State v. Williams

Decision Date10 November 2016
Docket NumberNo. 2015–1478.,2015–1478.
Parties The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. WILLIAMS, Appellant.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Richard Kasay, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Allen Vender, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

O'DONNELL, J.

{¶ 1} The Ninth District Court of Appeals certified a conflict between its decision in this case and a decision of the Eighth District Court of Appeals in State v. Holmes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100388, 2014-Ohio-3816, 2014 WL 4361331, on the following question: "Where a trial court sentences a defendant on counts that it had previously determined were subject to merger, is the sentence void or do principles of res judicata apply to preclude a defendant from challenging the sentence after direct appeal?"

{¶ 2} A court only has authority to impose a sentence that conforms to law, and R.C. 2941.25 prohibits the imposition of multiple sentences for allied offenses of similar import. Thus, when a sentencing court concludes that an offender has been found guilty of two or more offenses that are allied offenses of similar import, in conformity with State v. Whitfield, 124 Ohio St.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-2, 922 N.E.2d 182, it should permit the state to select the allied offense to proceed on for purposes of imposing sentence and it should impose sentence for only that offense. Accordingly, imposing separate sentences for allied offenses of similar import is contrary to law and such sentences are void. Therefore, res judicata does not preclude a court from correcting those sentences after a direct appeal.

{¶ 3} The judgment of conviction entered against Cameron D. Williams in this case reflects that the trial court concluded that the two counts of aggravated murder and one count of murder in connection with the killing of Darian Polk are allied offenses of similar import. Although the court ordered them merged for the purposes of sentencing, and although the state elected to have Williams sentenced for the aggravated murder charged in count three, the court imposed concurrent sentences on each of the three offenses instead of sentencing on only one offense. However, the imposition of concurrent sentences is not the equivalent of merging allied offenses, State v. Damron, 129 Ohio St.3d 86, 2011-Ohio-2268, 950 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 17, but because the state designated one allied offense for sentencing, a remand for resentencing is not necessary in this case. Rather, pursuant to Article IV, Section 2(B)(2)(f) of the Ohio Constitution, we modify the judgment of the appellate court to vacate the sentences imposed for murder in count one and aggravated murder in count two and affirm the remaining convictions and sentences in all respects.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 4} On July 28, 2007, Williams broke into an apartment rented by Tamara Hughes, his ex-wife, and shot and killed Darian Polk, whom he found sleeping with her in her bed. Williams then kidnapped Hughes at gunpoint, took her to an abandoned home, and engaged in sexual conduct with her. Akron police arrested him the next day.

{¶ 5} A Summit County Grand Jury indicted Williams on three counts of aggravated murder with death penalty specifications, two counts of kidnapping, and one count each of aggravated burglary, burglary, rape, violating a protection order, intimidating a crime victim, escape, having a weapon while under disability, carrying a concealed weapon, menacing by stalking, and domestic violence, along with firearm specifications.

{¶ 6} At trial, the jury found Williams guilty of two counts of aggravated murder with death penalty specifications (Counts two and three) and one count each of murder (as a lesser included offense of the aggravated murder charge alleged in Count one), kidnapping, aggravated burglary, violating a protection order, intimidating a crime victim, escape, having a weapon while under disability, and carrying a concealed weapon, along with firearm specifications. The remaining counts and specifications were dismissed. In the penalty phase of the trial, the jury found that the aggravating circumstances did not outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt and recommended a sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole after 30 years on each count of aggravated murder.

{¶ 7} At the sentencing hearing, the state elected to have Williams sentenced on the conviction for aggravated murder charged in Count three, and it did not request a sentence on the convictions for murder in Count one or aggravated murder in count two. The trial court merged counts one and two into Count three and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment with no possibility of parole until Williams had served 30 full years on that count. However, the sentencing entry provides:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED BY THIS COURT that the Defendant, CAMERON D. WILLIAMS, be committed to the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections * * * for a definite term of LIFE WITH PAROLE after Fifteen (15) years, which is a mandatory term pursuant to O.R.C. 2929.13(F), for punishment for the crime of MURDER, Ohio Revised Code Section 2903.02, a special felony; for a definite term of LIFE WITH PAROLE after Thirty (30) years, which is a mandatory term pursuant to O.R.C. 2929.13(F), for punishment of the crime of AGGRAVATED MURDER, Ohio Revised Code Section 2903.01(B), a special felony; for a definite term of LIFE WITH PAROLE after Thirty (30) years, which is a mandatory term pursuant to O.R.C. 2929.13(F), for punishment of the crime of AGGRAVATED MURDER, Ohio Revised Code Section 2903.01(D), a special felony * * *.
* * *
THEREUPON, pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Section 2941.25(A), the Court hereby Orders that the offense of MURDER, as contained in the amended Count 1 of the Indictment and the offense of AGGRAVATED MURDER, as contained in Count 2 of the Indictment be merged into the offense of AGGRAVATED MURDER, as contained in Count 3 of the Indictment for purposes of sentencing and that said sentencing be served concurrently and not consecutively with each other, for a total of LIFE WITH PAROLE AFTER Thirty (30) years for the three counts.
* * *
Accordingly, the total sentence the Court imposes is LIFE WITH PAROLE after Sixty–Nine (69) years * * *.

(Capitalization and boldface sic.) Thus, the trial court purported to merge the sentences for allied offenses by ordering that the sentences be served concurrently with each other.

{¶ 8} On appeal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed the conviction for violating a protection order as not supported by sufficient evidence but affirmed Williams's other convictions and sentences. 9th Dist. Summit No. 24169, 2009-Ohio-3162, 2009 WL 1856743, ¶ 55, 61. Williams did not argue that the trial court erred in sentencing him on allied offenses of similar import.

{¶ 9} On April 23, 2014, Williams moved to correct his sentences, asserting that the concurrent sentences imposed on Counts one, two, and three were contrary to law. He sought a de novo sentencing at which, he argued, all of his convictions should be merged as allied offenses into a single conviction for aggravated murder. The trial court denied the motion.

{¶ 10} The court of appeals affirmed, construing the motion as an untimely and successive petition for postconviction relief that the trial court lacked authority to consider. 2015-Ohio-2632, ¶ 6. The court further explained that "because Mr. Williams could have raised his arguments pertaining to his sentence and court costs in a direct appeal, he is now barred from asserting these arguments under the doctrine of res judicata." Id. at ¶ 7. And the appellate court rejected Williams's argument that the error in merging allied offenses rendered his sentences void, noting that this court had not yet applied its void sentence jurisprudence in these circumstances. Id. at ¶ 9.

{¶ 11} The Ninth District certified that its judgment conflicts with State v. Holmes, 8th Dist. No. 100388, 2014-Ohio-3816, 2014 WL 4361331. In that case, the trial court had determined that Holmes's convictions for rape and kidnapping were for allied offenses of similar import but nonetheless imposed separate sentences for each conviction. Although Holmes had not raised the issue in either his direct appeal or in his petition for postconviction relief, the appellate court concluded that his motion to vacate was not barred by res judicata, because the sentences for allied offenses were contrary to law and void. Id. at ¶ 2–3, 11, 20–22. It stated, "Once a trial court determines that two offenses are allied and are subject to merger, the trial court acts without authority when it imposes a sentence on both offenses. Thus, acting without authority renders the sentence void." Id. at ¶ 20.

{¶ 12} We agreed to resolve the conflict. 143 Ohio St.3d 1541, 2015-Ohio-4633, 40 N.E.3d 1178.

Positions of the Parties

{¶ 13} Williams maintains that "[s]entences for counts which were previously determined to be subject to merger are void, and res judicata does not preclude a defendant from challenging such sentences after direct appeal." He notes that State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, 922 N.E.2d 923, explains that trial courts have a mandatory duty to merge allied offenses, that imposition of concurrent sentences for allied offenses is not authorized by law, and that an offender is prejudiced by having more convictions than authorized by statute. Williams reasons that because a sentence is void when a court lacks authority to act or when it imposes a sentence that is not in accordance with statutorily mandated terms, sentences imposed for crimes that the trial court has found to be allied offenses of similar import are void and challenges to the sentences are not subject to the doctrine of res judicata.

{¶ 14} The state concedes that the trial court erred in...

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