State v. Williams

• Decision Date: 07 April 1998
• Docket Number: No. 15742,15742
• Citation: 709 A.2d 43,48 Conn.App. 361
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Adolph WILLIAMS.

Page 43

709 A.2d 43

48 Conn.App. 361

STATE of Connecticut v. Adolph WILLIAMS.

No. 15742.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 15, 1997.

Decided April 7, 1998.

Richard Emanuel, with whom, on the brief, were Kim E. Kerber and Christine A. Robinson, Certified Legal Interns, for appellant (defendant).

Frederick W. Fawcett, Assistant State's Attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Jonathan C. Benedict, State's Attorney, for appellee (State).

Before EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL, C.J., and SCHALLER and CRETELLA, JJ.

SCHALLER, Judge.

The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a)(1), ¹ carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29-35, ² and commission of a class A, B or C felony with a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53-202k. ³ On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) admitted the hearsay statement of a witness regarding a threat made against the victim by the defendant's brother, (2) concluded that sufficient evidence was presented at trial to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the charge of carrying a pistol without a permit, (3) instructed the jury on the definition of reasonable doubt, and (4) violated the defendant's constitutional right against double jeopardy when it convicted him of both manslaughter in the first degree and the commission of a class A, B or C felony with a firearm. We vacate the conviction of the violation of § 53-202k and affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On September 11, 1994, Andrew Mathis, Lori Thompson and the victim, Bradley Grandison, were on Wilmot Avenue in Bridgeport. Mathis, who was the state's chief witness, testified that he was selling crack cocaine with Grandison serving as his lookout to direct customers from the street to Mathis who was waiting out of view. The three had just finished smoking crack cocaine when Thompson, Grandison's girlfriend, left the scene to go to a nearby restaurant. As Mathis and Grandison were engaged in drug transactions, a car pulled up to the curb with the passenger side facing Grandison. Mathis identified the passenger as the defendant, Adolph Williams.

Mathis testified that he heard the defendant say to Grandison, "My brother wants his money." Mathis also heard the defendant mention the sum of $100. Grandison responded that he did not have the money to pay the defendant. Grandison then moved close to the car and stuck his head inside the passenger side window. Mathis could not hear the ensuing conversation, but saw Grandison back away from the car. Mathis then saw a large silver gun in the defendant's hand, and heard the defendant say, "You think I'm playing?" The defendant got out of the car with the gun in his hand and said, "I want the money." From a distance of four to five feet, the defendant fired several shots at Grandison, who was unarmed. Mathis observed the defendant point the gun downward so as to shoot Grandison in the legs. Grandison fell to the ground and the defendant got back into the car, which was driven away from the scene. Mathis ran from the scene after the shooting.

Thompson heard gunshots as she was returning from the restaurant. She saw the car speed away but got only a brief glimpse of the driver, whom she recognized but could not name. She ran to the scene and saw Grandison lying on the ground. He was unable to speak. Grandison was taken to a hospital where he later died from multiple gunshot wounds to the legs, chest and abdomen. Thompson had also been present at the same location on Wilmot Avenue several days prior to the shooting when Grandison and the defendant's brother, Terrence Williams, were arguing. Thompson testified, over objection, that she heard Terrence Williams tell Grandison that "he was going to shoot him if he did not get his money" and that Grandison responded that he did not have any money.

At trial, the defendant, who was then seventeen years old, testified in his own defense and claimed that he did not know Grandison, and was not near the scene of the crime on the day in question. He testified that he was at the house of a friend's girlfriend, approximately five or six blocks away from the scene, during the time of the shooting.

On November 30, 1995, after a six day trial, the jury found the defendant not guilty of the crime of murder, but guilty of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree. The jury also found the defendant guilty of the charges of carrying a pistol without a permit, and commission of a class A, B or C felony with a firearm. On January 19, 1996, the trial court sentenced the defendant to fifteen years imprisonment suspended after eight years and five years probation on the charge of manslaughter, one year imprisonment to run concurrently on the charge of carrying a pistol without a permit, and five years imprisonment to run consecutively on the charge of commission of a felony with a firearm. The total effective sentence was fifteen years, ⁴ execution suspended after thirteen years, and five years probation. This appeal followed.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly admitted the hearsay statement of Thompson regarding the threat made by the defendant's brother against the victim several days prior to the shooting. Specifically, the defendant claims that the trial court admitted the hearsay statement although no recognized exception to the hearsay rule justified its admission. We conclude that the statement was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted and, therefore, was not hearsay. As a result, it was proper for the trial court to admit the statement.

The defendant's claim is an evidentiary one, and " '[t]he trial court's ruling on evidentiary matters will be overturned only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the court's discretion.' " State v. Bruno, 236 Conn. 514, 549, 673 A.2d 1117 (1996). "The trial court also has broad discretion in balancing the probative value of proffered evidence against its prejudicial effect. That discretion is subject to reversal only where an abuse of discretion is manifest or where an injustice appears to have been done." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Weber, 31 Conn.App. 58, 65, 623 A.2d 506, cert. denied, 226 Conn. 908, 625 A.2d 1379 (1993).

The trial court admitted the testimony regarding the out-of-court statement of the defendant's brother on the ground that it was a third party threat, which is admissible against the defendant where there was some connection between the threat and the defendant, pursuant to State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517, 533-34, 504 A.2d 480, cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184, 106 S.Ct. 2922, 91 L.Ed.2d 550 (1986), and State v. Taft, 25 Conn.App. 578, 584-85, 595 A.2d 918, cert. denied, 220 Conn. 921, 598 A.2d 144 (1991). The trial court's admission of the statement under this authority was incorrect. This was not a situation where a prospective witness in a pending criminal proceeding was threatened by a third party connected to the defendant, where the evidence was introduced to show the defendant's consciousness of guilt, as was the case in Leecan and Taft. Nevertheless, we conclude that the statement was admissible because it was not hearsay; it was not introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.

Despite the trial court's incorrect basis for admitting the statement, we can sustain admission of the evidence if other proper grounds exist for admission of the statement. Johnny Cake, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 180 Conn. 296, 301, 429 A.2d 883 (1980); see Polymer Resources, Ltd. v. Keeney, 32 Conn.App. 340, 348, 629 A.2d 447 (1993).

Thompson testified that she heard the defendant's brother threaten to shoot the victim if he did not pay a debt owed to him. We conclude that this testimony was relevant because it tended to connect the defendant to the crime charged. The only eyewitness to the crime testified that immediately prior to the fatal shooting, he heard the shooter demand payment of a $100 debt owed to his brother. When the victim stated that he did not have the money, the shots were fired that resulted in the victim's death. Thus, the statement was introduced to prove the defendant's motive for shooting the victim: to collect the debt owed to his brother.

"Hearsay is an out-of-court statement that is offered to establish the truth of the facts contained in the statement.... State v. Miller, 154 Conn. 622, 629, 338 A.2d 167 (1967), and Murray v. Supreme Lodge, N.E.O.P., 74 Conn. 715, 718, 52 A. 722 (1902). A statement may or may not be hearsay, depending upon the purpose for which it is offered. When declarations are offered ... for the purpose of showing that such statements were made and not that what was declared was true, they do not come within the rule.... McDermott v. McDermott, 97 Conn. 31, 37-38, 115 A. 638 (1921); Engel v. Conti, 78 Conn. 351, 354, 62 A. 210 (1905)." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jaynes, 35 Conn.App. 541, 548, 645 A.2d 1060, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 928, 648 A.2d 880 (1994).

An out-of-court statement introduced to prove the motive of the accused, but not the truth of the matter asserted in the statement, is admissible. State v. Alvarez, 216 Conn. 301, 311, 579 A.2d 515 (1990). In Alvarez, the state offered a declarant's statements "not for the truth of the matter asserted therein, but rather to show the effect of the statements upon the defendant. The jury could infer from the statements that the defendant had a motive to kill the victim. United States v. Cline, 570 F.2d 731, 734 (8th Cir.1978). This is not hearsay. State v. Hull, [210 Conn. 481, 498-99, 556 A.2d 154 (1989) ]; State v. Gonzales, 186 Conn. 426, 429, 441 A.2d 852 (1982); C. McCormick,...