State v. Williams
| Decision Date | 13 March 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-1821-CR.,96-1821-CR. |
| Citation | 623 N.W.2d 106,241 Wis.2d 631,2001 WI 21 |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, v. Roosevelt WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause was argued by Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general.
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral argument by Melinda A. Swartz, assistant state public defender.
¶ 1.
We review again the court of appeals decision that reversed the conviction of the defendant, Roosevelt Williams, State v. Williams, 214 Wis. 2d 412, 570 N.W.2d 892 (Ct. App. 1997). On April 27, 1999, this court issued a decision, State v. Williams, 225 Wis. 2d 159, 591 N.W.2d 823 (1999), that reversed the court of appeals decision. However, on April 3, 2000, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated (without review) our decision, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000). Williams v. Wisconsin, 529 U.S. 1050, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000).
¶ 2. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), relates to the first of the two issues facing this court, whether an anonymous tip containing a contemporaneous report of drug trafficking, combined with independent observations and corroboration of details from the tip justified the investigatory stop of Williams. Judge James Eaton, assigned to Milwaukee County Circuit Court, found that there was reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the police officers did not have the requisite reasonable suspicion based upon the information before them. Now having the benefit of the Supreme Court's guidance in Florida v. J.L., we conclude that, considering the totality of the circumstances, including the indicia of reliability surrounding the anonymous tip and the police officers' additional observations, the officers reasonably suspected that criminal activity was afoot.
¶ 3. The second issue before us is whether there was reasonable suspicion for the police officers' subsequent search of the vehicle. The circuit court found that there was, and the court of appeals did not reach that question. We agree with the circuit court that under the circumstances, the officers reasonably suspected that they were in physical danger, justifying the protective search. We therefore reverse the court of appeals, and approve the decision of the circuit court, which denied Williams' motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search. Accordingly, we uphold the circuit court's judgment of conviction.
¶ 4. Sometime during the afternoon of November 2, 1995, a 9-1-1 telephone call1 was received from an anonymous caller. The transcript of the call is as follows:
¶ 5. The above information was dispatched by radio to Police Officers Johnny Norred and Phillip Henschel, who were driving a general patrol squad car:
¶ 6. Four minutes after receiving the dispatch, the officers arrived at 4261 Teutonia. It was daylight. As they drove past the building, they saw a vehicle matching the general description in the dispatch. The vehicle was a Chevy Blazer instead of a Ford Bronco at the rear, instead of the side, of the building.2 The Chevy Blazer was parked in an alley or driveway alongside an empty lot behind the building. The officers drove around the block in an attempt to approach the vehicle without being spotted. They conducted no surveillance and observed no drug trafficking.
¶ 7. The officers drove down an alley, and then turned to approach the vehicle so that the front of the police car faced the front of the Blazer. At this point, the officers observed that the Blazer had no license plates.3 Two persons were sitting in the front seat. Williams was seated in the driver's seat and a female was seated in the passenger's seat.
¶ 8. The officers also observed, as they pulled up, that Williams' right hand was out of view, reaching down and behind the passenger front seat. The officers approached the vehicle, drew their weapons, and told the occupants to put their hands where they could see them. Neither of the occupants was holding weapons. Officer Norred opened the driver's car door and ordered them out of the vehicle. The officers conducted a pat-down search of each occupant for weapons.4 Finding none, the officers secured Williams and the passenger in the back seat of the squad car.
¶ 9. Officer Norred returned to the Blazer and searched the area behind the passenger seat where he had observed Williams' hand hidden earlier. Having noted that Williams had long arms, the officer searched wherever Williams could have reached. The officer also searched the area within reach of the passenger's arm.
¶ 10. Within the area that he searched, Officer Norred found a green leafy substance that appeared to be marijuana, a container with 26 rocks he suspected to be cocaine base and another small bag of marijuana. At this point, Williams was placed under arrest.
¶ 11. Williams was charged with knowing possession, with intent to deliver, five grams or less of cocaine, in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 161.16(2)(b)(1) and 161.41(1m)(cm)(1) (1995-96). Williams moved to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search, asserting that the officers did not have a search warrant and the circumstances leading up to the search did not provide an exception to the search warrant requirement. On January 10, 1996, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion. The parties stipulated to the admission into evidence of the transcript of the 9-1-1 call and the subsequent dispatch.
¶ 12. In addition, Officer Norred testified that even though he and Officer Henschel took a "concealed route" in approaching the Chevy Blazer, he did not know if Williams had seen them or if Williams had a gun in his hand. This prospect made him fear for his safety. Officer Henschel testified that he, too, feared for his safety.
¶ 13. Officer Norred testified that the purpose of his search of the Blazer was to secure his and Officer Henschel's safety. He stated that Williams "may have had a gun in his hands, and he possibly may have dropped it [behind the seat]." Officer Norred explained that He also testified that he would have released Williams and the passenger to return to the vehicle had he not found what appeared to be cocaine base and marijuana.
¶ 14. The circuit court denied the suppression motion, finding that the officers reasonably relied upon the anonymous tip and verified the readily observable information contained in the tip. The circuit court also found that the defendant's hand was behind the passenger seat as the officers approached the vehicle. The court ruled that together, these considerations supported the officers' reasonable suspicion in making the stop and the subsequent protective search of the occupants and the Blazer.
¶ 15. Williams pled guilty. The circuit court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Williams to 30 months in state prison.5 Williams appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the circuit court's ruling. The court of appeals held that the officers could not have had reasonable suspicion in these circumstances where the anonymous tip "provide[d] only readily observable information, and they themselves observe[d] no suspicious behavior." State v. Williams, 214 Wis. 2d at 423. Because the court of appeals concluded that the initial stop was unlawful, it did not reach the issue of whether the subsequent search was lawful. Id. at 418, n.6.
¶ 16. We granted review and reversed the court of appeals. We found that the court of appeals focused only upon the anonymous tip, rather than the totality of the circumstances facing the officers at the time of the stop. State v. Williams, 225 Wis. 2d at 180. Considering both the quality and quantity of the information known to the officers, and the surrounding circumstances, we held that the officers had the necessary reasonable suspicion for both the investigatory stop and...
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