State v. Williams

Decision Date06 April 2018
Docket NumberNo. 16-0894,16-0894
Citation910 N.W.2d 586
Parties STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Deshaun Marvin Lamar WILLIAMS, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Christopher A. Clausen of Clausen Law Office, Ames, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tyler J. Buller, Assistant Attorney General, Dan Kolacia, County Attorney, and Matthew Speers, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

MANSFIELD, Justice.

This case requires us to decide what the State must prove as the essential elements of the offense of driving while barred as a habitual offender. See Iowa Code § 321.561 (2015). Based on our reading of the statute, we conclude the State must prove the defendant (1) operated a motor vehicle (2) during the time period his or her license was revoked as a habitual offender under section 321.560. See id . While the question whether the Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT) mailed a notice of revocation to the defendant may be relevant to whether the defendant’s license was in fact revoked, it is not an actual element of the offense. Therefore, in a particular case, such as this one, the State may be able to prove the defendant operated a vehicle during the time period he or she was barred from driving without offering proof of mailing. For these reasons, on further review, we affirm the judgment of the district court, including the defendant’s conviction for violating Iowa Code section 321.561, and affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On December 12, 2015, at around 2:00 a.m., a motorist driving on Highway 30 between Ames and Boone observed a vehicle that was "all over the road." As she passed the vehicle, it swerved and almost hit her car. The vehicle continued to weave back and forth between the shoulder and the median. The motorist called 911 to report the erratic driving and, while on the phone with the dispatcher, followed the vehicle. She saw the vehicle almost go into the ditch beside the highway. The speed of the vehicle varied, as it traveled very slowly at times and well above the speed limit at others. The motorist relayed to the dispatcher the license plate number she was able to make out in the dark.

Eventually, the driver of the vehicle turned onto a gravel road, stopped, and shut the vehicle’s lights off. The motorist remained on the scene within eyesight of the vehicle until law enforcement arrived about three or four minutes later. The motorist did not see anybody get in or out of the vehicle.

Sergeant Dallas Wingate of the Boone County Sheriff’s Office responded to the call. He found a stopped vehicle with its lights turned off that matched the description the dispatcher had given him. The vehicle’s engine was on. Defendant Deshaun Williams was the vehicle’s driver.

Upon approaching the vehicle, Sergeant Wingate noticed a very strong odor of alcoholic beverage emanating from the vehicle. The driver slurred his speech, seemed confused in answering questions, appeared to lack coordination, and had glassy, watery eyes. After Sergeant Wingate asked for Williams’s driver’s license several times, Williams provided a nondriver identification card, which Sergeant Wingate ran through dispatch. Sergeant Wingate subsequently learned the State had barred Williams from driving.

Continuing his investigation, Sergeant Wingate had Williams step out of the vehicle so Sergeant Wingate could conduct field sobriety tests. When Williams exited the vehicle, Sergeant Wingate could tell Williams had vomited on himself at some point. Williams refused to participate in any of the tests. Based on Williams’s revoked license and his refusal to perform the field sobriety tests, Sergeant Wingate placed him under arrest. Sergeant Wingate indicated to Williams that he was under arrest for driving while barred, to which Williams responded he knew he should not be driving.

Deputy Doug Twigg also arrived on the scene. According to Deputy Twigg, Williams’s speech was "very slow" and "very slurred." Williams stumbled when getting out of the vehicle and appeared confused and irritated. Williams told Deputy Twigg he had dropped off nine people, although Deputy Twigg testified the vehicle was a sedan that would not hold nine passengers.

Both Sergeant Wingate and Deputy Twigg had functioning body cameras on their persons during their interactions with Williams. Williams is the only person seen on the body camera footage.

Deputy Twigg placed Williams in his squad car because Sergeant Wingate’s car was a K-9 vehicle. At this point, Deputy Twigg could also smell the strong odor of alcoholic beverage coming from Williams and noticed Williams’s bloodshot, watery eyes. Deputy Twigg transported Williams to the Boone County jail. During the ride, Williams told Deputy Twigg he knew he should not be driving.

At the jailhouse, Williams refused to provide a breath sample for chemical testing. Sergeant Wingate noticed that Williams’s mood was capricious, switching between cooperative and boisterous or argumentative. Sergeant Wingate later testified mood swings are common in operating-while-intoxicated (OWI) cases because people impaired by alcohol have difficulty managing their emotions.

The State filed a trial information charging Williams with driving while barred, an aggravated misdemeanor, and OWI third offense as a habitual offender, a class "D" felony. See Iowa Code § 321.560 ; id. § 321J.2(2)(c ); id. § 902.8. The case went to trial on March 29 and 30, 2016.

At the close of evidence, Williams moved for judgment of acquittal on the OWI charge, arguing the State did not present sufficient evidence for a fact finder to conclude he was under the influence of alcohol. Williams also moved for judgment of acquittal on the driving-while-barred charge, contending the State failed to prove the IDOT mailed him notice of his license bar. The district court overruled Williams’s motions. The jury returned verdicts finding Williams guilty of both OWI and driving while barred. In the second stage of the bifurcated proceeding, the jury then found that Williams had incurred the prior convictions alleged by the State. The court sentenced Williams to fifteen years in prison, subject to a three-year minimum, on the OWI third conviction as a habitual offender, and to two years in prison on the driving-while-barred-as-a-habitual-offender conviction, the two sentences to run concurrently. See Iowa Code §§ 902.8, .9(1)(c ); id. § 903.1(2). Williams appealed. We transferred the case to our court of appeals.

The court of appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed Williams’s convictions and sentence. As to both charges, it rejected Williams’s arguments that there was insufficient evidence he was operating the vehicle. Regarding the OWI conviction, it found sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude Williams was under the influence of alcohol. Finally, as to the driving-while-barred charge, a majority of that court rejected Williams’s argument that the proof of mailing of the notice of barment was a required element of the offense. Four judges of that court dissented in part, finding that the State was required to prove mailing as part of the driving-while-barred crime and had failed to do so.

We granted Williams’s application for further review.

II. Issue We Will Consider on Appeal.

Because this case is before us on further review, "we have the discretion to review all or some of the issues raised on appeal or in the application for further review." State v. Clay , 824 N.W.2d 488, 494 (Iowa 2012). In exercising our discretion, we choose only to review Williams’s claim that the State is required to prove the IDOT mailed notice of the bar to him as an element of driving while barred. Accordingly, the court of appeals decision will stand as the final decision on the remaining issues.

III. Scope of Review.

Williams’s notice argument raises a question of statutory interpretation; thus, our review is for correction of errors at law. See State v. Nall , 894 N.W.2d 514, 517 (Iowa 2017).

IV. Analysis.

Williams contends his conviction for driving while barred must be set aside because the State did not prove it mailed notice of revocation to him.1 We begin with the language of the statute:

It shall be unlawful for any person found to be a habitual offender to operate any motor vehicle in this state during the period of time specified in section 321.560 except for a habitual offender who has been granted a temporary restricted license pursuant to section 321.215, subsection 2.

Iowa Code § 321.561.

The legislature gets to define the elements of the crime. State v. James , 393 N.W.2d 465, 468 (Iowa 1986) ("Elements ... are promulgated by the legislature because all Iowa crimes are statutory."). Reading Iowa Code section 321.561, it requires a person found to be a habitual offender to be operating a motor vehicle in Iowa during a specified period of time. Iowa Code § 321.561. It does not refer to notice as part of the offense. See id.

Even Iowa Code section 321.560, which is referenced in section 321.561, does not mention notice. It is entitled "Period of revocation—temporary restricted licenses," and states in part,

1. A license to operate a motor vehicle in this state shall not be issued to any person declared to be a habitual offender under section 321.555, subsection 1, for a period of not less than two years nor more than six years from the date of the final decision of the department under section 17A.19 or the date on which the district court upholds the final decision of the department, whichever occurs later.
....
2. A license to operate a motor vehicle in this state shall not be issued to any person declared to be a habitual offender under section 321.555, subsection 2, for a period of one year from the date of the final decision of the department under section 17A.19 or the date on which the district court upholds the final decision of the department, whichever occurs later.
3. The department shall adopt rules under chapter 17A that establish a point
...

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