State v. Williams

• Decision Date: 19 May 1980
• Docket Number: No. 65199,65199
• Citation: 392 So.2d 641
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. James WILLIAMS.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 641

392 So.2d 641

STATE of Louisiana v. James WILLIAMS.

No. 65199.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 19, 1980.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Connick, Dist. Atty., Brian G. Meissner, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-relator.

Dwight M. Doskey, Orleans Indigent Defender Program, New Orleans, for defendant-respondent.

MARCUS, Justice. ^*

James Williams, a deaf mute, was indicted for the June 14, 1975 aggravated rape of a seventy-four year old woman. Because defendant was unable to communicate, he entered a plea of not guilty "through his mother and sister."

Thereafter, examinations and evaluations were made of and treatment rendered to defendant through the joint efforts of the prosecution and defense. In December 1977, defendant moved to dismiss the proceeding or have defendant committed "civilly." After a hearing, the trial judge denied the motion. Upon defendant's application, we granted certiorari to review the correctness of this ruling. On October 9 1978, this court handed down a decision in which we remanded the case to the trial court for additional inquiry into defendant's mental condition and the possibility of treatment to improve his ability to communicate provided it could be accomplished without delay. "Otherwise," we stated, "the State must release Williams." State v. Williams, 363 So.2d 441 (La.1978).

On remand, the trial court ordered a mental examination for defendant and received a report from Dr. William C. Super, a psychiatrist, that he was unable to communicate with defendant and that some degree of mental retardation was involved. The court then ordered the district attorney to comply with the remainder of this court's order, i. e., either move to civilly commit defendant or dismiss charges by May 4, 1979. The district attorney filed a petition for civil commitment under the provision of La.R.S. 28:54 which provides in pertinent part:

A. Any person of legal age may file with the court a petition which asserts his belief that a person is mentally ill or is suffering from substance abuse and that the person is a danger to himself or others or is gravely disabled and may thereby request a hearing. The petition may be filed in the judicial district in which the respondent is confined, or if not confined, in the judicial district where he resides or may be found. The hearing shall not be transferred to another district except for good cause shown. A petitioner who is unable to afford an attorney may seek the assistance of any Legal Aid Society or similar agency if available.

D. As soon as practical after the filing of the petition, the court shall review the petition and supporting documents, and determine whether there exists probable cause that the respondent is mentally ill or suffering from substance abuse and that he is a danger to himself or others or is gravely disabled. If the court determines that probable cause exists, the court may appoint the respondent's treating physician if available, or if none, then another physician, preferably a psychiatrist, to examine respondent and make a written report to the court and respondent's attorney on the form provided by the office of mental health of the Department of Health and Human Resources. This report shall set forth specifically the objective factors leading to the conclusion that the person has a mental illness or suffers from substance abuse, the actions or statements by the person leading to the conclusion that the person is dangerous to himself or others or is gravely disabled and in need of immediate treatment as a result of such illness or abuse and why involuntary confinement and treatment are indicated. The following criteria should be considered by the physician:

(1) The respondent is suffering from serious mental illness or substance abuse.

(2) The respondent's condition is likely to deteriorate needlessly unless the respondent is provided appropriate medical treatment.

(3) The respondent's condition is likely to improve if he is provided appropriate medical treatment.

On July 5, 1979, a hearing in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans was held to determine if defendant should be civilly committed under the standard provided in La.R.S. 28:55:

E. If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is dangerous to self or others or is gravely disabled, as a result of substance abuse or mental illness, it shall render a judgment for his commitment to a designated treatment facility which is medically suitable and least restrictive of his liberty. ...

Dr. Super testified at the civil commitment hearing. In response to the court's inquiry as to whether defendant had any medical disability or disability related to substance abuse, Dr. Super responded:

I found no evidence that he's suffering from any major mental disorder, that is, psychosis for example or severe organic brain syndrome which would severely impair his ability to function.... His disability can be characterized primarily as a learning disability when it's a hearing and speech impediment and because of related to that there are no indications of mental deficiency, but the exact level of his intelligence is, of course, very difficult to arrive at, however, he's disabled through his hearing and speech difficulties.

On the basis of this testimony, the court maintained defendant's exception of no cause of action because the defendant had not been shown to have been "mentally ill" under the statute.

On July 16, 1979, the trial court ordered the state to release defendant. Upon the state's application, we granted certiorari to review this ruling.

The record reveals ample evidence of defendant's incompetency to stand trial and his inability to effectively assist counsel in his defense. In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), the United States Supreme Court was also faced with a deaf mute who could not communicate with others. The Court stated:

We hold, consequently, that a person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. If it is determined that this is not the case, then the State must either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release the defendant. Furthermore, even if it is determined that the defendant probably soon will be able to stand trial, his continued commitment must be justified by progress toward that goal. 406 U.S. at 738, 92 S.Ct. at 1858.

In Jackson, the Court noted that defendant's commitment under Indiana law was not founded upon any requirement of dangerousness.

Thus, because defendant is unfit to stand trial, the state had the option of either confining him for a reasonable length of time to teach him to assist in his own defense or institute civil commitment proceedings. To be involuntarily committed under La.R.S. 28:54, one must be judicially determined to be "a person (who) is mentally ill or is suffering from substance abuse and ... is a danger to himself or others or is gravely disabled ...." (Emphasis added.) La.R.S. 28:2(3) defines "dangerous to others":

"Dangerous to others" means the condition of a person whose behavior or significant threats support a reasonable expectation that there is a substantial risk that he will inflict physical harm upon another person in the near future.

If there is ample evidence that defendant committed the aggravated rape upon the seventy-four year old woman, there would be sufficient evidence that he is dangerous to others; in addition, to be civilly committed, defendant must be adjudged to be "mentally ill." It is this requirement that the civil district court found lacking.

Before the mental health law was completely revised in 1977, the judicial commitment statute (La.R.S. 28:53) required a different finding: "that the patient is suffering from a mental illness which causes him to be dangerous to himself or others ...." (Emphasis added.) The new statute does not require a finding of a mental illness causing a dangerous condition; it simply requires that a person be "mentally ill" and "dangerous." "Mentally ill" is a broad term encompassing many types of disorders. La.R.S. 28:2(14) broadly defines a "mentally ill person" as:

... any person with a psychiatric disorder which has substantial adverse effects on his ability to function and who requires care and treatment. It does not refer to a person suffering solely from mental retardation, epilepsy, alcoholism, or drug abuse.

If a person is found unfit to stand trial because of an inability to effectively communicate, he should be considered "mentally ill" under La.R.S. 28:54 unless his unfitness is due solely to a physical condition. If that person also meets the dangerousness requirement of the statute, he should be considered subjectable to involuntary civil commitment. By a requirement of finding a defendant both mentally ill (because he is unfit to stand trial) and dangerous to himself or others, the possibility of committing an individual to a mental facility solely because he has been found unfit to stand trial is avoided. ¹

This approach is identical to that used by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Lang, 76 Ill.2d 311, 29 Ill.Dec. 87, 391 N.E.2d 350 (1979). As stated in Lang:

(This) interpretation ... complies with the dictates of Jackson v. Indiana. Under this construction Lang, if found to be dangerous, would not be held indefinitely as a...