State v. Williams

Decision Date14 June 1975
Docket NumberNo. 47673,47673
PartiesSTATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Val Gene WILLIAMS and Jackie B. Reynolds, Appellants.
CourtKansas Supreme Court
Syllabus by the Court

1. Whether or not the endorsement of an additional witness will be allowed during the course of a trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court. The test for abuse of that discretion is whether or not the rights of the defendant were prejudiced by the endorsement.

2. It is better practice to offer an exhibit or group of related exhibits into evidence as soon as a sufficient foundation has been laid rather than wait until the close of the case and offer all exhibits en masse.

3. Where a party has the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses in reference to all exhibits as they are identified no error occurs when the exhibits are formally offered and received into evidence en masse at the conclusion of the offering party's case in chief.

4. Under K.S.A. 22-3202(3), where two or more defendants have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting the crime or crimes with which they are charged, it is not necessary that all defendants be charged in each count for the joinder of counts to be proper.

5. Under K.S.A. 22-3204, when two or more defendants are jointly charged with any crime the granting of a separate trial for any one defendant lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.

6. A person is responsible for the conduct of another when, either before or during the commission of a crime, and with the intent to promote or assist in the commission of the crime, he intentionally aids or advises the other to commit the crime. All participants in a crime are equally guilty, without regard to the extent of their participation.

7. Generally an error in the admission of evidence is cured by a prompt withdrawal and an admonition by the court to the jury to disregard it. In the absence of evidence to the contrary this court will assume that the jury followed the lower court's admonition.

8. Where no statement of the defendant was admitted into evidence during the trial whether or not proper constitutional warnings were given the defendant at the time of his arrest is immaterial.

9. Where two defendants were convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery as being two of the three participants in the crime it is held: there was no error by the trial court in (1) permitting the endorsement of a witness at the close of the state's case in chief, (2) permitting the state to introduce its exhibits into evidence en masse at the close of its case in chief, (3) denying one defendant's motion for a separate trial, (4) denying one defendant's motion for discharge at the close of state's evidence, (5) its instruction relating to the responsibility of a person for the conduct of another during the commission of a crime, or (6) refusing to grant a new trial.

Al Hybsha, Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant, Val Gene Williams.

Michael B. Roach, of Boyer, Donaldson & Stewart, Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant, Jackie B. Reynolds.

Stephen M. Joseph, Asst. Dist. Atty., argued the cause, and Curt T. Schneider, Atty. Gen., and Keith Sanborn, Dist. Atty., were with him on the briefs for appellee.

FOTH, Commissioner.

At approximately 5:15 p. m. on October 10, 1973, the Wichita City Teachers Credit Union was robbed at gunpoint of approximately $500. In a joint jury trial defendants Jackie B. Reynolds and Val Gene Williams were both convicted of aggravated robbery as being two of the three participants in the crime. Reynolds was also convicted of the possession of a pistol after a prior felony conviction. Both defendants appeal, claiming procedural errors.

Defendant Williams makes six separate claims of error, defendant Reynolds only two. The two claims common to both defendants will be dealt with first.

Just before it rested the state was granted permission to endorse the name of a police officer as an additional witness. The officer testified that the guns recovered when the defendants were arrested were loaded with live ammunition and capable of being fired. The prosecutor had expected another officer to be able to supply testimony.

Under K.S.A. 22-3201(6) the trial court is to exercise its discretion as to whether it will allow the endorsement of additional witnesses during trial, and its ruling will not be disturbed unless abuse of that discretion is shown. The test is whether or not the defendant's rights have been unfairly prejudiced. State v. Smith, 215 Kan. 34, 523 P.2d 691; State v. Stafford, 213 Kan. 152, 515 P.2d 769.

The objection by the defendants at trial was that the testimony was irrelevant. On appeal their contentions lean more to the claim that it is of an inflammatory nature and unduly influenced the jury. At neither stage is there a claim that defendants were surprised by the testimony, or that their trial strategy would have been any different had they been given fair warning that this particular witness was going to testify. His testimony added little, if anything, to the state's case. There was no prejudice, and no abuse of discretion.

The second claim defendants have in common is that the state formally offered its seventeen exhibits into evidence, en masse, at the conclusion of its case in chief. Each had been identified at some point earlier in the trial. The defendants assert that this bulk offer confused the jury and deprived counsel of an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the identifying witnesses. Although the record does not indicate in every instance that the witnesses were in fact cross-examined with particular reference to the exhibits now complained of, a full opportunity for such cross-examination was provided the defendants.

The trial court voiced strong disapproval of the procedure employed by the state, with some justification. We think it better practice for a party to offer an exhibit or a group of related exhibits into evidence as soon as a sufficient foundation has been laid. In this way court and counsel can focus their attention on one piece of evidence at a time. If there are deficiencies in the foundation it may be possible to cure them by a few additional questions to a witness on the stand. On the other hand, if the offer is made at the close of the offering party's case it may be necessary to recall, if possible, one or more witnesses to supply the missing pieces.

But regardless of which procedure may seem preferable as making for a more orderly trial, there was no error here. The controlling factor is that neither defendant now makes any claim that any one of the exhibits was inadmissible.

The remaining four allegations of error are made by defendant Williams alone:

He asserts that it was error for the trial court to deny his motion for a separate trial from Reynolds. Both defendants were charged with aggravated robbery, but an additional charge of unlawfully possessing a pistol was levied against Reynolds. This charge against Reynolds, claims Williams, is totally unrelated to the robbery charge against him and therefore the joinder of the two defendants was improper.

K.S.A. 22-3202(3) states that '(t)wo or more defendants may be charged in the same complaint, information or indictment if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting the crime or crimes. Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count.' (Emphasis added.)

The trial court, in denying Williams' motion for a separate trial stated: '(The) aggravated robbery occurred at the time and place and was committed by Mr. Reynolds and Mr. Williams. Appended to that charge is an allegation that Mr. Reynolds had a revolver. That was part and parcel of the initial crime and as such the cases are proper for joinder.' The trial court's analysis of the issue and finding thereon are eminently correct. The defendants were, as the...

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18 cases
  • State v. Jackson
    • United States
    • Kansas Court of Appeals
    • July 12, 2013
    ...accomplice liability, all persons involved are equally as responsible for all the actions of the others); State v. Williams & Reynolds, 217 Kan. 400, 404, 536 P.2d 1395 (1975) (all participants in crime equally guilty without regard to extent of their participation); State v. Turner, 193 Ka......
  • State v. Jones
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • January 15, 1988
    ...the same manner as if he were a principal. (K.S.A. 21-3205; State v. Jackson, 218 Kan. 491, 543 P.2d 901 [1975]; State v. Williams & Reynolds, 217 Kan. 400, 536 P.2d 1395 [1975]; State v. Ingram, 211 Kan. 587, 506 P.2d 1148 [1973]; State v. Campbell, 210 Kan. 265, 500 P.2d 21 [1972]; State ......
  • State v. Smolin
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • December 11, 1976
    ...in the same manner as if he were a principal. (K.S.A. 21-3205; State v. Jackson, 218 Kan. 491, 543 P.2d 901; State v. Williams & Reynolds, 217 Kan. 400, 536 P.2d 1395; State v. Ingram, 211 Kan. 587, 506 P.2d 1148; State v. Campbell, 210 Kan. 265, 500 P.2d 21; State v. Ogden, 210 Kan. 510, 5......
  • State v. Holloway
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • March 6, 1976
    ...mind, he must grant the motion.' (Syl. 3.) (See also, State v. Rasler, 216 Kan. 582, 583-584, 533 P.2d 1262, and State v. Williams & Reynolds, 217 Kan. 400, 403, 536 P.2d 1395.) After a careful review of the evidence presented by the record herein, we find this point has no The judgment of ......
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