State v. Williams
Decision Date | 06 May 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0358,2 CA-CR 2014-0358 |
Parties | THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. ROOSEVELT ARTHUR WILLIAMS, Appellant. |
Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.
Appeal from the superior Court in Pima County
The Honorable Peter J. Cahill, Judge
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART
Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
Joseph T. Maziarz, Section Chief Counsel, Phoenix
By Tanja K. Kelly, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee
Steven R. Sonenberg, Pima County Public Defender
By Erin K. Sutherland, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant
Presiding Judge Vásquez authored the decision of the Court, in which Chief Judge Eckerstrom and Judge Miller concurred.
¶1 Following a jury trial, Roosevelt Williams was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling forty years. On appeal, Williams argues the court erred by denying his motion to suppress statements he made during an interview with law enforcement because his waiver of Miranda1 rights was ineffective and his statements were involuntary. He also argues the court erred by allowing the state to introduce evidence of a text message because it could not be authenticated, other-act evidence regarding his motive for the murders, and an inflammatory crime-scene photograph of one of the victims. And, Williams argues the court erred by entering a criminal restitution order (CRO) that included fines, fees, and assessments. For the following reasons, we vacate a portion of the CRO but otherwise affirm Williams's convictions and sentences.
¶2 We view the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to upholding Williams's convictions. See State v. Almaguer, 232 Ariz. 190, ¶ 2, 303 P.3d 84, 86 (App. 2013). In September 2010, Williams moved into R.D. and J.P.'s trailer as a caregiver for R.D. G.T., who lived in a van on the property, visited the trailer occasionally to use the restroom and the computer. On October 4, G.T. noticed he had not seen R.D. and J.P. for a day. Later that week, Williams said R.D. and J.P. "were moving to Washington or looking for houses up there," but G.T. thought that was unusual, "[b]ased on what [he] knew about them."
Throughout that week, G.T. noticed "the air conditioning was turned up really high," there was "a weird smell inside the [trailer]," and Williams had "sprayed disinfectant . . . , or air freshener, to cover up the smell."
¶3 On October 10, while Williams was away, G.T. entered the trailer and found R.D. and J.P. dead in J.P.'s room. Deputies with the Pima County Sheriff's Department subsequently arrived at the trailer, found Williams outside, and placed him in custody. Autopsies of the victims established they both had suffered more than a "dozen sharp-force injuries that involved the head, the neck, and the arms" and died as early as October 6. During the investigation, deputies collected evidence showing Williams had withdrawn or spent all the money in the victims' joint bank account, a television was missing from the living room, and Williams recently had sold several DVDs at a pawn shop. They also found the victims' cell phones under Williams's mattress.
¶4 A grand jury indicted Williams for two counts of first-degree murder.2 Before trial, Williams moved to suppress his statements made during an interview with Detective Martin Rosalik. Williams noted that, at the start of the interview, Rosalik had stated, "You're not being detained" and "[i]f you . . . want to go anytime that you want, just let me know and I'll drive you back." Williams argued this statement rendered his waiver of Miranda rights ineffective and his subsequent statements involuntary. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion.
¶5 Before trial, Williams also moved to preclude crime-scene photographs of the victims and a text message sent from one victim's cell phone. First, he argued that photographs of the victims should be precluded as unduly inflammatory. The trial court deniedthis motion, finding they had "sufficient probative value . . . that's not outweighed by their gruesome, unfortunate, depictions." Second, Williams filed a motion to preclude evidence of a text message found on J.P.'s cell phone. That message, sent on October 7, stated, "[C]an[]not call we are roaming please stop by house let the boys know we might be back late sunday to fill[] them in looks like we are moving out of state phs will be off." Williams anticipated that the state would "try to introduce this text message [to] argue that [he] sent it to cover up for the unexplained absence of [J.P.] and [R.D.]" But, he argued, the text message lacked proper authentication because the state could not show he had authored it. The court deferred ruling on this motion, suggesting instead that the parties "readdress this issue" at trial.
¶6 The jury found Williams guilty of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder on both counts, and the trial court sentenced him as described above. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).
¶7 Williams argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements made during the interview with the detective. He maintains Rosalik's statement about Williams being able to leave at any time distorted Williams's understanding of his rights and amounted to a coercive promise. We review the court's ruling for an abuse of discretion. State v. Naranjo, 234 Ariz. 233, ¶ 4, 321 P.3d 398, 403 (2014); State v. Boggs, 218 Ariz. 325, ¶ 43, 185 P.3d 111, 121 (2008). In doing so, we consider only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and view it in the light most favorable to upholding the court's ruling. State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, ¶ 25, 140 P.3d 899, 909 (2006).
¶8 The following evidence was presented at the suppression hearing: Rosalik arrived at the trailer and found Williams handcuffed in the back of a deputy's patrol vehicle. Rosalik told Williams, "[W]e're conducting an investigation here," and asked if he would "be willing to . . . come down to [the] station and talk." Williams agreed. After placing Williams in an interviewroom, Rosalik removed the handcuffs, and the following exchange occurred:
The interview continued uninterrupted for approximately forty-eight minutes, during which time Williams denied there was "anything strange going . . . on around the house . . . within the last couple of days" and claimed J.P. and R.D. had been traveling. Rosalik then left the interview room for over an hour, and, when he returned, his questions became more accusatory. Williams invoked his right to counsel four minutes later. Williams later told another detective that Rosalik had
¶9 In his motion to suppress, Williams argued Rosalik's statement—that he was "not being detained" and could "go anytime that [he] want[ed]"—induced him to speak and "undercut the purpose of the Miranda warnings." He asserted that the "promise" from Rosalik "implie[d] that it doesn't matter what you say . . . we'll take the cuffs off and you can go home at any time." The trial court denied the motion, finding Williams "knew he was being questioned about the alleged victims and his relationship to them and knew that he did not have to answer questions or say anything" and Rosalik's statement was "not a promise of a benefit that was relied upon in making a confession." Accordingly, the court allowed the state to play a video of the interview at trial.
¶10 Williams raises the same arguments on appeal. We consider first the argument that his waiver "was neither knowing nor intelligent" because Rosalik's "statements made immediately prior to the reading of [his] rights minimized the gravity of his situation." "If the accused has been given his Miranda warnings and makes a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of those rights, . . . statements [made to police officers] are admissible." State v. Smith, 193 Ariz. 452, ¶ 29, 974 P.2d 431, 438 (1999). The defendant must have "'a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.'" In re Andre M., 207 Ariz. 482, ¶ 7, 88 P.3d 552, 554 (2004), quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). In determining whether a valid waiver occurred, a trial court must "focus on the particular facts and circumstances of a case, 'including the defendant's background, experience and conduct.'" State v. Rivera, 152 Ariz. 507, 513, 733 P.2d1090, 1096 (1987), quoting State v. Montes, 136 Ariz. 491, 495, 667 P.2d 191, 195 (19...
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