State v. Williams
| Decision Date | 01 November 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 2001-KA-1650.,2001-KA-1650. |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana, v. Corey D. WILLIAMS. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
G. Benjamin Cohen, R. Neal Walker, New Orleans, for Applicant.
Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General, Paul Carmouche, District Attorney, Edwin L. Blewer, III, Catherine M. Estopinal, Hugo A. Holland, Jr., Shreveport, for Respondent.
Gabriella Celest, for Juveile Justice Project of LA (Amicus Curiae).
James B. Gardner, Shreveport, for Arc of Louisiana (Amicus Curiae).
Mark D. MacNamara, New Orleans, Counsel for American Association of Mental Retardation.
In addition to issues customarily addressed in death penalty cases, this case1 represents the first time this court must address issues arising from Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), a decision of the United States Supreme Court which prohibited the execution of mentally retarded persons.2 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the defendant's conviction, pretermit consideration of the penalty phase of defendant's trial, and remand for an evidentiary hearing regarding the determination of whether the defendant is mentally retarded. If the defendant is determined not to be mentally retarded, we maintain jurisdiction to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed in this case. See LSA C.Cr.P. art. 905.9 and La. Sup.Ct. R. 28.3
On February 11, 1998, a Caddo Parish grand jury indicted defendant, Corey D. Williams, for the January 4, 1998 first degree murder of Jarvis Griffin. On September 4, 1998, the State filed an amended indictment: (1) correcting the spelling of the name of the defendant;4 and (2) charging with specificity that the first degree murder was based on LSA-R.S. 14:30(A)(1) and occurred while defendant, as a principal with Gabriel Logan, was "engaged in the perpetration and attempted perpetration of the armed robbery, first degree robbery, and simple robbery" of the victim. On February 12, 1998, defendant entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, the State and the defense filed reciprocal discovery motions. On March 23, 27, and 29, 2000, the court conducted a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress his custodial statements, which the court denied. On August 29, 2000, the defense moved to re-open the suppression hearing based on the voluntariness of defendant's confession. The defense argued that subsequent to the court's original ruling, the defense had defendant's intelligence tested by psychologist Dr. Mark Vigen; the test reflected an intelligence quotient (IQ) of 68, indicating a diminished capacity which prevented defendant's waiver of his legal rights from being freely and knowingly given. The State did not object to reopening the rehearing on the motion to suppress to allow the defense the opportunity to introduce the reports concerning the testing. At an October 6, 2000 hearing, the court again denied the motion to suppress.
Defendant's trial commenced on October 23, 2000.5 On October 27, 2000, the Caddo Parish jury returned the verdict of guilty as charged.6 At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury returned the sentence of death after finding the occurrence of the one aggravating circumstance urged by the State, namely, that the offender was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an armed robbery. See LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.4(A)(1). Defense counsel filed motions for a new trial as to both the guilt and penalty phases, and a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. On November 20, 2000, the court denied these motions and imposed the sentence of death in accordance with the jury's verdict. Defendant now appeals his conviction and death sentence on the basis of 17 assignments of error.7
On the night of January 4, 1998, 16-year-old defendant, Corey Williams, and his friend, Chris Moore, were walking in the Queensborough area of Shreveport, Louisiana. When they arrived at 2219 Virginia Street, they noticed that a pizza delivery man was at the home of their friend, Renee Iverson. A group of young people had gathered at Iverson's home, and more arrived in anticipation of sharing in the pizza. Present were Iverson's boyfriend, Nathan Logan; his 16-year-old brother, Gabriel Logan; Trimeka Mack; Derrick White; Walter Shaw; and an individual Iverson knew only as "P."
At the front porch of her house, Iverson paid the delivery man, 23-year-old Jarvis Griffin. She noticed Gabriel Logan, who had exited the house, meet Williams in her front yard. She watched as Gabriel Logan reached under his shirt and passed a gun to Williams. Iverson then reentered her house with the pizzas, and Griffin returned to his car.
Moore, who had approached Iverson's house with Williams, also saw Gabriel Logan hand something to Williams. As Griffin was pulling away in his car, Williams raised a gun, approached the driver's side of the vehicle, and fired several shots. Williams then ran from the scene with the weapon.
After hearing the shots, Iverson and her friends exited the house in time to see Griffin's vehicle roll down the street and veer into the porch at 2603 Darien Street. When the vehicle came to a stop, Gabriel Logan ran to it, pulled the apparently lifeless driver from the car, and began rifling through his pockets. The bystanders watched as Gabriel Logan entered the vehicle and took a green bank bag and a pizza before fleeing the scene with Moore.
The police arrived on the scene. Despite their efforts to save Griffin, he died from internal hemorrhage.8 The police began interviewing the witnesses, most of whom had been either inside or outside of Iverson's home.
Meanwhile, Nathan Logan, who had also left the scene, encountered Gabriel Logan and Moore in an alley as they were dividing the money from the green bag.9 The Logans parted company with Moore, and Nathan Logan took his brother home. He later told detectives that as soon as he and his brother, along with another friend, Patrick Anthony, arrived at their home, Williams telephoned Gabriel Logan and told him that the gun was in the barbecue pit outside his mother's house.
The Logans and Anthony10 retrieved the gun; they cleaned it, placed it inside a bag, and hid the bag near their apartment complex. They disposed of the pizza box and the green bank bag in a nearby dumpster. Nathan Logan later escorted police to retrieve these pieces of evidence.
Firearms identification experts tested the .25 caliber semi-automatic handgun and determined that the bullets retrieved from Griffin's body and car had been fired by that weapon. Nathan Logan's fingerprints were found on the empty clip of the weapon.
As a result of the witnesses' statements, the police arrested Williams and Gabriel Logan within hours of the shooting. The detectives advised defendant of his rights in the presence of his mother, Dorothy Williams, and defendant gave a recorded statement in which he claimed that Gabriel Logan shot the victim. Defendant's first statement was taken at approximately 5:47 a.m. on January 5, 1998. Ms. Williams returned home.
In a separate room, Gabriel Logan was advised of his rights, and he refused to give a statement to the police. During the time the officers were completing defendant's arrest paperwork, defendant told Det. Gryder that he wanted to tell them what really happened. After defendant re-initiated the interview, the police returned Ms. Williams to the station.
The officers reminded defendant that he had already been advised of his rights, and they proceeded to take the second statement at 8:30 a.m. In the presence of his mother, defendant confessed to shooting the victim, providing the following details. Defendant admitted that he and Gabriel Logan decided to "get a lick," meaning that they wanted to rob the pizza delivery man. With gun in hand, defendant approached Griffin and said, "[G]ive me the money." When Griffin turned sideways, apparently reaching for the money, defendant believed he may have been about to pull a gun, so he shot him. Defendant stated that afterwards, he ran home and hid the gun in the barbecue pit on the porch.
At trial, the jury heard defendant's two statements. Defendant did not testify at either the guilt or penalty phases of his trial.
Defendant claims the trial court precluded him from introducing at trial evidence that he had requested an attorney before custodial questioning and that the request was denied.
A review of the record of the hearing on the motion to suppress provides background for this issue. Defendant testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress held on March 27, 2000. On direct, defendant acknowledged that the officers read him his rights before he gave his first statement, that he and his mother were given an opportunity to discuss those rights privately, and that he understood those rights. However, defendant indicated he "asked for a lawyer, but they told me that I couldn't have one because it was too early in the morning." Defendant indicated that he went ahead and made the first statement to police. On cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited from defendant that he requested counsel prior to the first statement, but he did not mention he was denied counsel on the first recording. Defendant also testified only he and two detectives were present when he asked for counsel.
The March 27, 2000 hearing was recessed because the defense wanted to call defendant's mother, who had been in court earlier, but had since disappeared. Two days later, the court resumed the motion hearing. Ms. Williams's rendition of the scenario surrounding the request for a lawyer was markedly different from that of her son. Ms. Williams repeatedly said the request for counsel came before the second statement, not the first statement; she told the judge that she was definitely present when her son asked for a lawyer, and the two detectives were also present. She stated she...
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