State v. Williams, 11692

• Decision Date: 01 January 1985
• Docket Number: No. 11692,11692
• Citation: 195 Conn. 1,485 A.2d 570
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Stanley WILLIAMS.

Page 570

485 A.2d 570

195 Conn. 1

STATE of Connecticut v. Stanley WILLIAMS.

No. 11692.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 5, 1984.

Decided Jan. 1, 1985.

Suzanne Zitser, Asst. Public Defender, with whom, on the brief, was Joette Katz, Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Justin Sullivan, law student intern, with whom was Donald B. Caldwell, State's Atty., Rockville, for appellee (State).

Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, PARSKEY, SHEA and SANTANIELLO, JJ.

ARTHUR H. HEALEY, Associate Justice.

After a jury trial, the defendant, Stanley Williams, was convicted of possession of a weapon inside a state correctional institution in violation of General Statutes § 53a-174a. ¹ This conviction stemmed from an incident in the Connecticut Correctional Institution at Somers. A correctional officer, while searching the defendant following a disturbance, found a shank (a steel rod sharpened to a point attached to a wooden handle) concealed under the defendant's left pant leg stuck into his sock. On appeal, the defendant presses two claims of error: First, he claims that his right to a fair and impartial trial was denied as a result of the court's refusal to remove shackles from his legs before jury selection commenced; and second, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to strike from the record remarks made in closing argument by the state's attorney concerning the defendant's failure to call certain inmates to testify. We find no error.

I

We first examine the defendant's claim that the trial court erred in refusing to order the removal of restraints from his legs prior to the selection of jurors. In essence, the defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ruling, both before and during the jury selection proceedings, that the defendant would remain in leg shackles, thereby denying his right to a fair and impartial trial. We disagree.

Our review of the record discloses that the following occurred: On July 21, 1982, the day jury selection began, the defendant, who was an inmate at the Connecticut Correctional Institution at Somers, was brought into the courtroom with his legs restrained by shackles. The defendant's trial counsel requested the court to remove the restraints prior to the entrance of the jury panel into the courtroom. The defense counsel asserted that he did not perceive "any escape risk" if the defendant were unshackled. The court noted that the defendant would enter the courtroom prior to the jury panel. Also, the trial court inquired about the need for restraints from the two correctional officers who had transported him from the prison in Somers to the courthouse. One officer indicated that he knew nothing of the defendant's past record, that he had never met him prior to that day and that he "couldn't honestly say" anything about leg irons in the courtroom. The other officer simply said: "I have no idea." ² The trial court then observed that the jurors would not see the restraints because "the Court has gone to some expense and effort in order to prevent the jurors from noticing that [restraint] with a specially constructed panel under that table" where the defendant and his counsel would be seated in the courtroom. Thereafter, the trial court, in response to the defense counsel's statement that the defendant would be testifying at trial, offered assurances that the jurors would then be excused so that the restraints could be removed out of their presence, and the defendant would be unrestrained physically while on the stand. Assessing the situation, the trial court, at that point, denied the defendant's request to remove the restraints. At the defendant's request, the trial court allowed prospective jurors to enter only the forward end of the jury box in order to minimize any likelihood that jurors would observe the restraints. After the voir dire had been underway for almost two hours, the defendant refused to participate further in the proceedings and, out of the presence of the jury panel, voluntarily absented himself from the courtroom when the trial court denied his renewed request to have the restraints removed. ³ Shortly after the defendant left the courtroom, one of the two correctional officers informed the court that: "He [the defendant] made a statement downstairs [that] he is not coming back to court tomorrow unless we have to fight to bring him back." The defendant thus was not present in the courtroom for about the last forty minutes of the July 21 voir dire, informing the court that the reasons for his absence were the leg restraints and sorrow over his brother's recent death.

The next day, the defendant appeared in court for the remainder of the jury selection. The trial court again denied the defendant's request to remove his restraints, this time for two additional reasons: First, the defendant appeared to the court to be "doing his utmost to avoid having a trial"; and second, the sheriff in charge of courtroom security had stated that the defendant presented a risk, and therefore preferred that his legs remain shackled. Later that day and prior to the start of evidence, the trial court ordered removal of the restraints in recognition of the defendant's improved in-court demeanor and conduct during the latter part of jury selection. The defendant was tried before the jury, therefore, free of any physical restraints whatsoever. We note also that the defendant, having signed a written waiver when offered civilian clothes for his court appearance, chose to appear in court wearing his khaki prison uniform. ⁴

As a general proposition, a criminal defendant has the right to appear in court free from physical restraints. Woodards v. Cardwell, 430 F.2d 978, 982 (6th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911, 91 S.Ct. 874, 27 L.Ed.2d 809 (1971); Corey v. State, 126 Conn. 41, 42, 9 A.2d 283 (1939); People v. Duran, 16 Cal.3d 282, 288-89, 290-91, 545 P.2d 1322, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618 (1976); Commonwealth v. Brown, 364 Mass. 471, 475, 305 N.E.2d 830 (1973); Rush v. State, 301 So.2d 297, 300 (Miss.1974); State v. Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 365-66, 226 S.E.2d 353 (1976); Commonwealth v. Davis, 466 Pa. 102, 116, 351 A.2d 642 (1976); see also Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344, 90 S.Ct 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353, reh. denied, 398 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 1684, 26 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970). Grounded in the common law, ⁵ this right evolved in order to preserve the presumption favoring a criminal defendant's innocence, while eliminating any detrimental effects to the defendant that could result if he were physically restrained in the courtroom. Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 105-106 (6th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959, 94 S.Ct. 1976, 40 L.Ed.2d 310 (1974); Clark v. State, 280 Ala. 493, 496, 195 So.2d 786, appeal dismissed, 387 U.S. 571, 87 S.Ct. 2071, 18 L.Ed.2d 967 (1967); Commonwealth v. Brown, supra, 364 Mass. 475, 305 N.E.2d 830; see also annot., 90 A.L.R.3d 17, 33-36 (1979).

We nevertheless recognize that the trial judge "has a duty to do what may be necessary to prevent escape, to minimize danger of harm to those attending trial as well as to the general public, and to maintain decent order in the court room." Commonwealth v. Brown, supra, 364 Mass. 475, 305 N.E.2d 830. We have said that reasonable physical restraints may not violate the rights of the criminal defendant "if there is a reasonable ground to anticipate that otherwise he may do violence or escape." Corey v. State, supra, 126 Conn. 42-43, 9 A.2d 283. When a "reasonable necessity" exists, the trial court may employ reasonable means of restraint upon a criminal defendant. Id.; Practice Book § 892; ⁶ see Illinois v. Allen, supra, 397 U.S. at 350, 90 S.Ct. at 1064 (Brennan, J., concurring) (the federal constitution neither requires nor prohibits the use of restraints upon "a defendant bent on disrupting his trial"). Indeed, the use of physical restraints has been upheld to maintain courtroom security, even in the absence of disruptive conduct, when the trial court deemed it necessary to do so. See, e.g., Loux v. United States, 389 F.2d 911, 919-20 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 867, 89 S.Ct. 151, 21 L.Ed.2d 135 (1968). The use of shackles does, in a given case, protect an important state interest such as safety in the courtroom. Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206, 209 (5th Cir.1974), rev'd on other grounds, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126, reh. denied, 426 U.S. 954, 96 S.Ct. 3182, 49 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1976); see State v. Gilbert, 121 N.H. 305, 310, 429 A.2d 323 (1981). The trial court thus is charged with maintaining the proper balance of the rights of a criminal defendant to appear in court free of restraint with the need in certain instances for precautionary security measures. When either ordering the use of restraints or refusing to remove them, the trial court must ensure that the reason for their employment is detailed in the record. Practice Book § 892; Kennedy v. Cardwell, supra, 107; People v. Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d 291, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322; Commonwealth v. Brown, supra, 364 Mass. 479, 305 N.E.2d 830; Flowers v. State, 43 Wis.2d 352, 363, 168 N.W.2d 843 (1969). An adequate record demonstrating the necessity for the use of the restraints imposed is essential to meaningful appellate review of claims such as are made here. In this case, we find the record adequate for review.

The standard under which we review this claim made by the defendant is whether the trial court abused its sound discretion in refusing to order the restraints removed during the selection of the jury. "[S]ound discretion has long meant a discretion that is not exercised arbitrarily or wilfully, but with regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law, and directed by the reason and conscience of the judge to a just result.... And this requires a knowledge and understanding of the material circumstances surrounding the matter calling for the...