State v. Williams

Citation263 S.C. 290,210 S.E.2d 298
Decision Date14 November 1974
Docket NumberNo. 19909,19909
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
PartiesThe STATE, Respondent, v. Robert WILLIAMS, Appellant.

Ray P. McClain, Charleston, for appellant.

Sol. Robert B. Wallace and Asst. Sol., A. Arthur Rosenblum, Charleston, Atty. Gen., Daniel R. McLeod, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert M. Ariail and Staff Atty., Joseph R. Barker, Columbia, for respondent.

LEWIS, Justice:

Appellant shot one Phoebe Maybank with a pistol on February 15, 1973. The bullet struck her in the neck and she was paralyzed from the wound so inflicted. She died about eight (8) months later, on October 8, 1973, from a blood clot which resulted, in the opinion of the medical expert, from the paralysis caused by the gunshot wound. Appellant was initially charged with assault and battery with intent to kill and, subsequently, with murder, after the victim died. Two indictments were obtained and consolidated for trial, one charging assault and battery with intent to kill and the other murder. The trial of appellant resulted in his conviction of voluntary manslaughter and a sentence of fifteen (15) years, from which this appeal is prosecuted.

The several questions presented will be disposed of in substantially the order of the occurrence of the incidents upon which they are based.

Appellant was arrested on February 15, 1973, shortly after the commission of the crime. A hearing was held before the magistrate on the following day, February 16th, to determine appellant's right to bail under the charge of assault and battery with intent to kill. As a result of this hearing, bond was set at $10,000.00. Appellant, an indigent, was not represented by counsel at the hearing. However, some time later, appellant's present counsel obtained the consent of the State to a reduction in the amount of bail and secured appellant's release from custody upon posting bond in the amount of $2500.00. After the victim died and a charge of murder was entered, appellant was continued on bail in the latter amount.

Appellant moved at the time of his arraignment that the indictment be dismissed because he was not afforded counsel at the initial bond hearing. The motion was denied and the contention that this was error presents the first question for decision.

Appellant contends that the hearing to determine his entitlement to bail was a 'critical stage' in the prosecution and that the failure to provide counsel to represent him at the time deprived him of due process, equal protection of the laws, and reasonable bail.

No arbitrary, fixed stage of the prosecution has been set at which a defendant must be provided counsel in order to protect his constitutional rights. It is now settled however that an accused is entitled to the assistance of counsel at every Critical stage of the proceedings and failure to have such assistance is reversible error even though no prejudice is shown. Moorer v. State of South Carolina, 244 S.C. 102, 135 S.E.2d 713.

Generally, a critical stage of a criminal proceeding has been reached when there is at least a reasonable possibility of prejudice to the defendant in the defense of his case. The test for determining whether a critical stage of the proceedings has been reached, as it relates to the right of counsel, is whether the particular stage either requires or offers opportunity to take a procedural step which will have prejudicial effects in later proceedings, or whether events transpire that are likely to prejudice the ensuing trial. Miller v. State of South Carolina, 309 F.Supp. 1287 (4th Cir.); Sigler v. Bird, 354 F.2d 694 (8th Cir.).

The bail hearing on February 16th was not a critical stage of the prosecution and the failure to provide counsel for appellant at such hearing does not constitute ground for reversal in the absence of a showing that prejudice resulted therefrom.

There is no showing in this record, nor does appellant contend, that anything occurred at the bail hearing which in any way affected or prejudiced his subsequent trial or that was likely to do so. He was not required to plead to the charges nor was any occurrence or statement at the hearing used in his subsequent trial.

The contention that the original requirement of $10,000.00 bail was excessive is without merit. The determination of the amount of bail was within the discretion of the granting officer and there is no showing of any abuse of such discretion. State v. Taylor, 255 S.C. 268, 178 S.E.2d 244.

The trial judge therefore properly refused to dismiss the charges because of the failure to provide counsel at the bail hearing.

Appellant also contends that the trial judge erred in refusing to dismiss the indictment upon the ground that it was obtained solely upon the basis of hearsay testimony, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the South Carolina Constitution. The record is devoid of any showing to substantiate the allegation that only hearsay testimony was presented to the grand jury and this exception is properly overruled on that ground.

Assuming however that the record sustained the charge that the indictment was founded upon hearsay evidence, there existed no basis in this record to dismiss the indictment upon that ground. In Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397 (cited with approval in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 79 S.Ct. 1237, 3 L.Ed.2d 1323) the United States Supreme Court disposed of the Fifth Amendment claims in the following language:

'If indictments were to be held open to challenge on the ground that there was inadequate or incompetent evidence before the grand jury, the resulting delay would be great indeed. The result of such a rule would be that before trial on the merits a defendant could always insist on a kind of preliminary trial to determine the competency and adequacy of the evidence before the grand jury. This is not required by the Fifth Amendment. An indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, . . ., if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits. The Fifth Amendment requires nothing more.'

An indictment based upon hearsay testimony violates no right of the appellant under Article 1, Section 17 (now Section 11) of the South Carolina Constitution. In fact, our decisions preclude inquiry into the factual basis for an indictment by the grand jury. Margolis v. Telech, 239 S.C. 232, 122 S.E.2d 417.

Argument that appellant was deprived of Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights is also without merit. The long-established secrecy of grand jury actions and the nature of its operations and functions makes Sixth Amendment rights inapplicable to its proceedings.

As previously stated, the victim did not die until approximately eight (8) months after she was shot. Appellant was first indicted for assault and battery with intent to kill and, subsequently, for murder when the victim died. The two indictments were consolidated for trial over the objections of appellant. It is contended that this constituted prejudicial error.

The controlling legal principles are thus stated in the syllabus to McCrary v. State of South Carolina, 249 S.C. 14, 152 S.E.2d 235:

'Where the offenses charged in separate indictments are of the same general nature involving connected transactions closely related in kind, place and character, the trial judge has power, in his discretion, to order the indictments tried together over objection by the defendant in the absence of a showing that (defendant's) substantive rights would be prejudiced.'

The offenses charged in the indictments were of the same nature and involved only one transaction, i.e., the shooting of the deceased. Other than his contention that death did not result from the gunshot wound, appellant's defense to both charges was the same. Neither was there any showing of prejudice from the trial of the charges together. Appellant's contention that the consolidation resulted in prejudice because the jury was lead to believe that he was guilty of multiple wrongdoing is not supported by the record. The testimony and instructions to the jury left no doubt that the charges arose out of one incident and that the question to be decided was which of the charges, if any, was sustained by the proof.

The question of consolidation of the charges for trial was addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and no abuse of such discretion has been shown.

Error is also charged in the alleged failure of the trial judge to require the State to respond to appellant's pretrial motion for discovery of (1) all evidence in the hands of the solicitor which was favorable to the appellant, (2) the transcript or minutes of the grand jury proceedings, and (3) certain specified information concerning the State's case against appellant.

There is no merit in the contention that the State failed to properly respond to the motion for discovery. In response to this motion, the court directed: 'That everything the Solicitor has that you be allowed to examine and look at and talk to his witnesses, if you want to.' The record shows that the State made its entire file on the case available to counsel for appellant and that the court advised his counsel: 'If there is anything else that you can think of that you want, I will get it for you if I can . . .' Appellant's brief concedes that 'there were no grand jury minutes' and therefore, if it had been proper to do so, could not have been furnished. The conclusive answer to the present contention is that there is no factual basis to support it.

Appellant unsuccessfully moved, prior to trial, for an order 'authorizing payment of a reasonable fee by the State of South Carolina to an independent forensic pathologist to be retained by defendant to evaluate medical and scientific evidence of the cause of death of the victim of the...

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    • 14 Mayo 2013
    ...limited to the issue of interim confinement”), citing United States v. Wade, supra, 388 U.S. at 227, 87 S.Ct. 1926;State v. Williams, 263 S.C. 290, 295, 210 S.E.2d 298 (1974) (bail hearing not critical stage of criminal prosecution). Similarly, in People v. Collins, 298 Mich.App. 458, 828 N......
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    .... but rather is limited to the issue of interim confinement''), citing United States v. Wade, supra, 388 U.S. 227; State v. Williams, 263 S.C. 290, 295, 210 S.E.2d 298 (1974) (bail hearing not critical stage of criminal prosecution). Similarly, in People v. Collins, 298 Mich. App. 458, 828 ......
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