' petition for review. Our jurisdiction is proper under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 20-3018(b) (petition for review of Court of Appeals decision).

ANALYSIS

Williams raises seven issues. We have reordered his issues and combined two lesser included offense issues for our analysis. As reordered and combined, Williams argues: (1) The State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his aggravated burglary conviction; (2) his convictions for aggravated burglary and domestic battery are mutually exclusive; (3) the district court erroneously instructed the jury on aggravated assault when it told the jury the State had to prove Williams used "a deadly weapon, a baseball bat"; (4) the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of assault and battery; (5) Kansas' aggravated battery statute, K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5413(b)(1)(B), is unconstitutionally vague; and (6) cumulative error deprived him of a fair trial. We reject each argument.

1. Sufficient evidence supports Williams' conviction for aggravated burglary .

Williams argues there was insufficient evidence to support his aggravated burglary conviction. Our standard for reviewing this claim is well-settled: Appellate courts review sufficiency claims in a criminal case to determine whether " ‘a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ " State v. Dunn , 304 Kan. 773, 821, 375 P.3d 332 (2016). In making this determination, appellate courts view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, which means the court " ‘does not reweigh evidence, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make determinations regarding witness credibility.’ [ Citations omitted.]" 304 Kan. at 822, 375 P.3d 332.

We apply that standard to Williams' argument that the State failed to prove the offense of aggravated burglary. Aggravated burglary is defined as "without authority, entering into or remaining within any building ... in which there is a human being with intent to commit a felony, theft or sexual battery therein." K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5807(b). Williams argues the State failed to prove he lacked authority to enter the residence because he was living or had previously lived there and previously even had a key. Given these facts, he argues the State had to prove he had established a new residence in order to prove he no longer had the authority to enter the residence. He asserts it was not enough to show Robinson did not want him to enter the residence and had taken away his key. To support his argument he states that "the authority to enter is a property right tied to the status of one's residence." He then argues "the state's laws of residence take on a legal meaning" and, in Kansas, a change in residency requires " ‘not only physical or bodily presence in the new location, but also the intention to abandon the old residence and adopt another in the new location.’ K.S.A. 77-201."

Williams appears to quote from K.S.A. 77-201 to support his argument. But that statute does not include the quoted language. K.S.A. 77-201 relates to the construction of statutes and includes definitions of terms often used throughout various statutory codes. It defines "[r]esidence" to mean "the place which is adopted by a person as the person's place of habitation and to which, whenever the person is absent, the person has the intention of returning." K.S.A. 77-201, Twenty-third. The statute also provides some guidance for determining residence: "When a person eats at one place and sleeps at another, the place where the person sleeps shall be considered the person's residence." K.S.A. 77-201, Twenty-third . This statute does not, on its face, support Williams' contention that the State had to prove his intent to abandon Robinson's home as his residence and to adopt a new residence. And he cites no authority for his assertion that "the authority to enter is a property right tied to the status of one's residence." Failure to support a point with pertinent authority or show why it is sound despite a lack of supporting authority or in the face of contrary authority is like failing to brief the issue. See State v. Murray, 302 Kan. 478, 486, 353 P.3d 1158 (2015).

More significantly, the aggravated burglary statute does not require the State to prove (or disprove) a burglar's residence. Instead, the State needs to prove the burglar lacked authority to enter or remain in the residence. See K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5807(b). As the Court of Appeals stated: "The State only needs to present enough evidence to prove each element of the crime, as prescribed by statute." Williams , 2015 WL 8174299, at *4 (citing In re Winship , 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 [1970] ; State v. Rupert , 247 Kan. 512, 514-15, 802 P.2d 511 [1990] ). Thus, Williams "requires too much." 2015 WL 8174299, at *4.

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that this court has not stated a test for determining whether a person enters or remains in a home "without authority," as that phrase is used in the aggravated burglary statute. 2015 WL 8174299, at *5. But such a test is hard to devise because the determination is...

To continue reading

Request your trial
63 cases
  • State v. Gentry, 116,371
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Kansas
    • September 20, 2019
    ...We exercise unlimited review of those questions. Next, if we find error, we conduct a ‘reversibility inquiry.’ " State v. Williams , 308 Kan. 1439, 1451, 430 P.3d 448 (2018) (quoting State v. Williams , 295 Kan. 506, Syl. ¶ 5, 286 P.3d 195 [(2012)] ). The standard for the reversibility inqu......
  • State v. Buck-Schrag
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Kansas
    • December 18, 2020
    ...We exercise unlimited review of those questions. Next, if we find error, we conduct a ‘reversibility inquiry.’ " State v. Williams , 308 Kan. 1439, 1451, 430 P.3d 448 (2018) (quoting State v. Williams , 295 Kan. 506, Syl. ¶ 5, 286 P.3d 195 [2012] )."The standard for the reversibility inquir......
  • State v. Moyer, 105,183
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Kansas
    • February 15, 2019
    ......Williams , 308 Kan. 1440, Syl. ¶ 9, 430 P.3d 448 (2018). With the character and the number of errors in this case, it is disingenuous for the Moyer II majority to say the verdict would have been the same because the evidence was strong. While we have stated no prejudicial error may arise under the ......
  • State v. Carr
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Kansas
    • January 21, 2022
    ...Viewed together, the jury instructions made clear "the crime" in question was capital murder. See State v. Williams, 308 Kan. 1439, 1453, 430 P.3d 448 (2018) (stating general rule that jury instructions must be considered as a whole, with no instruction considered in isolation). Accordingly......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT