State v. Williams, 96-1586-CR
| Citation | 568 N.W.2d 784,212 Wis.2d 241 |
| Decision Date | 18 June 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-1586-CR,96-1586-CR |
| Parties | NOTICE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION. RULE 809.23(3), RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROVIDE THAT UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS ARE OF NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT IN LIMITED INSTANCES. STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Wisconsin |
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for Kenosha County: DAVID M. BASTIANELLI, Judge. Affirmed.
Before BROWN, NETTESHEIM and ANDERSON, JJ.
John Williams appeals from a judgment convicting him of one count of armed robbery in violation of § 943.32(1)(b) and (2), STATS., and one count of armed burglary in violation of § 943.10(1)(a) and (2)(a), STATS. 1 Both convictions were as a repeater pursuant to § 939.62(1)(c), STATS. Williams has also appealed from an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. We affirm the judgment and the order.
Williams raises numerous arguments which we will address seriatim. His first argument challenges the admission of evidence that he was on probation at the time of the current offenses. He contends that the prejudicial nature of the evidence outweighed any probative value it had.
A trial court has broad discretion in determining the relevance and admissibility of proffered evidence. See State v. Brecht, 143 Wis.2d 297, 320, 421 N.W.2d 96, 105 (1988). Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact which is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. See § 904.01, STATS. However, even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See § 904.03, STATS. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has a tendency to influence the outcome of the proceeding by improper means. See State v. Bedker, 149 Wis.2d 257, 266-67, 440 N.W.2d 802, 805 (Ct.App.1989). We will not find an erroneous exercise of discretion in the admission of evidence if any reasonable basis exists for the trial court's decision. See State v. Lindh, 161 Wis.2d 324, 361 n. 14, 468 N.W.2d 168, 181 (1991). 2
The complaint against Williams alleged that on July 2, 1994, he placed a knife to the back of Olga Raglin, forced his way into her apartment and took money from her purse. At trial, Raglin testified that she had almost $10,000 in her purse, which she was saving for her daughter Evelyn. Wilson admitted to the police and in his testimony at trial that he obtained money from Raglin, but claimed that it was $700 and that it was given to him by Raglin as a loan.
At trial, the State presented evidence from a probation agent who testified that Williams was under her supervision in July 1994. She further testified that she attempted to contact Williams after being alerted by the police that he was a suspect in a robbery, but found that he was no longer living at his last known address. The agent testified that because leaving without notifying his agent was a violation of Williams' probation, she issued the equivalent of a warrant for his arrest. Other evidence indicated that Williams left Kenosha the day after the reported robbery of Raglin, going to a hotel in Milwaukee where he was subsequently arrested.
The trial court properly determined that evidence concerning Williams' probation status was relevant. Evidence of a defendant's flight is admissible as an indicia of consciousness of guilt, and therefore of guilt itself. See State v. Winston, 120 Wis.2d 500, 505, 355 N.W.2d 553, 556 (Ct.App.1984). In this case, evidence that Williams fled Kenosha the day after the robbery supported an inference that he stole Raglin's money, rather than receiving it as a loan. See State v. Selders, 163 Wis.2d 607, 621, 472 N.W.2d 526, 531 (Ct.App.1991). This inference was strengthened by the evidence that he was on probation, indicating that he feared the consequences of remaining in Kenosha more than he feared the consequences of violating his probation by leaving without notifying his agent. In addition, it supported an inference that he did not want his probation agent to know where he was because if she knew then the police would also be able to find him.
Because the evidence regarding Williams' probationary status was material to determining whether he took money from Raglin with the motive and intent to steal it, or whether it was given freely to him as he contended, the trial court properly found it to be relevant. See State v. Ingram, 204 Wis.2d 177, 183, 554 N.W.2d 833, 835-36 (Ct.App.1996). This is true regardless of whether the evidence is reviewed under general relevancy standards or whether it is viewed as other acts evidence subject to § 904.04(2), STATS. See Ingram, 204 Wis.2d at 189, 554 N.W.2d at 838. In addition, the trial court properly determined that the relevancy of the evidence outweighed any prejudice arising from it, particularly since other properly admitted evidence indicated that Williams had five prior convictions. In light of that evidence, any prejudice arising from evidence that Williams was on probation at the time of these crimes must be deemed negligible. 3 Moreover, any prejudice was further reduced or eliminated by the cautionary instruction given by the trial court indicating that the jury could consider evidence that Williams had committed previous crimes only to assess his credibility and could not use his prior convictions as proof that he was guilty of the charged offenses. See State v. Parr, 182 Wis.2d 349, 361, 513 N.W.2d 647, 650 (Ct.App.1994).
Williams also objects to the admission of evidence that he had a drug habit and debts related to it, and that he was in jail when he made incriminating statements to another inmate concerning the robbery of Raglin. However, evidence that he told both another inmate and the police that he had a $300-per-day drug habit which he partially financed on credit was relevant to establish his motive to rob Raglin. See State v. Johnson, 184 Wis.2d 324, 338, 516 N.W.2d 463, 467 (Ct.App.1994); see also Brecht, 143 Wis.2d at 320, 421 N.W.2d at 105. In this case, evidence that Williams had an expensive drug habit and debts arising from it was relevant not only to prove that he had a motive to rob Raglin, but also to disprove his contention that he only borrowed money from her. A jury could reasonably infer that a person who consumed $300 per day in drugs would want more than $700 to supply his habit and repay past debts. The trial court therefore reasonably determined that the evidence was relevant and that its relevance outweighed any prejudice arising from it. Moreover, the trial court expressly instructed the jury that it could consider the evidence of Williams' need for drug money only on the issue of motive and could not use it to conclude that he had a bad character and was acting in conformity with that character by committing the charged crimes. This instruction presumptively removed any prejudice arising from admission of the evidence. See State v. Shillcutt, 116 Wis.2d 227, 238, 341 N.W.2d 716, 721 (Ct.App.1983), aff'd, 119 Wis.2d 788, 350 N.W.2d 686 (1984).
We also find no error in the admission of James Lowery's testimony that he and Williams were in the county jail when Williams told him about his drug habit and debts and admitted robbing Raglin. Lowery testified that he was a jailhouse lawyer and that Williams sought to talk to him about his case. The information concerning Williams' inmate status thus was relevant to establish the context in which his admissions were made, providing an explanation for why Williams would make damaging admissions to someone he barely knew. See id. at 236, 341 N.W.2d at 720. Moreover, as with the information regarding Williams' probationary status, the information that he spoke to Lowery in jail was of little prejudice in light of the properly admitted evidence that he had five prior convictions. Similarly, any prejudice was presumptively eliminated by the trial court's instruction that Williams' prior convictions could be considered only in assessing his credibility and not as a basis for inferring that he had a bad character and was acting in conformity therewith.
Williams next contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance to him and that the trial court improperly refused to grant him an evidentiary hearing on this issue. We disagree.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance, an appellant must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that it prejudiced the defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To prove deficient performance, an appellant must show that his counsel made errors so serious that he or she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. See id. Review of counsel's performance gives great deference to the attorney and every effort is made to avoid determinations of ineffectiveness based on hindsight. See State v. Johnson, 153 Wis.2d 121, 127, 449 N.W.2d 845, 847 (1990).
Even if deficient performance is found, a judgment will not be reversed unless the appellant proves that the deficiency prejudiced his or her defense. See id. at 127, 449 N.W.2d at 848. We need not address the deficiency prong of the test if prejudice is not shown. See id. at 128, 449 N.W.2d at 848. Moreover, a trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, may deny a postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance without holding a hearing if the defendant fails to allege sufficient facts in his or her motion to raise a question of fact or presents only conclusory allegations, or if the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief. See State v. Bentley, 201 Wis.2d 303, 309-10, 548 N.W.2d 50, 53 (1996); State v. Washington, 176 Wis.2d 205, 214-15, 500 N.W.2d 331, 335-36 (Ct.App.1993).
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